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1)

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Eliezer considers a beehive, Karka.
What makes it Karka?

(b) This means that one can acquire Metaltelin together with it, a creditor may write a P'ruzbul if the debtor owns a beehive, and that it is not subject to Tum'ah.
What other ramifications does this ruling have?

(c) The reason that the P'ruzbul is dependent upon the debtor owning land might be because then, it is as if the creditor has a Mashkon (thereby minimising their divergence from Torah law, since whenever the creditor has a Mashkon, he cannot transgress 'Lo Yigos' in which case Sh'mitah does not cancel the debt).
What else might the reason be?

(d) And if a beehive is considered Karka in other regards, why does Rebbi Eliezer need to specifically mention that it is Karka regarding P'ruzbul too?

(a) We just explained that the beehive is not subject to Tum'ah. How about the honey inside the beehive? Is *it* subject to Tum'ah?

(b) What does the Tana mean when he says 've'Einah Mekabeles Tum'ah *bi'Mekomah*'? Is this qualification confined to the Din of Tum'ah?

(c) What do the Chachamim say?

(d) According to the Chachamim, is the honey in the beehive subject to Tum'ah too?

(a) Based on this Beraisa, who do we initially assume to be the author of the Beraisa which considers a pipe that one carved first and fixed to the Mikveh only afterwards as Metaltelin (to invalidate the Mikveh)?

(b) How do we establish Rebbi Eliezer in such a way that even he might be the author of the Beraisa of Mikveh. What source does Rebbi Elazar give for Rebbi Eliezer's ruling?

(a) So we turn to a Mishnah in Keilim (to find which Rebbi Eliezer does not hold like the Beraisa regarding a pipe in a Mikveh). According to Rebbi Eliezer there, a baker's board that one attached to the wall is not subject to Tum'ah.
What, besides a kneading-board, might this be referring to?

(b) According to the Chachamim, the board is subject to Tum'ah.
Why do neither Tana seem to hold like the Beraisa regarding a Mikveh?

(a) We try to establish the author of the Beraisa of Mikveh as Rebbi Eliezer, and the case of the board is different, inasmuch the Tum'ah is only mi'de'Rabbanan.
Why is that?

(b) Are all straight wooden vessels subject to Tum'ah mi'de'Rabbanan?

(c) How must we then classify Mayim She'uvin? What does the Toras Kohanim learn from the word "Mayan"?

(d) How do we now try to establish the author of the Beraisa of Mikveh as Rebbi Eliezer.
If he considers a pipe that is later fixed to the ground, Metaltelin, why does he not also consider a board that is later fixed to the wall Metaltelin, too?

6)

(a) We query this explanation however, based on the tradition that Mayim She'uvin too, is only mi'de'Rabbanan.
In light of this tradition, how will we explain the Toras Kohanim (which learns from "Ma'ayan" that Mayim She'uvin is d'Oraysa)?

(b) What is the reason for this difference?

(c) We also refute the previous explanation on the basis of a statement of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina? By what sort of board does he establish the Mishnah?

(a) We therefore finally establish the Beraisa of Mikveh like the Chachamim, who consider the baker's board, Metaltelin.
Then why in the Mishnah of Mikveh, do they consider a pipe that is carved into the ground, Karka?

(b) In that case, why do they not also consider one that was carved first, Karka, too?

(a) If someone is pleased with the rain, because he wants to use it to wash fruit, the fruit that he washes is Muchshar le'Kabel Tum'ah.
What will be the Din if he is pleased with the water because he wants to use it to wash ...

1. ... Metaltelin other than food (but which then falls on to food)?
2. ... something that was always Mechuber le'Karka (which then fell on to food)?

(b) Under what category does an Itztrubal (the wooden frame encircling the millstone) fall?

(c) Rav Yosef asks whether the rain-water will be Machshir le'Kabel Tum'ah if the owner is pleased because he intends to use it to wash the Itztrubal. Why is the She'eilah non-existent according to Rebbi Eliezer?

(d) And what would Rebbi Eliezer say in the equivalent case, if it was not an Itztrubal that the owner had in mind to wash, but a fixed mortar?

(a) Rav Yosef poses his She'eilah according to the Rabbanan who consider a fixed mortar Metaltelin, with regard to the sale of the house.
Why might they agree with Rebbi Eliezer with regard to Machshir Le'Kabel Tum'ah, even though they argue with him with regard to a sale? What might be their reason in the latter case, other than that all Talush ve'li'Besof Chibro is considered Metaltelin?

(b) These Rabbanan concede however, that an Itztrubal is included in the sale of the house. If, according to the side of the She'eilah (that considers a fixed mortar Metaltelin), this is not because they consider an Itztrubal, Karka, then what is the reason for the distinction?

(c) Do we have a precedent for this (where something is considered Talush as regards Hechsher Tum'ah, but Mechubar as regards the sale of a house?

(d) Seeing as the She'eilah incorporates a fixed mortar (which is the point over which they argue with Rebbi Eliezer), why did Rav Yosef ask about an Itztrubal?

(e) What is the outcome of the She'eilah?

(a) Rav Nechemyah Brei de'Yosef ruled that a woman is entitled to claim Isur Nechasim even from her husband's.
What does this imply? Like which Tana does he hold?

(b) This ruling follows a statement of Rava.
What did Rava say in Kesuvos with regard to a woman's Kesuvah, Mezonos and Parnasah?

(c) What is 'Parnasah'?

(a) What did the Ge'onim institute with regard to a woman claiming her Kesuvah nowadays?

(b) Does it also extend to 'T'nai Kesuvah' (e.g. Mezonos)?

(c) Yet Rav Nechemyah B'rei de'Rav Yosef's ruling is relevant nowadays, too.
Why is that?

(d) What does Rav Ashi mean when he quotes Rav Kahana, who used to claim Isur Mechsi even from 'Amla de'Bati'?

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