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1)

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a woman cannot establish a Chazakah on her husband's property. This is not obvious (since everyone knows that she is simply eating the Mezonos to which she is entitled) - because we are speaking when the husband designated a different field for her Mezonos.

(b) Nevertheless, she cannot establish a Chazakah - because he probably won't mind his wife eating a little extra from his other fields.

(c) We infer, like we did in the previous Sugya, that although there is no Chazakah on her husband's field, if the woman proves that she purchased it, we accept her proof. The problem with this is - why the husband cannot claim that he only went through the motions of selling her the field, in order to get her to reveal money that she had hidden from him.

(d) We establish the inference even according to those who hold that someone who sells a field to his wife is believed to say that he only did so in order to get her to reveal money that she had hidden from him - by establishing the case (not when he sold her the field, but) when he gave her the field as a gift.

(a) Rav Nachman commented to Rav Huna about the wonderful thing they had learned the previous day in the 'T'chum', by which he meant in the Beis-Hamedrash, which used to be outside the town but within T'chum Shabbos, to enable people from the nearby towns to learn there.

(b) When Rav Nachman told Rav Huna that they had learned 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Kansah ... ' (based on the assumption that the husband also wrote his wife a Sh'tar), precluding from the theory that he only intended to induce her to reveal her money, he retorted - that this was obvious, seeing as even without the money, the Sh'tar would acquire anyway.

(c) Rav Huna does not contend with the possibility that the husband deliberately wrote the Sh'tar for fear that, if he would not, his wife would not hand over the money - because it is far-fetched.

(d) Rav Huna bases his ruling (that a Sh'tar Mechirah alone acquires) on the Mishnah in Kidushin, which validates a Kinyan of Karka by means of Kesef, Sh'tar or Chazakah. We refute this proof however, from a statement by Shmuel - who establishes the case of Sh'tar there by a Sh'tar Matanah, but not by a Sh'tar Mechirah.

(a) Rav Hamnuna attempts to corroborate Rav Huna from the Beraisa 'bi'Sh'tar Keitzad'?, which specifically rules that a Sh'tar alone acquires. And Rav Hamnuna himself - establishes this Beraisa by someone who sells a field because of its poor quality.

(b) Otherwise - a Sh'tar Mechirah is not Koneh until the purchaser pays, to conform with Rav Nachman and Shmuel.

(c) Rav Ashi disagrees with Rav Hamnuna, establishing the latter Beraisa by a Sh'tar Matanah, and the Tana states '*Sadi Mechurah Lach*, Sadi Nesunah Lach' (despite the fact that he is talking about a Matanah only) - because he is speaking when the donor wants to give the recipient the rights of a buyer.

(d) By writing in the Sh'tar ...

1. ... 'Sadi Mechurah Lach' - the donor accepts Achrayus on the sale.
2. ... 'Sadi Nesunah Lach' - he precludes the field from Diyna de'Bar Metzra (should one of the neighbors claim that he has first rights).

(a) The Beraisa rules that if someone borrowed from his Eved, whom he subsequently set free, or from his wife, whom he subsequently divorced, he owes them nothing - because he only borrowed the money to induce them to reveal money that they had hidden from him.

(b) We apply this reasoning here - because (based on the principle 'Eved Loveh le'Ish Malveh') 'Anan Sahadi' (we are witnesses) that a person will not go into debt, if there is another way of interpreting his actions.

(c) We do not however, apply it in our case (of Rav Nachman and Rav Huna) where the man sold his wife his field - because there, by selling his field, he is not placing himself into debt ...

(d) ... even if he sold her the field with Achrayus, since, until such time as someone claims the field from her, he does not owe her anything.

5)

(a) Rav Huna bar Avin sent to the Beis-Hamedrash that if someone sells his field to his wife, she acquires it (like Rav Nachman), whilst he eats the Peiros. But, he hastened to add, Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and all the Gedolei ha'Dor disagreed with him, because they held - that (based on the fact that a man loves his wife) he really meant to give her a Matanah, and he only wrote a Lashon of Mecher in order to strengthen her hand (as we explained on the previous Amud).

(b) To reconcile Rav Huna bar Avin with the Beraisa that we just cited 'Lavah min ha'Eved ve'Shichrero ... Ein Lahen Alav K'lum' - we differentiate between a loan and a sale (as we explained there).

(c) Rav makes a distinction between whether one sells his wife a field - in which case he may eat the Peiros, or gives it to her as a gift - in which case he may not (like Rav Huna bar Avin).

(d) Rebbi Elazar holds - that either way, he may not eat the Peiros (like Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and their colleagues).

(a) When Rav Chisda ruled like Rebbi Elazar, Rabana Ukva and Rabana Nechemya - grandsons of Rav, objected.

(b) The gist of their objection was - that Rav Chisda had followed the opinion of Rebbi Elazar, who was not as great as Rav.

(c) Rav Chisda did not reply that he had indeed followed the opinion of great men (i.e. Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and their colleagues) - because they too, like Rebbi Elazar, were disciples of Rebbi Yochanan (rendering them inferior to Rav).

(d) Rav Chisda replied - that he did indeed follow the opinion of a great man, because when Ravin arrived, he quoted Rebbi Yochanan, who ruled like his disciples.

(a) Rava finally rules 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Lo Kansah, ve'ha'Ba'al Ochel Peiros'. When we ask 'Tarti', we mean - that the two statements contradict each other, because 'Lo Kansah' implies neither the field nor the Peiros, so how can he then say that the husband eats the fruits.

(b) We explain the discrepancy in Rava's ruling, by establishing the first statement when the woman did not hide money, and the second statement when she did (in which case the husband only sold her the field in order to induce her to reveal it).

(c) Rava in fact, holds like Rav Yehudah, who makes the same distinction. This ruling overturns the entire Sugya - inasmuch as Rav Nachman, Rav Huna, Rav Huna bar Avin and Rav all hold that the sale is valid and that we do not ascribe any other motive to the transaction. Nor did the Amora'im who disagree with them dispute this point.

(a) The Beraisa forbids the acceptance of a Pikadon from a woman, an Eved or a Katan - because we are afraid that they may have stolen them (the woman from her husband, the Eved from his master and the Katan from his father or whoever he was living with), and it is forbidden to aid a abet a Ganav.

(b) If one did accept a Pikadon from a woman or an Eved ...

1. ... assuming that they are still alive - one returns it to them.
2. ... assuming that they have died - one returns it to the husband and master respectively.

(c) The Pikadon is returned to the husband - because he is the woman's heir (seeing as a husband inherits his wife).

(a)

1. If the woman was already divorced at the time of her death - the Pikadon must be returned to her heirs (not to her ex-husband).
2. Even if the Eved had been set free before he died - the Pikadon must be returned to his master (and not to his heirs, if he has any, and it is not free to keep, if he does not).

(b) The difference is due to the fact - that we do not establish the woman as a Ganav, like we do the Eved).

(c) Someone who accepted a Pikadon from a Katan - must put it away for the Katan ('make a Segulah', which will be explained shortly).

(d) If the Katan had already died, then he must return it to his heirs (for the same reason as one returns it to the woman's heirs, as we just explained).