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1)

(a) It is obvious that if Reuven says 'Yachlok P'loni bi'Nechasai' the recipient receives half his property.
What is Reuven doing when he says that?

(b) Not so obvious is the Din in a case where Reuven says 'T'nu Cheilek li'Peloni'.
What might Cheilek mean, besides possibly, a half?

(c) How do we initially reconcile this with the Beraisa 'T'nu Cheilek li'Peloni bi'Nechasai', Yirash im ha'Banim'? How do we establish our case?

(d) What does it help establishing our case when the donor has no sons, seeing as every Yisrael has relatives?

(a) One of the alternative explanations is that the Amora'im who asked the Kashya and Ravina bar Kisi, who gave he answer, were not aware of that Beraisa (even assuming that we are speaking when the donor has children). Bearing in mind that we will now cite Sumchus to resolve the She'eilah, why might they have even known of the Beraisa? And if they did, why did they not cite it?

(b) Ravina bar Kisi cites the Beraisa 'ha'Omer T'nu Cheilek li'Peloni be'Bor, Ein Pachos me'Revi'a'.
What is in the Bor?

(c) On what grounds does Sumchus, the author of this Beraisa, issue this ruling? Why does he say 'Ein Pachos me'Revi'a'? What does this imply?

(d) Sumchus continues 'le'Chavis, Ein Pachos mi'Sheminis'.
What is the significance of 'an eighth'?

(a) Why does Sumchus rule that if donor said 'for the pot', the recipient will not receive less than a twelfth?

(b) And if he said 'li'Tefi'ach', he concludes, the recipient receives not less than a sixteenth (a quarter of a quarter).
What is a 'Tefi'ach'?

(c) How do other commentaries explain Sumchus?

(a) What does another Beraisa say about a Levi who sells a field to a Yisrael on condition that he receives the Ma'aser each year?

(b) What will happen if the purchaser sells the field? Will the Levi lose his rights?

(c) In which case will his son inherit this rights?

(d) And what does the Tana say in a case where the Levi stipulated that the Ma'aser is his only as long as the field is in the purchaser's jurisdiction?

(a) On what grounds do we query this Beraisa? Why ought the Levi's initial condition to be invalid?

(b) How do we answer this Kashya? Why is it not a case of 'Davar she'Lo Ba Le'olam'?

(c) What does Resh Lakish extrapolate from this Beraisa, with regard to someone who sells a house?

(d) What is the basis of his Chidush (which will be explained immediately)?
What is normally the Din regarding the roof of a house that a person sells?

6)

(a) Rav Zvid explains Resh Lakish (who, based on the Beraisa, validates the seller's condition that the roof including a Ma'akeh remains his, as we just explained) to mean that if he wants to fix ledges that jut out over the purchaser's Chatzer, he may.
Would this not have been permitted anyway?

(b) In the event that the seller dies, does this right extend to his children?

(c) According to Rav Papa, the condition does not permit the seller to fix ledges that jut out over the purchaser's Chatzer.
Then what does his condition achieve?

(d) If, without the condition, the seller would not be permitted to rebuild his roof should it cave in, how will we establish the Mishnah in Bava Metzi'a, which permits it?

(a) On what grounds does Rav Zvid disagree with Rav Papa (which is basically the smaller Chidush)?

(b) What problem do we have with Rav Papa's interpretation of Resh Lakish's Chidush?

(c) Without Resh Lakish, how would we have known Rav Papa's Chidush?

(d) How do we answer this Kashya on Rav Papa?

(a) According to Rav Dimi from Neherda'a, if Reuven sells Shimon a house and he specifically includes 'Umka ve'Ruma', what does he incorporate with the word ...

1. ... 'Umka'?
2. ... 'Ruma'?

(b) What must he therefore add, according to Rav Dimi, if he wants to include a Bor and a Dus? Why is that?

(c) What else does this Lashon include?

(a) We refute the proof from the next Mishnah 've'Lo es ha'Bor ve'Lo es ha'Dus, Af-al-Pi she'Kasav Lo Umka ve'Ruma', by establishing the Mishnah when he did not write Umka ve'Ruma in the Sh'tar.
Then what does the Tana mean when he writes 'Af-al-Pi she'Kasav Lo ... '?

(b) What will 'Umka ve'Ruma' then come to include?

(a) How do we again try and prove Rav Dimi right from our Mishnah 've'Lo es ha'Gag bi'Zeman she'Yesh Lo Ma'akeh Gavohah Asarah Tefachim'.
What would be the problem with this if we assumed that one acquires Umka ve'Ruma (including the roof) automatically?

(b) If on the other hand, one does not acquire Umka ve'Ruma automatically (like Rav Dimi), why is there no problem with the fact that the purchaser nevertheless acquires the roof-space when there is no Ma'akeh?

(c) How do we refute the proof? Why indeed, might a roof with a Ma'akeh be different?

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