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1)

(a) Since Raban Yochanan ben Zakai instituted after the Churban Beis Hamikdash, that they would accept the witnesses all day, says Rabah, the Takanah of two days became Batel - in which case Rosh Hashanah became like every other Yom-Tov, and an egg that is laid on the first day, is permitted on the second.

(b) Abaye queried this from Rav and Shmuel - who lived after the Churban, yet they ruled that it is forbidden.

(c) We reconcile Rav and Shmuel with Raban Yochanan ben Zakai - by establishing the latter by the B'nei Eretz Yisrael, and the former to the B'nei Chutz la'Aretz, whose Minhag to keep two days was never broken, and who therefore continue to keep Yom-Tov as a Takanah (and not merely as a Safek).

(a) Rav Yosef disagrees with Rabah - according to him, even after Raban Yochanan ben Zakai rescinded the Takanah of two days by Rosh Chodesh, the Takanah of two days by an egg remains, because it was a 'Davar she'be'Minyan' (something that was decided by a majority ruling), and a Davar she'be'Minyan cannot be rescinded by a second Beis-Din unless they are superior in knowledge and in number.

(b) Rav Yosef learns from the Pasuk in Yisro ...

1. ... "Lech Emor Lahem, Shuvu Lachem le'Oholeichem" (following "Heyu Nechonim li'Sheloshes Yamim, Al Tigshu el Ishah") - that something that was forbidden through a Beis-Din (in this case, it is Hashem who issued the decree, and who then rescinded it) does not automatically become permitted, even when the reasons for the decree become obsolete, but need to be specifically rescinded.
2. ... "bi'Meshoch ha'Yovel, Heimah Ya'alu va'Har" (following "Gam ha'Tzon ve'ha'Bakar Al Yir'u el Mul *ha'Har ha'Hu*" - the same Derashah as we learned from "Lech Emor Lahem, Shuvu Lachem le'Oholeichem". The proof from "Lech Emor Lahem ... " however, is inconclusive, since Hashem's command there, might have been issued in the form of a command (to fulfill the Mitzvah of Onah with their wives - whereas the Heter to return to them did not perhaps, require a specific command).

(c) The indication that the prohibition to ascend the mountain ought not to apply anyway after the departure of the Shechinah (but which is nevertheless not automatically dissolved) - lies in the words "Gam ha'Tzon ve'ha'Bakar Al Yir'u el Mul *ha'Har Hahu*", which implies that it is only forbidden to graze on the mountain as long as it is *that mountain* (i.e. whilst the Shechinah is on it, but not once It has departed).

(d) We learn that it is not the *place* of a person that honors *him*, but the *person* who honors the *place* - from the same Pesukim of "el Mul ha'Har ha'Hu" and "bi'Meshoch ha'Yovel, Heimah Ya'alu ba'Har", from which we see that Har Sinai was only holy as long as Hashem's Shechinah was on it, but that the moment It departed, the Kedushah departed from the mountain, too.

3)

(a) The Torah gives the owner of Kerem Reva'i the option of - either bringing his fruit to Yerushalayim and eating it there be'Taharah, or of redeeming it, and of taking the money to Yerushalayim and spending it there.

(b) We learn this Din from a Gezeirah-Shavah "Kodesh" "Kodesh" from Ma'aser Sheini.

(c) Chazal instituted that - people who lived within a radius of one day's journey from Yerushalayim were obligated to take the fruit itself to Yerushalayim, and not to redeem it. The reason for this was in order to adorn the markets of Yerushalayim with fruit.

(a) Rebbi Eliezer wanted to declare his vineyard Hefker for the poor - because the vineyard in question was east of Lud (which was the western extremity of one day's radius from Yerushalayim), and he could not take the trouble to take all the grapes to Yerushalayim.

(b) His disciples told him that his colleagues (meaning Raban Yochanan ben Zakai - his Rebbe) had already rescinded the decree to bring all the fruit to Yerushalayim (and that it was therefore unnecessary to declare the vineyard Hefker).

(c) We deduce from their words - that despite the fact that, after the Churban of the Beis Hamikdash, the reason for the decree no longer applied, it was nevertheless necessary to specifically rescind it (and that it was not automatically dissolved).

(d) We need this *third* proof that 'Davar she'be'Minyan, Tzarich Minyan Acher le'Hatiro' - to teach us that this principle extends even to Rabbinical decrees, too.

(a) The egg remain Asur, according to Rav Yosef - because Raban Yochanan ben Zakai only rescinded the Takanah of *Eidus* (when the witnesses arrived after Minchah-time), but not that of the egg.

(b) Abaye objects to this, on the grounds that there was no specific decree regarding an egg - only that of testimony, and the Din of egg follows that of testimony. Consequently, once the decree of testimony has been rescinded, the egg on Rosh Hashanah automatically adopts the same Din as on every other Yom-Tov (like Rabah argues on Amud a).

(c) Rav Ada and Rav Salmon agree with Abaye, but rule like Rav Yosef, (though not for the same reason as him) - because, they say, we are worried that if we permit the egg *this year* when there is *no Beis Hamikdash*, then perhaps by *next year*, the *Beis Hamikdash* will be built, and people will think that just as last year, the egg was permitted on the second day, so too, will it be permitted this year. They will not of course realize that last year, since there was no Beis Hamikdash, the two days of Rosh Hashanah had *two* Kedushos, whereas this year, now that the Beis Hamikdash has been rebuilt, it only has *one* Kedushah.

(d) We are not by the same token, worried that if, at the time when there is no Beis Hamikdash (and there is therefore no Shir in which to err), the witnesses are permitted to testify all day, they may do the same after the Beis Hamikdash has been rebuilt - because testimony (unlike the Din of egg, which lies in the hands of each individual) is controlled by Beis-Din (who are unlikely to err).

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