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Beitzah 31

1) THE DISPUTE BETWEEN REBBI YEHUDAH AND REBBI YOSI ABOUT WOOD IN A "KARPAF"

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one may bring in wood on Yom Tov from a Karpaf (a large, enclosed area), even when the wood is scattered about (because since the area is enclosed, we assume that one had intention before Yom Tov to use the wood inside of it on Yom Tov). Rebbi Yehudah says that in order for the wood to be permitted, the Karpaf must be near the city (and only then do we assume that one had intention to use it). Rebbi Yosi says that the Karpaf must have a lock, and then the wood may be used even if it is far away and not near the city.

The Gemara asks what exactly Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi are saying. The Gemara suggests two possibilities: (1) The first possibility is that Rebbi Yehudah requires both that the Karpaf have a lock and be near the city, and Rebbi Yosi says that it suffices to have either a lock (and be far away) or to be near the city (without a lock). (2) The second possibility is that Rebbi Yehudah says that the only determining factor is the distance of the Karpaf from the city -- it must be nearby (even if it has a lock), and Rebbi Yosi says that the only determining factor is that it must have a lock (even if it is nearby).

The Gemara concludes that from Rebbi Yosi's word in the Mishnah we can infer that he is saying "Tarti l'Kula" -- he holds of two leniencies.

The Gemara seems to be concluding like the first possibility, that Rebbi Yehudah requires that the Karpaf be both nearby and have a lock, while Rebbi Yosi holds of two leniencies -- the Karpaf may be either nearby, or have a lock, but need not have both, and that is indeed how TOSFOS explains the Sugya.

However, RASHI says that the Gemara is concluding with a *third* explanation of the Machlokes. The Gemara is concluding that Rebbi Yehudah holds that the only determining factor is the distance (the Karpaf must be nearby), which is what the *second* possibility suggested was the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah, while Rebbi Yosi holds that either being nearby or having a lock is acceptable -- like the *first* possibility (see Chart #11)!

Why does Rashi say that the Gemara's conclusion is combining the first and second possibilities of the Machlokes? The Gemara simply says that Rebbi Yosi holds of two leniencies, which implies the first version of the Machlokes. How does Rashi know that the Gemara is concluding that even Rebbi Yehudah holds of one Kula (that the Karpaf does not need a lock if it is nearby)? And if the Gemara only suggests two ways to understand the argument in the Mishnah, why should Rashi posit that there is a third possibility?

ANSWER: The wording of Rebbi Yosi's statement as it appears in our Mishnah is that it is permitted to bring in wood from "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key, *and* even if (v'Afilu) it is [far away] within the Techum Shabbos." RASHI, in the end of the Mishnah, quotes this line of the Mishnah with a slight difference: "even if (*Afilu*) it is [far away] within the Techum Shabbos." That is, Rashi's Girsa of the Mishnah does not have the letter "Vav" -- "and" -- before the word "Afilu." That is also the Girsa recorded by the DIKDUKEI SOFRIM (#80), and the RIF (manuscript) and the Cambridge manuscript of the Mishnah (footnote, ibid.).

However, when Rashi explains the *Gemara* the part of the Gemara that quotes this part of the Mishnah to prove what Rebbi Yosi holds, Rashi (end of DH Rebbi Yosi l'Kula, and end of DH O Dilma) records the phrase the way it appears in our texts -- "*v'Afilu*!" Although Rashi's Mishnah apparently did not have the extra "Vav," his Gemara deliberately added the "Vav." But why?

Rashi understands that the extra "Vav" denotes that the Gemara is presenting a *two-part* proof. It is proving from the words of our Mishnah both what is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah and what is the opinion of Rebbi Yosi.

First, the Gemara cites the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key," in order to prove one thing, and then it cites the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even if (Afilu) it is [far away] within the Techum Shabbos" to prove the second point. To denote that there are *two* distinct points, each of which can be proven from a different line of the Mishnah, the Gemara adds the letter "Vav" before citing the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement in the Mishnah. (The CHIDUSHEI HA'ME'IRI quotes a Girsa of the Gemara that explicitly shows that the Gemara is bringing separate proofs from each half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, by adding the words, "*v'Od, Mai* Afilu...," clearly showing that from the word "Afilu" and on it is citing a second proof.) What, though, is the Gemara proving from each half of Rebbi Yosi's statement?

Rashi says that the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key," implies that *normally* a Karpaf is not locked and does not need a key. That proves that Rebbi Yehudah -- who permits taking wood from a standard, unqualified Karpaf -- permits a Karpaf even without a lock, as long as it is nearby.

The second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even if (Afilu) it is [far away] within the Techum Shabbos," teaches us that Rebbi Yosi holds that if the Karpaf is nearby, then we rule more leniently, and it does not need a lock.

We find proof for this approach from two inferences in the words of Rashi. When the Gemara concludes that "Rebbi Yosi Tarti l'Kula," (Rebbi Yosi holds of two leniencies), Rashi explains (beginning of DH Tarti) that we learn from Rebbi Yosi's words what both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi hold (in that order). Why does Rashi mention Rebbi Yehudah first? He should mention Rebbi Yosi first, since the Gemara addresses his opinion explicitly ("Rebbi Yosi Tarti l'Kula..."), and the proof to Rebbi Yehudah's is Rashi's own addition! It must be that Rashi sees that the Gemara itself is making a two-part inference from the Mishnah, and it is the *first* half of Rebbi Yosi's statement that reveals what Rebbi Yehudah holds, and only the *second* half that reveals what Rebbi Yosi holds. That is why Rashi puts them in that order -- he is explaining the proofs of the Gemara in the order that the Gemara presents them.

In addition, in the Girsa of that appears in an early manuscript of Rashi (quoted in Dikdukei Sofrim #200), it is even more clear that there are two parts to the proof, because in that text there is an additional comment (DH Ta Shema) that does not appear in our text of Rashi, in which Rashi says explicitly that since Rebbi Yosi says "any area...," "and also in the end of his words he adds 'even if it is [far away]...,' from here we learn that he holds of two leniencies." Rashi is explaining that the Gemara is saying a two-part proof -- that Rebbi Yosi holds of two leniencies, *and* that Rebbi Yehudah holds that the Karpaf needs to be nearby. (M. Kornfeld)

31b

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if a storehouse of fruit became breached on Yom Tov, one may take fruit by reaching in through the opening, but one may not break open any part of the storehouse l'Chatchilah. Rebbi Meir says that it is permitted to break open the storehouse l'Chatchilah in order to get to the fruit.

If the fruit was locked up within the storehouse in such a way that it was not possible to get to the fruit during Bein ha'Shemashos, then the fruit should be Muktzah! Why, then, is it permitted to take the fruit on Yom Tov when the storehouse is breached?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (DH Notel) explains that when an object may not be used at the start of Shabbos only because it is Asur mid'Rabanan to use it, then the object is not Muktzah Machmas Isur. In order to get to the fruits, one would have to do only an Isur d'Rabanan of Stirah, as the Gemara says, since the storehouse is built with uncemented rows of bricks. Therefore, the fruit is not Muktzah Machmas Isur.

TOSFOS asks that we find a number of cases where an Isur d'Rabanan does create an Isur of Muktzah, such as a bed on which money was left during Bein ha'Shemashos (Shabbos 44b), and a basket on which there were chicks (Shabbos 43a) during Bein ha'Shemashos, in which case the bed or basket become a "Basis l'Davar he'Asur" and may not be moved the entire Shabbos.

Rashi might answer that cases of a Basis l'Davar he'Asur are different because the object of Heter that is underneath the Muktzah itself becomes an object of Isur. In contrast, when the object of Heter is merely inaccessible due to an Isur which stands before it (it is locked inside of a room, such as in our case), then the object (the fruit) has no Isur of Muktzah.

The RAMBAN asks a different question. We find that a candle that was aflame during Bein ha'Shemashos is Muktzah, even though extinguishing it is only an Isur d'Rabanan (because it is a Melachah sh'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah). According to Rashi, it should not be Muktzah! The answer to this question may be that Rashi holds that a Melachah sh'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah, although Asur only mid'Rabanan, is also a "Melachah," and therefore it is treated stringently.

(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Nifchas) cites RABEINU MOSHE who offers a different answer. He says that it does not matter whether the Isur involved with using the object is an Isur d'Oraisa or an Isur d'Rabanan. Rather, it depends on whether the Isur has been entirely removed from the world, or whether it is still in existence but no longer acts to prohibit the second object. In the case of a storehouse built with uncemented rows of bricks, once there is an opening in some of them, there is absolutely no Isur of Stirah involved in entering through that opening and taking the fruit. Similarly, he says, fruits of Tevel are not Muktzah on Shabbos and may be eaten when their Ma'aser is separated (even though it is not permitted to separate Ma'aser on Shabbos), since the Isur Tevel of those fruits is no longer extant. In the case of a Basis, though, the object of Muktzah which had made the permitted utensil a Basis in the first place is still in existence (it has just been removed from the item that was supporting it), and therefore the utensil remains a Basis and is Asur.

Tosfos questions this answer. According to this logic it should be *Asur* to take the fruits from the storehouse because the rest of the bricks are still present and the Isur Stirah is therefore still present. Only if *all* of the bricks were removed would it be permitted to take the fruits.

(c) TOSFOS explains that this Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who does not hold of Muktzah.

What does Tosfos mean by that? Rebbi Shimon agrees that in order for the item which was inaccessible because of an Isur during Bein ha'Shemashos to be Mutar, one must be "Yoshev u'Metzapeh" (anticipate that it will become Mutar), and in this case there would seem to be no reason for the owner of the storehouse to anticipate being able to eat the fruit on Yom Tov!

The RASHBA asks this question, and answers that the Mishnah is referring to a case of a storehouse that is already beginning to break down and is likely to collapse on Yom Tov, and thus one had intention to use the fruit inside of it.

(d) The RASHBA himself says that if it is talking about a storehouse that had a shaky wall ("Kosel Re'u'ah"), then the Mishnah could be in accordance with both Rebbi Shimon *and* Rebbi Yehudah. It is referring to a case where one made a Tenai before the start of Yom Tov that he wants to be able to use the fruit when the wall breaks down. Such a Tenai works even according to Rebbi Yehudah, states the Rashba. (See Insights to 30:1:(c).)

(e) The RAMBAN (in Milchamos at the end of the Perek) explains that the Mishnah is discussing a case when the storehouse had become breached *before* Shabbos. That is why the fruits are not Muktzah Machmas Isur. However, if the storehouse was breached before Shabbos, then obviously it is permitted to take the fruit on Shabbos, and thus what is the Chidush of the Mishnah?

The Ramban explains that we might have thought that it is prohibited to take fruits from the place of the breach, because one might extend the opening to make it larger. Alternatively, we might have thought that it is prohibited because it is like an Otzar, a storehouse; since one originally sealed it off, the fruit is like an item that was placed in a storehouse, which Rebbi Yehudah maintains is Muktzah. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that it is not considered Muktzah, nor is it prohibited to take the fruit out of fear that one might make the opening larger.

The Ramban asserts that this is the opinion of the RIF (and, by inference, of the RAMBAM).

(f) The Ramban suggests a second possible way of understanding the Rif (and Rambam). Perhaps these fruits are not considered Muktzah Machmas Isur because there is nothing inherently wrong with them. The only thing preventing us from eating them is something external to them; the wall that stands between us and them. They themselves, though, are perfectly edible on Shabbos. For this reason, the fruit cannot be compared to an oil lamp that is burning at the start of Shabbos, in which case the oil was unable to be used because of the inherent Isur of extinguishing the fire (Mechabeh) by removing the oil from the lamp. (The Ramban adds that Basis l'Davar he'Asur is an exception to this rule. Although an external object makes the Basis inaccessible, the Basis nevertheless becomes Muktzah Machmas Isur since it becomes itself an object of Isur, see above (a).)

(The Ramban himself, in Milchamos to Pesachim 56a, seems to reject this argument when he writes that detached dates high up in a palm tree become Muktzah Machmas Isur, since one cannot climb the tree to get them at the start of Shabbos -- M. Kornfeld.)

HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 518:9) permits fruit behind a fallen wall without qualifying what kind of wall (like the Rif and Rambam). It would seem that the fruit is allowed whether an Isur d'Oraisa is involved in dismantling the wall or an Isur d'Rabanan, whether part or the wall or the entire wall collapsed, whether it collapsed on Erev Yom Tov or on Yom Tov, whether the wall was weak or strong. The Poskim point out that the only way of explaining this ruling is as the Ramban suggested (f), that the fruits did not become Muktzah since the Isur is not inherent to them.

The BI'UR HALACHAH, though, writes that since most of the Rishonim do not accept this ruling (and the Ramban himself offered another possible way of interpreting the Gemara), one should not permit such fruits to be eaten or moved except under extenuating circumstances ("She'as ha'Dechak").