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1)

(a) The Beraisa states that if Reuven received a different cloak than the one that he gave ...

1. ... to repair, from the tailor - he is permitted to wear it until the owner comes to pick it up.
2. ... to the doorman to hang up at a Beis-Avel or at a wedding - he is forbidden to wear it.

(b) It ought to be forbidden to use the coat in the Reisha no less than in the Seifa - because of the principle 'Sho'el she'Lo mi'Da'as Gazlan Hu'.

(c) Rav asked Rebbi Chiya this Kashya. He replied - that we assume that the owner of the coat that Reuven received asked the tailor to sell the cloak for him, and by mistake, he sold Reuven's cloak, and paid the owner (see Ritva).

(d) This only applies however, if the Uman himself returned the wrong coat, but not if it was his wife of children who returned it. Rav Chiya B'rei de'Rav Nachman qualifies the concession even if the Uman himself was the one who returned it - confining it to where he returned the cloak S'tam; but if he said 'Here's *your* cloak', then it is evident that he erred and Reuven is prohibited to wear it.

(a) Abaye volunteered to show Rava the swindlers of Pumbedisa. When Reuven claimed that he had witnesses that the coat that he saw by him was the one that he had given him to repair, the Uman would counter - that it was not the same coat.

(b) Reuven could not take the coat on the basis of that evidence - because the witnesses only caught a glimpse of a coat that resembled Reuven's, but did not get a chance to look at it properly to ascertain that it really was.

(c) When Reuven asked the Uman to produce the coat for the witnesses to identify - he refused.

(d) Rava justified the Uman's behavior - based on the Beraisa (that we discussed on the previous Daf) which rules against the Uman provided the owner saw (and recognized) the article. Otherwise, he has no claim against him.

(a) Rav Ashi advised Reuven (if he was smart) - to pull the Uman aside and admit that he owes him a large sum of money, which is presumably why he is holding on to the coat, and that if they assessed its value together, it may turn out to be worth more than the debt, in which case, he was willing to pay his debt, and redeem his coat.

(b) According to Rav Acha B'rei de'Rav Ivya, if the Uman was smart - he would decline his offer, on the grounds that the assessors had already assessed it and that, in fact, it was not worth more than the debt.

4)

(a) When we ask on our Mishnah that denies an Aris the right to establish a Chazakah 'Amai, Ad ha'Idna Palga ve'Hashta Kula', we mean to ask - why it is not a Chazakah, seeing as an Aris takes only half the produce, whilst the Aris in our Mishnah, took the entire harvest (which the owner would certainly not have allowed him to do, unless he had actually purchased it).

(b) Rebbi Yochanan answers 'Masnisin be'Arisi Batei Avos'. What distinguishes Arisei Batei Avos from other Arisin - is the fact that they are hired for life (and after their death, the contract extends to their children).

(c) Rebbi Yochanan means - that unlike regular Arisin, who would generally divide the crops with the owner on an annual rote basis, the Arisei Batei Avos and the owner would take two or three years each alternately, thereby making a Chazakah impossible.

(a) If an Aris Batei Avos brought other Arisin down to the field to work there, he establishes a Chazakah - because the owner would not allow him to send other Arisin down to the field in his place without his express permission.

(b) Even this will not constitute a Chazakah however - if he distributed the work among the Arisin with his own participation, because we assume that if the work proves too much for the Aris, the owner authorizes him to get other Arisin to assist him.

(a) Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov (see Tosfos) whether an Aris may testify - whether if someone claimed the field from his employer, he was permitted to testify on his behalf, or whether, since he received fruit from the field, he was prejudiced.

(b) Rav Yosef, who was sitting in front of Rav Nachman, quoted Shmuel, who ruled in the affirmative. The problem with this ruling is - that the Tana of a Beraisa rules 'Eino Me'id'.

(c) Rav Yosef reconciles Shmuel with the Beraisa by establishing the latter when there is fruit in the field, by which he means - that the Aris has not yet taken his portion of the fruit. Consequently, it lies in his interest to ensure that his employer retains ownership of the field. Otherwise, the claimant will take the field, together with the fruit (as is the Din regarding a Nigzal).

(d) Whereas Shmuel speaks when there is no more fruit in the field, because he has already received his portion (Rabeinu Gershom), in which case it makes no difference whether his employer retains the field or loses it. Nor is he prejudiced inasmuch as the owner will probably hire him again next year if the field remains in his possession - because firstly, it is easy to find employment as an Aris, and secondly, there is no guarantee that he will not hire him someone else the following year.

(a) A creditor or the guarantor may testify on behalf of the debtor - provided he has another field from which to claim.

(b) We do not consider the guarantor prejudiced even then, because if the debtor has another field, it will save problems should he have other creditors, who will otherwise take the one field, leaving the guarantor with the obligation of giving the second creditor the other one - because it is too far-fetched (to worry that a. the debtor will not pay his debt on time, and b. that he has other debtors who will claim his field).

(c) The first purchaser may also testify for the second purchaser only if he has another field. This means that if Reuven sold one field to Levi and another, to Yehudah, Levi may testify on behalf of Yehudah (against Shimon's claims) if either Yehudah has another field that he bought from Reuven or if Reuven himself still possesses a field that he did not yet sell (or even if he sold it to Yisachar after selling to Yehudah).

(d) Otherwise Levi is forbidden to testify on his behalf - because he is prejudiced inasmuch as, once Yehudah loses the field that he bought from Reuven, Reuven's creditor will turn to him.

(a) On the other hand, the second purchaser (Yehudah), is permitted to testify on behalf of the first one (Levi), whether he (the first purchaser or the seller) has other fields or not - because either way, the creditor always goes to the second purchaser first.

(b) This too, will be prohibited however - if Reuven sold Levi the field with Achrayus and does have other fields from which he can claim, because then, should Levi lose his field to Reuven's creditor, he will turn to him.

(c) An Areiv Kablan is an Areiv who takes the money from the creditor and hands it to the debtor. As opposed to an ordinary Areiv, from whom the creditor cannot claim as long as the debtor is able to pay, an Areiv Kablan must be prepared to pay should the creditor decide to go to him first (even if the debtor has the money [see Rashash]).

(d) Some say that an Areiv Kablan may testify for the debtor, provided he has another field (just like an ordinary Areiv can). Others forbid it - because the more fields the debtor has, the more chance that the creditor will claim one of them, and leave him alone.

(a) An Areiv who possesses Beinonis (medium-quality fields) might find it worthwhile to testify on behalf of a debtor - who otherwise owns Ziburis, if the field in question is Beinonis (because in doing so, he encourages the creditor to claim from the debtor and not from him).

(b) If a regular Areiv owns Beinonis and the debtor Ziburis (poor-quality fields) - then the creditor has no right to claim from the Areiv, only from the debtor.