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1)

(a) In the case where a Shechiv-Mera divided his property between his wife and his sons, leaving over only one date-palm, Ravina initially thought that his wife could only claim the date-palm for her Kesuvah (but not from the sons' portions).

(b) Had the husband not left over the date-palm - he would have permitted her to claim her entire Kesuvah out of the portions belonging to the sons.

(c) Rav Yeimar objected to Ravina's intended ruling - because, he said, if she cannot claim from the sons' portions, she cannot claim from the date-palm either (if she was Mochel the one, she was Mochel the other).

(d) Rav Yeimar therefore ruled that she was entitled to claim her entire Kesuvah out of the sons' portions as well as the date-palm - because once a husband leaves over property, however little, she sees no point in protesting as long as that property has not been assessed, in which case her silence cannot be construed as Mechilah.

(a) Rav Huna ruled that in the case of a Shechiv-Mera who wrote all his property to someone other than his son - if he was an heir then he would receive the property as an inheritance, whereas if he was not, then it would be a gift.

(b) He wrote a Lashon such as 'Nechasai Lach' - which is ambiguous, and can be interpreted according to the situation.

(c) We assume that if the beneficiary was an heir, he meant to give it to his as a Yerushah - in order not to negate the Torah law of Yerushah.

(d) Rav Huna mentioned specifically a Shechiv-Mera - because he was referring to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah (who in turn, presented the case of a Shechiv-Mera), but not necessarily to preclude a Bari.

(a) Rav Nachman was surprised at Rav Huna's ruling - because, he told him, if he intended to rule like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, then he should have said so.

(b) The actual case to which Rav Huna must have been referring was - where Reuven said to Shimon (who was a Shechiv-Mera) 'To whom will you leave your property, to Levi'? To which Shimon replied 'To whom then?'

(c) Rav Huna is coming to teach us - that even in this case, there is a distinction between Matanah and Yerushah (see also Rabeinu Gershom).

(a) Rav Ada bar Ahavah initially suggested that the difference between Yerushah and Matanah concerned an Almanah being sustained from her husband's estate - meaning that if the beneficiary received the estate in the form of a Matanah, the widow would not be sustained from it.

(b) The basis for this distinction is the Mishnah in Gitin - which rules that an Almanah cannot be sustained from Nechasim Meshubadim.

(c) What makes a Matnas Shechiv-Mera a Kinyan de'Rabbanan is - the fact that, min ha'Torah, one cannot acquire a gift after the donor's death.

(d) Rava objected to Rav Ada bar Ahavah's suggestion however - on the basis of a 'Kal va'Chomer'. Because if she is sustained from her husband's property that belongs to the heirs mi'd'Oraysa, then she certainly ought to be sustained from it which the beneficiary receives it only mi'de'Rabbanan (through the Kinyan of a Shechiv-Mera, on whom the Chachamim decreed 'Divrei Shechiv-Mera ki'Chesuvin ve'chi'Mesurin Dami').

(a) Rava therefore concluded by citing Rav Acha bar Rav Ivya (whom we discussed earlier) who ruled - that if someone says 'Nechasai Lach, ve'Acharecha li'Peloni' - assuming that the first person is an heir, the second person (Acharecha) receives nothing according to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, since 'Nechasai Lach' in such a case, is seen as a Lashon Yerushah, in which case, it will automatically pass on to his heirs after his death.

(b) And that is precisely what Rav Huna meant with his distinction. If the beneficiary is an heir then he will receive it as a Yerushah, in which case it will go to his heirs after his death, even if the donor added 've'Acharecha li'Peloni'; whereas if he is not, then, upon his death, it will go to 'Acharecha'.

(c) Despite the fact that Rav Huna referred to 'Shechiv-Mera she'Kasav', he really meant 'she'Amar', because there is no fundamental difference between the two.

(d) We cannot accept the Shechiv-Mera's words 'Acharecha li'Peloni' - because having made the first beneficiary a Yoresh, trying to stop the process of Yerushah constitutes 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah'.

6)

(a) In a case of 'Acharecha' where the first beneficiary was an heir - Rav Ilish wanted to abide by the Shechiv-Mera's instructions.

(b) Rava, citing the words of Acha bar Rav Ivya, compared Rav Ilish initial ruling to the rulings of 'Dayni de'Chatzatzta'. According to Rabeinu Chananel this means graveyard Dayanim (see Rashash). Alternatively, it might mean - 'compromising Dayanim (from the word 'la'Chetzotz', to divide).

(c) Rav Ilish was embarrassed - because he was afraid that Rava would suspect him of erring in other rulings too (when he was not there to correct him).

(d) Rava consoled him by quoting the Pasuk in Yeshayah "Ani Hashem be'Itah Achishenah" - implying that whenever Tzadikim need salvation, Hashem sends it (here too, when Rav Ilish needed correction, Hashem sent him Rava, an indication that when Rava was not there, he had not erred [see also Mesores ha'Shas]).

(a) The Mishnah states that if someone writes his estate to others, ignoring his children - what he did is valid, but the Chachamim are displeased with him for uprooting the Din of Yerushah min ha'Torah).

(b) Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says - that if his sons did not behave as they should, then what he did was praiseworthy.

(c) We ask whether the Rabbanan argue with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or not. They might argue with him - on the grounds that sometimes, good children are born of bad parents (as we will see later).

(d) We try to resolve this She'eilah from a Beraisa which discusses an incident that occurred with Yosef ben Yo'ezer, who declared a wine [or oil]-drawing vessel full of Dinrim, Hekdesh - to prevent his errant son from inheriting it.

(a) The errant son then married - the daughter of the crown-maker of Yanai ha'Melech.

(b) When he opened the fish that he bought his wife after she had given birth - he discovered a precious stone.

(c) His wife advised him to sell the stone to the treasurers of Hekdesh, rather than to the King's treasurers - because she knew that the latter would under-assess it.

(d) She also warned him that, when having it evaluated - not to name a price, because of the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevohah, ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' (One's word to Hekdesh is like handing it to a Hedyot).

(a) The price they quoted for the stone, which they wanted for the Choshen (see Rashash) was - thirteen wine-drawing vessels-full of Dinrim.

(b) When the treasurers informed the son of Yosef ben Yo'ezer that they only had seven vessels-full of gold coins in the kitty, he replied - that he would accept what they had, and the remaining six, he declared Hekdesh.

(a) We try to prove from the statement 'Yosef ben Yo'ezer brought in one, but his son brought in six' - that the Rabbanan must agree with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, since the statement is clearly a praiseworthy one, vindicating Yosef ben Yo'ezer's actions (though this proof only seems to be clear according to the second explanation in the following answer).

(b) The statement may have been made by the assessors for the sake of the records. Alternatively, it was made by all the Chachamim of the generation, in order to learn from it, as we explained.

(c) From the alternative version 'Yosef ben Yo'ezer brought in one, but his son took out seven' (which has derogatory connotations), we learn that the Rabbanan must argue with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel.

(d) This leaves us with two conflicting proofs - in essence, without a proof.

(a) We resolve our She'eilah from a statement by Shmuel, who told Rav Yehudah - not to deprive one son of his Yerushah in favor of another, even from a bad son to a good one, a clear proof that the Rabbanan argue with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel (otherwise, like whom would Shmuel hold?)

(b) And the 'Kal va'Chomer' that he added is - not to deprive a son in favor of a daughter.

(c) We cannot resolve Shmuel's ruling with Rebbi 'Yochanan's principle 'Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu' - because he does not agree with it.

(d) Regarding the many principles stated in Shas (such as 'Halachah ki'S'tam Mishnah', 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva me'Chavero'), we must bear in mind - that they are Halachah, except when the Gemara rules otherwise. Note, that this appears to clash with the Rashbam's previous statement (in spite of his connecting them with the word 'Hilkach' [therefore]).

(a) When a man, whose sons were not going on the right path, left his entire estate to Yonasan ben Uziel - he sold a third, declared a third Hekdesh and returned the remaining third to the original heirs.

(b) He made a point of first selling a third and declaring a third Hekdesh, before returning the last third to the original heirs - to illustrate to Shamai ha'Zaken (whose reaction he anticipated), that he was not returning the property to the original heirs as a Sheli'ach of their father, but because he, as the rightful owner, was entitled to do with it as he saw fit.

(c) Shamai ha'Zaken approached him with his stick and his satchel - to rebuke him for contravening the wishes of the donor (who did not want his sons to benefit from his property).

(d) To which he replied - that just as he was powerless to negate his sale and his declaration of Hekdesh, so too, was he powerless to negate his gift.

(a) The basis of Shamai's argument was - the principle 'Mitzvah le'Kayem Divrei ha'Meis'.

(b) Its ramifications were - that since he had contravened the donor's wishes, his gift to the heirs was Bateil, and so was the initial gift to Yonasan ben Uziel (in which case the sale and the Hekdesh were invalid too).