ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 65
BAVA BASRA 61-67 - This week's study material has been dedicated by Mrs.
Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving memory of her husband, Reb
Yitzchok Yakov ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Irving Grunberger helped many people
quietly in an unassuming manner and is dearly missed by all who knew him.
His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan.
(a) 'Rav Huna Amar Rav, Halachah ke'Divrei Chachamim. Rebbi Yirmiyah bar
Aba Amar Shmuel - Halachah ke'Divrei Rebbi Akiva'.
(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba said in front of Rav many times 'Halachah
ke'Rebbi Akiva', yet he remained silent - because he (Rebbi Yirmiyah bar
Aba) had switched the opinion of Rebbi Akiva and the Chachamim, quoting
Rebbi Akiva as saying that a seller sells begrudgingly (see Rashash).
(c) Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel rules that if brothers distribute their father's
property, one does not have a path on the other - by which he means that the
brother who receives the inner field does not have right of way through his
brother's field to get to his own (even using the path that his father used
(d) He does not say that the brother who receives the outer field purchased
with an Ayin Ra'ah - because the question whether one sells generously or
begrudgingly is confined to the seller, and has nothing to do with the
(a) When Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel adds that one brother does not have on the
1. ... windows, he means - that the brother who received a house cannot
prevent the one who received the Chatzer from building a wall in the
Chatzer, even though it blocks out the light from his windows of his house.
(b) According to Rav - in all of these cases, the brother does have the
2. ... ladders, he means - that the brother who received an attic does not
have the right to place his ladder in the Chatzer of the brother who
received the house and the Chatzer, in order to climb up to his attic.
3. ... a stream of water, he means - that one brother does not have the
right to carry the water that he draws from the stream through his brother's
field to get to his own.
(c) Ravina suggested that Rav and Shmuel followed their reasoning in the
previous ruling (regarding a sale), and that we would know one ruling from
the other - because brothers dividing their father's property is similar to
(d) Rav Ashi countered that we would not know ...
1. ... Rav's first ruling from the second one - inasmuch as in the latter
case, the brother can claim that he expects to use the property in the same
way as his father did (an argument that will not hold water by an ordinary
2. ... Shmuel's second ruling from the first one - because, by the same
token, in the case of brothers, Shmuel might well concede to Rav that the
brother does reserve the right.
(a) We quote the Pasuk "Tachas Avosecha Yih'yu Banecha" - in support of the
S'vara that we just gave to explain the need to issue both sets of rulings.
(b) When Rav Nachman asked Rav Huna like whom the Halachah was (like Rav
Huna Amar Rav or Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel), he replied - like Rav Nachman
Amar Shmuel, because he was close with the Resh Galusa (he was actually his
son-in-law), and therefore came into contact with many Dayanim (or Dinim -
Rabeinu Chananel), making him Halachah-oriented.
(a) If Reuven who has two fields, gives the outer field as a gift to Shimon,
and the inner one ...
1. ... he sells to Levi - Levi certainly has no right of way through
Shimon's field to get to his, because it is obvious that a gift is given
with more goodwill than something that is sold.
(b) They thought that in a case where Reuven sells the outer field to
Shimon, and gives the inner one to Levi, Levi does not have right of way,
like in the previous cases. The correct ruling however is - that he has.
2. ... he gives to Levi, or he sells them both to the same two people - Levi
does not have right of way through Shimon's field, even according to the
Rabbanan, because it is only with regard to what the seller retains for
himself that they hold that he sells begrudgingly, but not vis-a-vis what he
sells to another purchaser.
(c) This ruling is based on a Mishnah later in the Perek, where the Tana
rules that someone who gives his friend a field as a gift and retains the
water-pit, say for himself - must purchase a path to his water-pit, even
according to the Rabbanan ...
(d) ... because even they agree that when someone gives a gift, he does so
(a) The Mishnah states that someone who sells a room, has automatically sold
the door, the fixed mortar and the wooden frame that surrounds it - but not
the key, the moveable millstone or the millhopper (a large funnel through
which the grain is channeled).
(b) Neither does the purchaser automatically acquire the stove or oven -
because they are moveable. The principle that governs these rulings is -
that whatever is attached to the ground is automatically included in the
sale, whereas whatever is detached is not.
(a) If the seller were to add 'Hu ve'Chal Asher be'Socho' - then the sale
would also incorporate all the Metaltelin listed above, which are generally
designated for that house exclusively, but not other Metaltelin, because we
are assuming that he is not moving far from the Shechunah and still has a
need for them.
(b) The Tana later will differentiate between this case and someone who
sells a Chatzer - whose sale incorporates all Metaltelin, with the exception
of wheat and barley (stocks of food [because he clearly intends to move
further afield, and no longer has any need of his Metaltelin]).
(c) Alternatively, this distinction might even apply in a case where the
seller was moving house to another area - because we could also
differentiate between the vesssels listed in our Mishnah, which one does not
tend to lend due to their heaviness (or in the case of the key, because it
is of no real value anywhere else), and other vessels, which are easily
moveable. And it is the latter which are not included in the sale in our
Mishnah (irrespective of where the seller is moving to), but are included in
the sale of a Chatzer.
(d) Whereas someone who sells a town - sells everything in it, even animals
and Avadim, and certainly wheat and barley (either because of the excessive
trouble in moving them, or because the bigger the sale, the more its
accessories are Bateil to the main object being sold).
(a) We suggest that the author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Meir, who
holds that the accessories of a vineyard are included in the sale of the
vineyard. Rebbi Meir's ruling seemingly clashes with our Mishnah - which
precludes a moveable mortar from the sale of a house, whereas Rebbi Meir
includes moveable items, such as canes to suppport the vines, in the sale of
(b) The problem with establishing our Mishnah not Rebbi Meir is - that it is
a S'tam Mishnah, and we have a principle 'S'tam Mishnah Rebbi Meir'
(although admittedly, there are many exceptions to this).
(c) In order to try and reconcile Rebbi Meir with our Mishnah, we establish
his ruling - by permanent accessories, which are not moved under any
circumstances, whereas the mortar in our Mishnah is not a permanent fixture.
(d) We refute this explanation however, in view of a key, which (although it
is moveable) is a permanent fixture, and which our Tana precludes from the
sale. And we know that a key is a permanent fixture - because the Mishnah
contrasts it with a door, which is definitely a permanent fixture (when it
could have otherwise differentiated between two kinds of keys, one that is
permanent and one that is not).
(a) The Beraisa, listing what is, and what isn't sold together with the
house, adds a Nagar and a Man'ol to the door in our Mishnah (which is not
sold). A 'Nagar' - is fixed to the wall, and a 'Man'ol' - to the door.
(b) A carved mortar is sold with the house, but not one that is fixed. The
former is - actually carved out of a rock which juts out of the wall of the
house, whereas the latter is carved when it is detached and then fixed to
(c) If the seller stipulated 'Hu ve'Chol Asher be'Socho', all of the above
are included. It does not however, include a Bor, Dus or Yatzi'a (refer to
opening Sugya of the Perek) despite the fact that they are attached to the
ground - because they are not built as part of the house.
(a) Rebbi Eliezer states that whatever is fixed to the ground is like the
ground (and is sold with the house).
He disagrees with the Tana Kama - who
makes a distinction between a mortar that was built into the wall and one
that was attached only later. According to him, both are automatically sold
with the house.
(b) The author of our Mishnah (which does not make a distinction between one
mortar and the other, is therefore Rebbi Eliezer.
(a) The problem with a manufactured pipe that feeds rain-water into a Mikveh
is - the fact that the water becomes 'Mayim She'uvin' (which invalidates the
(b) If the water flows into the Mikveh via a natural ditch - the Mikveh is
Kasher (because 'Mayim She'uvin' by definition pertains to a man-made vessel
(a) The Beraisa renders a pipe that is manufactured first and then fixed to
the Mikveh - Pasul (because it is considered She'uvin), whereas vice-versa -
it is Kasher (because it is no worse than a Mikveh that is carved out of the
(b) Rebbi Eliezer might well be the author of the Beraisa of Mikveh (which
differentiates between the two kinds of pipe), even though in the Beraisa of
mortar, he does distinguish between the two. This is - because maybe his
reason there is based on the S'vara that a seller sells generously (like
Rebbi Akiva his Talmid), and has no bearing on the Din of Mikveh.
(c) The author of the Beraisa of Mikveh - could in fact be the Rabbanan of
Rebbi Eliezer ...
(d) ... and when we say 'Lo Rebbi Eliezer ve'Lo Rabbanan' - we are not
referring to the Rabbanan of Rebbi Eliezer.
(a) We do not ask 'Which Rabbanan', like we ask 'Which Rebbi Eliezer' -
because it is not the way of the Gemara to become so involved.
(b) We only make the statement 've'Rabbanan Savri Mocher be'Ayin Ra'ah
Mocher' - in order to balance Rebbi Eliezer. In fact, the author of the
Beraisa can certainly be the Rabbanan.