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Bava Basra, 126
BAVA BASRA 126-128 - have been generously dedicated by Dick and Beverly
Horowitz of Los Angeles, California. May they be blessed with a life of joy
and much Nachas from their children and grandchildren.
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1) GIVING AWAY AN INHERITANCE BEFORE ONE RECEIVES IT
OPINIONS: Rav Asi states that in a case in which a Bechor chose to receive
an ordinary share of a field together with his brother, and not a double
portion, he thereby foregoes his rights to the double portion. Rav Papa
maintains that the Bechor has only relinquished his rights to the double
portion of *that* field, but he still receive a double portion of the rest
of the estate. Rav Papi argues and maintains that the Bechor has shown that
he does not want a double portion, and thus he has relinquished his rights
to the double portion of the entire estate. The Gemara explains that the
Machlokes between Rav Papa and Rav Papi is whether or not a Bechor is
considered to have a share in the estate before the estate is divided among
the heirs.
Does this Machlokes apply only to a Bechor, or also to an ordinary son? May
an heir sell or give away his portion of the inherited estate before the
estate is divided?
(a) The RASHBAM maintains that when Rav Papa and Rav Papi argue, they are
arguing only about the extra portion that a Bechor is entitled to receive.
Only this portion can be sold or given away before the estate is divided,
according to Rav Papi who maintains that "Yesh Lo l'Bechor Kodem Yerushah;"
the Bechor owns his portion even before the estate is divided among the
heirs. An ordinary son's portion of the inheritance, though, certainly
cannot be sold before the estate is divided.
(b) TOSFOS (126b, DH Lo Asa) maintains that the opposite is true. The
argument between Rav Papa and Rav Papi is *only* with regard to the special
portion of the Bechor. The portion of an ordinary son certainly may be sold
before the division of the estate according to both Amora'im.
HA'GA'ON RAV NAFTALI TROP (#192) explains that the Rashbam and Tosfos
disagree with regard to the status of the estate before division. The
estate, before division, is called, "Tefusas ha'Bayis." Tosfos maintains
that the Tefusas ha'Bayis is considered to be like property owned by
partners in a partnership; all of the brothers have a share of the estate,
but it has not yet been clarified which heir owns which part of the
property. Since each of the brothers own a share of the estate, he
essentially is a partner in the ownership of the estate with his brothers,
and thus he may sell or give away his own portion, just as a partner may
sell or give away his share of property owned in a partnership.
The Rashbam disagrees and holds that heirs, before the division of the
estate, are *not* comparable to partners. In a normal partnership, each
partner owns only a portion of the property. In the case of Tefusas
ha'Bayis, each heir owns the *entire* estate collectively with the other
heirs. Since he does not own any specific portion by himself, but rather he
owns the entire estate together with the other heirs, he may not sell or
give away his portion. (Y. Marcus)
126b
2) A FIRSTBORN'S RIGHT TO DECLINE THE DOUBLE PORTION WHILE HIS FATHER IS
ALIVE
OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that when one stipulates that "my firstborn son
shall not inherit the double portion," his stipulation is not valid because
it conflicts with the law of the Torah which entitles the Bechor to a double
portion. The Gemara asks that this stipulation is one concerning a monetary
matter, and such a stipulation *is* binding even when it conflicts with the
law of the Torah. The Gemara answers that such a stipulation is binding only
when we can assume that there is consent on the part of all of those who are
affected by the stipulation. In our case, we cannot assume that the Bechor
consents.
This seems to imply that if the Bechor explicitly expressed his consent,
then he would have relinquished his rights to his double portion. Does this
mean that a Bechor can relinquish his right, during his father's lifetime,
to receive the double portion of inheritance after his father dies?
(a) The RASHBAM (DH Hasam Ka Machlah) says that the reason why the father's
statement is not binding in this case is because the silence of the Bechor
is not considered consent; he is being quiet merely in order to avoid
angering his father. He does not have any intention, though, to forego his
double portion. The Rashbam's words imply that if the Bechor explicitly
consents to forego his double portion, then his consent is valid and he does
not receive the double portion.
The OR ZARU'A suggests, in explaining the Rashbam, that the Rashbam
maintains that only a Bechor can forego his double portion, but an ordinary
son cannot forego his portion. This is because the Torah refers to the
Bechor's double portion as a "gift" (see Insights to Bava Basra 124:1).
Since a person is able to decline a gift, the Bechor is able to decline the
double portion. An ordinary heir, though, cannot decline his share, since
doing so would be counter to the Torah's Halachah of Yerushah. (See also
KOVETZ SHI'URIM #403.)
The KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN (278:13) explains that, according to the Rashbam, the
Bechor's right to forego his double portion applies not only when his father
says that he does not want the Bechor to receive the double portion, but
even when the Bechor, on his own initiative, declares that he does not want
the double portion. This is because the mechanism by which the Bechor is
able to forego his double portion is through *Mechilah*; a person can be
Mochel and forego something that he is entitled to receive. The NESIVOS
HA'MISHPAT, on the other hand, explains that the Bechor *cannot* forego his
double portion; the Torah requires that he receive it as an inheritance.
Only when the *father* of the Bechor says that he does not want the Bechor
to receive the double portion, and the Bechor consents, does the Bechor not
receive the double portion. This is because the father has the right to
re-direct the inheritance to any of his heirs. Even though the Torah
prohibits him from re-directing the double portion away from the Bechor,
when the Bechor consents the Torah's prohibition is removed, and the double
portion can then be re-directed by the father. When the father does not
re-direct the double portion, though, and the Bechor declares that he wishes
to forego the double portion, he cannot forego the double portion that the
Torah gives him.
(b) The RASHBA and other Rishonim argue and maintain that a Bechor cannot
forego his right to the double portion while his father is alive. The Torah
gives the property to the Bechor when his father dies, and until that time
there is nothing that the Bechor can do to stop the Torah's law from taking
effect.
(The RAMAH explains that the son's right to receive the inheritance comes at
the moment that he was born. At that moment, he did not renounce that right,
and thus the Torah's law takes effect and he receives the Yerushah and he
cannot decline it.)
The Rashba says that the Gemara, when it says that the Bechor did not
consent, does not mean that if he did consent, his consent would be valid.
Rather, the Gemara means that the Bechor *cannot* consent to forego his
double portion, and even if he does consent, his consent is not valid. This
is also the explanation of the NIMUKEI YOSEF here (see also TOSFOS in
Kesuvos 56b).
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