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1)

(a) What is the Mishnah in Me'ilah referring to when it speaks about Hekdesh that is fit for ...

1. ... the Mizbe'ach but not for Bedek ha'Bayis?
2. ... Bedek ha'Bayis but not the Mizbe'ach?
3. ... neither? Then on what basis are they Hekdesh?

(b) Why are the things listed in the first group not fit for Bedek ha'Bayis?

(c) What does the Tana say about all three cases?

(d) How will we explain the sequence of these groupings?

(a) What does the Tana say about a pit full of water, a trash-heap full of manure, a dove-cot full of doves, a field with herbs growing in it and a laden fruit-tree, if one declared the container Hekdesh? What do they all have in common?

(b) At which point is one Mo'el?

(c) What does Rebbi Yehudah say in a case where they were all filled only after the owner had declared them Hekdesh?

(d) What does Rebbi Yossi say about a field and a tree?

(a) What Halachic distinction does Rebbi draw, with regard to the above Machlokes, between the case of the pit and that of the dove-cot on the one hand, and a field and a tree on the other?

(b) What is the basis for this distinction?

(c) What problem do we have with Rebbi declaring that Rebbi Yossi appears right in the case of a field and a tree?

(d) Why could we have asked the same Kashya on the other half of his declaration 'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yehudah be'Bor ve'Shuvach'?

(a) What do we mean when we suggest that Rebbi Yossi only mentioned a field and a tree in order to challenge Rebbi Yehudah?

(b) We refute this suggestion however, from another Beraisa.
What does Rebbi Yossi say there, which proves that what he said in the previous Beraisa was his personal view?

(c) Then what did Rebbi really say?

(a) In another Beraisa, which discusses 'Hikdishan ve'Achar-kach Nismal'u', the Tana Kama holds 'Mo'alin Bahen ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tochan'; Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagrees.
How did Rabah initially establish their Machlokes?

(b) What would the Tana'im then hold by a pit and a dove-cot?

(a) In the Seifa 'Hikdishan Melei'in', the Tana Kama says 'Mo'alin Bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan'. What do we mean when we say 'Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon Machlif'?

(b) What problem does Abaye present on Rabah from Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion in the Seifa of the Beraisa?

(c) Why is it so obvious that if the fruit was there there initially, it ought to be Hekdesh?

7)

(a) So how do we amend Rabah's interpretation of the Machlokes? In which case do they argue?

(b) And what will both Tana'im hold in the case of a field and a tree?

(c) We now have two Machlokos, one in the Reisha and one in the Seifa.
What is the basis of their Machlokes in the Reisha (where the water and the doves came after the Hekdesh, and) where the Tana Kama holds ' ... Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho' and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin'?

(a) Does Rebbi Meir always hold 'Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'?

(b) Does Rebbi Meir himself make this distinction?

(c) Then how can we establish Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon like Rebbi Meir in the case of ...

1. ... the water in the pit?
2. ... the doves in the dove-cot (neither of which appears to be inevitable at all)?

(d) Will it make a difference as to whose dove-cot is close to the one in question?

(a) How does Rava establish the declaration of Hekdesh in the Seifa (where the water and the doves were there before the Hekdesh)?

(b) And to explain Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon ('Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho'), he establishes him like his father in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis'.
What does Rebbi Shimon say there about someone who sells a pit which is full of water (though that is not the actual case of Rebbi Shimon there)?

(c) What does his son Rebbi Elazar now hold?

(d) Then why does he hold in the Reisha (where the Hekdesh preceded the water and the doves) 'Mo'alin Bo u'va'Meh she'be'Tocho'? Why does he not apply the S'vara 'Makdish, be'Ayin Ra'ah Makdish' there too?

11)

(a) We just established our Mishnah like Rebbi Nasan (whom we referred to as an individual opinion).
Does this mean that the Halachah is not like him (but like the Rabbanan)?

(b) Then why do we refer to it as an individual opinion?

(c) Would the same principle apply if an Amora, in refuting a Kashya directed at him from a S'tam Mishnah, answered 'Yechida'ah Hi'?

(d) What might the Rabbanan of Rebbi Nasan ('Hikdishan Melei'in, Mo'alin Bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan') then hold?

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