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1)

(a) We quoted the Beraisa which rules that if chickens are pecking at the rope of a bucket, the rope snaps and the bucket drops and breaks, the owner is obligated to pay full damage. We attempt to resolve Rava's current She'eilah ('Basar Me'ikara O Basar Tavar Mana') from there - inasmuch as the Tana must holds that we go after the initial stroke, because otherwise, the owner would be obligated to pay only for half the damage.

(b) Initially, we establish the Chidush of the Beraisa by the rope, which it is not considered unusual for chickens to have chewn (in which case, the owner ought to pay Chatzi Nezek) - because the Tana speaks when it is covered with dough.

(c) We reject ...

1. ... this interpretation of the Beraisa however, on the grounds - that the Tana speaks specifically about the bucket breaking (and not the rope).
2. ... the attempt to establish the Beraisa like Sumchus (who doesn't hold of Tzeroros in the first place) - because of the Seifa, which obligates the owner to pay half, in the event that part of the first vessel shoots up and breaks a second vessel.

(d) We cannot counter this by differentiating between 'Kocho' (with which Sumchos does not agree) and 'Ko'ach Kocho' (with which he does) - on the grounds that this is the She'eilah that was asked by Rav Ashi (who clearly could not find any indication either way in a Mishnah or a Beraisa).

3)

(a) Rava asks whether Chatzi Nezek Tzeroros pays mi'Gufo or min ha'Aliyah. Perhaps he pays only mi'Gufo, like all cases of Chatzi Nezek. But he might have to pay min ha'Aliyah - because we never find 'Urcheih' (any case that is not Keren) who pays mi'Gufo.

(b) We try and resolve Rava's She'eilah from the Beraisa quoted above 'Hidus Eino Mu'ad; Yesh Omrim, Harei Zeh Mu'ad', establishing 'Hidus' to mean - 'Hidus ve'Hitiz'.

(c) And we initially think that 'Hidus Eino Mu'ad' means - that he pays mi'Gufo.

(d) According to the alternative interpretation - the Tana Kama holds like the Rabbanan (who reduce Tzeroros to Chatzi Nezek), and Yesh Omrim, like Sumchus.

(a) The Mishnah later discusses the case of a dog that took a hot cake together with burning coal and carried them to a haystack. If he subsequently ...

1. ... eats the cake - the owner must pay in full.
2. ... sets fire to the haystack - he pays Chatzi Nezek, because once the fire spreads from the location where the dog placed the coal, it is Tzeroros.

(b) We try to resolve Rava's She'eilah from the Beraisa that qualifies the Mishnah, which states - 'Meshalem Chatzi Nezek mi'Gufo' (a clear proof that Tzeroros pays mi'Gufo).

(c) We reject this resolution on the basis of the opinion of Rebbi Elazar in the Beraisa - who says that he pays full damages for the haystack too (and there is certainly no reason why he should have to pay *full* damages mi'Gufo.

(d) Nor can we establish Rebbi Elazar like Sumchus, and abide by the proof - because Rava's She'eilah was confined to the Rabbanan, who say that Tzeroros pays Chatzi Nezek, and not according to Sumchus.

(a) So we establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Elazar and the Rabbanan when the dog carried the coal in an unusual way (in its mouth). Had he carried it normally, they would both have agreed - that he pays full damages (like Sumchus).

(b) Despite the fact that the burning of the haystack is now a Toldah of Keren, Rebbi Elazar maintains that he pays full damage - because he holds like Rebbi Tarfon, who holds that even Keren pays full damages in the Reshus of the Nizak.

(a) Although the above interpretation of the Beraisa is acceptable, we nevertheless try to reinstate the possibility of resolving Rava's She'eilah (that Chatzi Nezek Teroros pays mi'Gufo as we initially suggested), we establish Rebbi Elazar both like Sumchus (as we just explained) and like Rebbi Yehudah, who says - that 'Tzad Tamus bi'Mekomah Omedes' (meaning that every Mu'ad still pays half of the damage from the body of the Mazik).

(b) 'mi'Gufo', according to Rebbi Elazar - will then refer to the half of the payment which is Tzad Tamus, but not to the other half.

(c) We refute this suggestion however, on the grounds - that Rebbi Yehudah only said 'Tzad Tamus bi'Mekomah Omedes' in the case of a Tam that became a Mu'ad, but not in this case, where the animal was a Mu'ad to start off with.

(d) We finally establish the Machlokes Tana'im - by an animal that damaged three times through Tzeroros. The Tana Kama holds that there is no such thing as Ha'ada'ah for Tzeroros (seeing as the first time it is Urcheih too); whereas, according to Yesh Omrim, there is.

(a) The basic problem with this explanation is- since we are talking about regular Tzeroros, which are Urcheih, what difference does the number of times make? It cannot become more Urcheih than it already is?

(b) The alternative way of explaining Rebbi Elazar (to avoid this problem, though we nevertheless accept the first explanation) would therefore be - to establish the case by when the animal did the Tzeroros in an unusual way, turning it into a Tam.

(c) And the Rabbanan would hold - that there is no such thing as Tam and Mu'ad by Tzeroros.

8)

(a) Rava asks whether 'Yesh Ha'ada'ah li'Tzeroros O Ein Ha'ada'ah li'Tzeroros?'

(b) The two sides of Rava's She'eilah are - whether one has to pay ...

1. ... Nezek Shalem - because since he pays Chatzi Nezek the first time (like Keren), we compare it to Keren in this regard, which pays full damage after three times.
2. ... Nezek Shalem - because it is Urcheih to begin with (as we just explained), and it cannot more Urchei than it already is.

(c) Rava will reconcile his She'eilah with the fact that we just established the Machlokes between the Rabbanan and Rebbi Elazar as to whether there is such a thing as Tam and Mu'ad by Tzeroros or not - by establishing the Machlokes by the first time the animal damages, according to Sumchus (whereas his She'eilah, which refers to the fourth time, follows the opinion of the Rabbanan).

(d) Rava prefers to establish both the Rabbanan and Rebbi Elazar by the first time the animal damaged, according to Sumchus, rather than according to the Rabbanan - because that would be encroaching on the She'eilah of whether, according to them, there is Shinuy by Tzeroros, to pay only a quarter Nezek, and not a half.

(a) Earlier, we established Rebbi Elazar like Rebbi Tarfon, who obligates Keren bi'Reshus ha'Nizak to pay in full. We know that Rebbi Tarfon does not require payment min ha'Aliyah, too - because he learns Keren bi'Reshus ha'Nizak from Keren bi'Reshus ha'Rabim (as we shall see later).
Consequently, he will apply the principle of 'Dayo', which teaches that just as Keren bi'Reshus ha'Rabim pays mi'Gufo, so too does Keren bi'Reshus ha'Nizak, and no more.

(b) In fact, we know that Rebbi Tarfon does not Darshen 'Dayo' - because if he did, then Keren bi'Reshus ha'Nizak would only pay Chatzi Nezek (like it does in the Reshus ha'Rabim).

(c) Nevertheless, he does Darshen it here - because it is only where 'Dayo' would otherwise negate the 'Kal va'Chomer' completely, that he then prefers to rather negate 'Dayo' in order to accommodate the 'Kal va'Chomer'.

(a) Once again quoting the Beraisa 'Hidus Eino Mu'ad; ve'Yesh Omrim, Mu'ad', and amending it to read 'Hidus ve'Hitiz ... ', we try to resolve Rava's She'eilah - by establishing that the Tana Kama holds 'Ein Ha'ada'ah li'Tzeroros', and Yesh Omrim, 'Yesh Ha'ada'ah'.

(b) We refute this proof, as we did the previous ones - by connecting the Machlokes with that of Sumchus (Yesh Omrim) and the Rabbanan (the Tana Kama).

(c) In a case where a animal let droppings on someone's dough, Rav Yehudah obligates the owner to pay in full. Rebbi Elazar says - Chatzi Nezek.

(d) We reconcile Rebbi Elazar here with Rebbi Elazar above who obligated full payment for Tzeroros - by establishing this Rebbi Elazar as Rebbi Elazar ben P'das, the Amora, and the previous one, as Rebbi Elazar ben Shamu'a, the Tana. We know that - because otherwise, how could we then ask (on Tana'im), why they do not rather just state like which Tana they hold (as we are about to do). And besides, if one could ask such a Kashya on Tana'im, then why did we not ask it above, in connection with the Beraisa of Hidus?

(a) If Rav Yehudah and Rebbi Elazar are not arguing about whether 'Yesh Ha'ada'ah li'Tzeroros' (Rava's She'eilah), then the basis of their Machlokes will be - like which Tana they hold, like Sumchus (Rav Yehudah) or the Rabbanan (Rebbi Elazar).

(b) It is indeed unusual for an animal to let droppings on a dough (and Rav Yehudah ought not to obligate him to pay in full). However - we are speaking when the location was crowded, and there was nowhere else for the animal to stand.

(c) The problem with this version of the Machlokes is - that all Rav Yehudah needed to have said was that he ruled like Sumchus and Rebbi Elazar, like the Rabbanan.

(a) Considering that relieving oneself is normally a pleasure (and we are concerned with Tzeroros, which are a Toldah of Regel), we establish that the animal must have been suffering from diarrhea (from which the regular aspect of pleasure is absent). Alternatively - all damages caused in this way are considered Regel, because 'Kocho' is always Regel (even if the animal derives pleasure from what it did).

(b) 'Tanfah Peiros le'Hana'asah' (which we cited in the first Perek as a Toldah of Shen) means - that the animal rolled on the fruit.

(c) Rav Yehudah and Rebbi Elazar form their own Machlokes, rather than Rav Yehudah rule like Sumchus, and Rebbi Elazar, like the Rabbanan - in order to extend the Machlokes to 'Gelalim' (damage by excretion, which drop from the body, and), which we would otherwise have thought are considered Gufo and not Kocho.

(a) Rami bar Yechezkel cites a Beraisa that if a chicken stuck its head inside a glass vessel and broke it by giving a shriek, the owner would be obligated to pay in full. According to Rav Yosef Amri de'Bei Rav, if a horse or a donkey broke a vessel in the same way - he would have to pay half damages.

(b) We try to resolve Rava's She'eilah from this Beraisa - by establishing the Beraisa by when it had already damaged three times, and they argue over whether there is Ha'ada'ah by Tzeroros (Rami bar Yechezkel) or not (Rav Yosef).

(c) After establishing this Machlokes too, like that of Sumchus and the Rabbanan, how do we answer the Kashya, that this is a most unusual thing for an animal to do (in which case everyone ought to agree that he pays only half damages) - by establishing the case when there were seeds in the glass jar, and it would not be at all unusual for the animal to stick its head inside.