Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Berachos 20

1) TRANSGRESSING THE TORAH PASSIVELY FOR THE SAKE OF MAN'S HONOR

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that it is permitted to forego bringing the Korban Pesach or circumcizing one's son in order to bury the dead when there is no one else to bury it, because one is only passively -- and not actively -- violating the Torah by refraining from performing those Mitzvos.

RASHI (DH Shev v'Al Ta'aseh) asks that we know that a Nazir and a Kohen are allowed to be Metamei themselves *actively* in order to bury the dead when there is no one else to bury it (see Rashi 19b, DH ul'Achoso). Why does the Gemara not prove from here that one is allowed to violate a Mitzvah actively for the sake of man's honor?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI answers that the Torah *never forbade* a Nazir or Kohen from becoming Tamei when there is a body that needs burial. Therefore, the Nazir or Kohen is not violating a Torah-commandment when he becomes Tamei by burying the dead, and we cannot learn from there that one may violate a Mitzvah for the sake of man's honor.

TOSFOS (DH Shev v'Al Ta'aseh) questions Rashi's explanation. The Gemara in Yevamos 4a) says that we learn that a Mitzvas Aseh (positive commandment) overrides a Mitzvas Lo Ta'aseh (negative commandment) from the fact that the Torah permits a mixture of wool and linen (Shatnez) for the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. Thus, the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Shatnez. Asks Tosfos, perhaps an Aseh *never* overrides a Lo Ta'aseh -- not even the Aseh of Tzitzis. The only reason why one may make Tzitzis out of Shatnez is because the prohibition of Shatnez was *never said* with regard to a garment that is obligated in Tzitzis!

It must be that there is no such thing as the Torah making an exception to a prohibition. Rather, the prohibition exists, but it is outweighed by the Mitzvas Aseh.

The CHAVOS YA'IR (#95) defends Rashi's explanation. Rashi did not mean that whenever the Torah explicitly states an exception to a prohibition (such as in the case of using Shatnez to make Tzitzis) that we understand it to mean that the prohibition never applied in such a situation. Rather, when the Torah states both the prohibition and the exception in the *same place*, *then* we say that the prohibition indeed does not apply. In the case of using Shatnez to make Tzitzis, the words from which we learn that Tzitzis may be made of Shatnez ("Gedilim Ta'aseh Licha" (Devarim 22:*12*)) were not written as an explicit exception to the rule of Shatnez (Devarim 22:*11*). The prohibition of Shatnez and the commandment to make Tzitzis are two separate verses; it is merely from the proximity of the verses that we learn that Shatnez is outweighed by the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. (Similarly, an elderly person's "exception" from the Mitzvah to return lost objects is not written as an explicit exception from the obligation to return lost objects. Rather, it is written two verses earlier (in Devarim 22:1). Therefore, it is not classified as an *exception* to the obligation, but rather, his honor *overrides* the obligation.)

The only time we may say that the prohibition was not said in the place of the Mitzvah is when the Torah states the exception *explicitly*, *in* the verse in which the prohibition appears, such as in the case of a Nazir or Kohen. The very verse (Bamidbar 6:7) that states that a Nazir may not be Metamei for close relatives (i.e. the prohibition), implies that he may be Metamei for a body that has no one to bury it (i.e. the exception).

(b) TOSFOS (ibid.) answers that we cannot learn from Nazir and Kohen that one may violate a Mitzvah for the sake of man's honor, because the prohibition of a Kohen being Metamei and the prohibition of a Nazi being Metamei are different. A Kohen's prohibition is weaker because it applies only to him and not to non-Kohanim, and therefore it is pushed aside for the sake of man's honor. A Nazir's prohibition can be uprooted retroactively by the Nazir finding grounds to annul his Nezirus. Therefore, it, too, is a weaker prohibition which can be pushed aside for the sake of man's honor.

Tosfos' answer, though, is problematic. Why did the Gemara itself not ask the question and give that answer? (Indeed, the RASHBA writes that the text of some printings of the Gemara actually included that question and gave that answer.)

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Rav Gidel used to sit next to the Mikvah and instruct the women how to immerse themselves. The Rabanan asked him, "Are you not afraid of your evil inclination?" Rav Gidel answered, "They (the women) appear to me like white geese."

The Gemara then relates that Rebbi Yochanan used to sit next to the Mikvah so that the women would see his beauty when they came out and would have beautiful children. The Rabanan asked him, "Are you not afraid of the 'evil eye'?"

Why did the Rabbanan not ask Rebbi Yochanan if he was afraid of his evil inclination?

ANSWERS:

(a) Rebbi Yochanan's eyelashes were so long that he could not see anything, as the Gemara relates in Bava Kama (117a). (BACH)

(b) Since Rebbi Yochanan just wanted the women to see his beauty as they came out, he sat at a distance from the Mikvah. Rav Gidel, however, had to sit close to the Mikvah in order to instruct the women how to immerse themselves properly. (RASHASH)

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that "women, slaves, and children are exempt from Keri'as Shema and Tefilin, and they are obligated in Tefilah, Mezuzah, and Birkas ha'Mazon." What type of child is the Mishnah referring to? If the child has reached the age of Chinuch, then he is obligated in all the Mitzvos. If he has not reached the age of Chinuch, then he is exempt from all the Mitzvos! ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (DH Ketanim) explains that the Mishnah is referring to children who have *reached* the age of Chinuch. They are exempt from Keri'as Shema, says Rashi, because they are not always near their father when the time for Shema comes and he is unable to instruct them to say Shema regularly. (The Yerushalmi mentions such a reasoning. It seems from Rashi that part of the Mitzvah of reciting Shema is reciting it with regularity. Since the father will not be able to instruct his child to recite the Shema *on a regular basis*, he is unable to instruct his child to perform the Mitzvah the same way it would be done if he was an adult, and thus the children are entirely exempt. From the Gemara in Erchin (2b; see Insights to Erchin 2b, #2) it is apparent that there is no obligation of Chinuch unless the child will perform the Mitzvah with all of its components, the same way he would perform the Mitzvah if he was an adult. M. Kornfeld)

(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Ketanim) cites the RI, who explains that when the Mishnah says that children are exempt from Keri'as Shema it is referring to children who have *not reached* the age of Chinuch. When the Mishnah, in the end, says that they are obligated in Tefilah, it is referring to children who *have reached* the age of Chinuch.

(c) RABBEINU TAM (cited in Tosfos, ibid.) explains that when the Mishnah says that children are exempt from Keri'as Shema, it is referring to children who have *not reached* the age of Chinuch. The end of the Mishnah that says "they are obligated in Tefilah, Mezuzah, and Birkas ha'Mazon" is not referring to children at all, but only to women and slaves.

HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 70:2) cites both the opinions of Rabbeinu Tam (c) and Rashi (a) and concludes that it is proper to conduct oneself like Rabbeinu Tam and instruct children who have reached the age of Chinuch to recite Keri'as Shema.

20b

QUESTION: The Gemara asks whether a woman's obligation to recite Birkas ha'Mazon is mid'Oraisa or mid'Rabbanan. If a woman is obligated only mid'Rabbanan, then she cannot recite the blessing for a man in order to exempt him from *his* obligation (which is mid'Oraisa).

The Gemara later (48a), however, says that a man who ate only a k'Zayis of bread (and whose obligation is only mid'Rabbanan) may exempt a man who ate his full (and whose obligation is mid'Oraisa). Why, then, is a woman unable to exempt a man, even if her obligation is only mid'Rabbanan?

ANSWER: The ROSH (3:13) answers that the reason why a man who ate only a k'Zayis may exempt a man who ate his full is because of the concept of "Arvus" -- "responsibility:" every Jew is responsible to see that every other Jew fulfills the Mitzvos. The Torah thus allows a man to exempt another man even if he ate *nothing*. The Rabbanan, though, instituted that in order to exempt another man, he must at least eat enough to obligate himself to recite the blessing, even mid'Rabbanan. Women, on the other hand, do not bear group "responsibility;" they have no obligation to see to it that every other Jew fulfills his obligation. Therefore, unless a woman's obligation to recite Birkas ha'Mazon is on the same level as a man's (i.e. mid'Oraisa), she cannot exempt him from his obligation.

The DAGUL MEREVAVAH (OC 271:2) refers to the MAGEN AVRAHAM (271:1) who says that if a person Davens the Ma'ariv Shemoneh Esreh on Shabbos night, he fulfills his Torah obligation to recite Kidush (although he must still fulfill his Rabbinic obligation to recite Kidush over a cup of wine). The Dagul Merevavah writes that according to this, even though a woman normally has the same obligation of Kidush as a man has, if a woman recited Ma'ariv on Shabbos night she cannot exempt a man who has not Davened. Since her obligation is now only mid'Rabbanan (because she already fulfilled her d'Oraisa obligation), she cannot exempt a man's d'Oraisa obligation, because women are not in the category of "responsibility" that would enable her to exempt another person even when she herself is not obligated.

RAV AKIVA EIGER (ibid.) responds that when the Rosh wrote that women are not bound by group "responsibility," he did not mean that they are *never* responsible for another Jew's fulfillment of the Mitzvos. Rather, a woman is not "responsible" only when it comes to a Mitzvah that she is not obligated to perform herself. With regard to a Mitzvah that she, too, is also obligated to perform mid'Oraisa, she does have "responsibility" for other Jews. Therefore, she *could* exempt a man from his d'Oraisa obligation to recite Kidush.

Support for the Dagul Merevavah could be adduced from the Gemara in Sotah (37b) that says that all 600,000 men who stood at Sinai became responsible for one another. That number did not include the women. This implies that women are not included in "Arvus" at all.