REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 88
(a) What does Rebbi Yehudah learn from the Pasuk in Shoftim (in connection
with Bo'shes) "Ki Yinatzu Anashim Yachdav Ish *be'Achiv*"?
(b) How do the Rabbanan counter this? Why do they consider an Eved 'Achiv'?
(c) In that case, bearing in mind that the Torah writes "va'Asisem Lo
Ka'asher Zamam La'asos "Le'Achiv*", how does Rava Amar Rav Huna explain why
witnesses who testify that an Eved murdered, for example, and who then
become Zomemin, are Chayav Miysah?
(a) Based on the fact that an Eved is called 'Achicha', what do we ask from
the Pasuk in Shoftim "mi'Kerev *Achecha* Tasim Alecha Melech"? What would we
(b) How do we counter this Kashya from a Ger?
(c) Why in fact, are neither a Ger nor an Eved eligible to sit on the
(a) And what do we then ask from the Pasuk in Shoftim "ve'Hineh Eid Sheker
ha'Eid, Sheker Anah *be'Achiv*"?
(b) We answer that if a woman, who is fit to marry into the community, is
not eligible to testify, how much more so an Eved, who is Pasul.
we learn from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with Eidim Zomemin)
"ve'Amdu Sh'nei *ha'Anashim*"? Which two people does this come to preclude?
(c) We ask on the above Limud from Ishah however, 'Mah le'Ishah she'Kein
How do we counter this Kashya? If we cannot learn it from
a woman alone, whom will we add to turn it into a "Mah ha'Tzad'?
(d) Why do we then need Ishah? Why can we not learn it from Katan alone?
(a) What is now the Tzad ha'Shaveh between Ishah and Katan, which enables us
to learn that an Eved too, is not eligible to testify? What do all three
have in common?
(b) What Pircha do we ask on this 'Mah ha'Tzad'? What intrinsic advantage
does an Eved have over an Ishah and a Katan?
(c) We then try and learn Eved from Gazlan.
On what grounds do we reject
(d) So from where do we finally learn that an Eved is Pasul le'Eidus?
(a) Mar B'rei de'Ravina learns it from another source.
Seeing as the Torah does not intend to make a D'rashah from the Seifa, why
did it write "u'Vanim Lo Yumsu Al Avos" (which implies 'al-Pi Banim she'Ein
Lahem Chayas Avos')? Why did it not rather write "u'Vanim Lo Yumsu Al
How does he
interpret the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Lo Yumsu Avos Al Banim"?
(b) What prompts him to interpret the Pasuk like this? Why does he not
interpret it literally?
(c) If that is so, we ask, why do we not also Darshen the continuation of
the Pasuk "u'Vanim Lo Yumsu Al Avos" 'Lo Yumsu al-Pi Banim she'Ein Lahem
Whom would this then preclude from testifying?
(d) We refute this Kashya on the grounds that even if a Ger does not have
Yichus upwards, he does have Yichus downwards (seeing as his children are
Meyuchas after him).
So what if he does? Why can the Torah not preclude an
Eved (who has no Yichus at all) from testifying, from the Reisha, and a Ger
(who does not have Yichus le'Ma'alah) from the Seifa?
Answers to questions
(a) To whom did Rav Shmuel bar Aba's mother bequeath her property before she
(b) In whose possession did Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba place the property when Rav
Shmuel bar Aba came before him with his Sh'tar?
(c) Rebbi Aba, unhappy with Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba's ruling, took the case to
Rav Hoshaya, who presented the case to Rav Yehudah.
What did Rav Yehudah
quote Shmuel as saying?
(d) Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba replied that he had the support of a Mishnah in
What does he set out to prove from there?
(a) The Tana there says that if someone bequeaths his property (by means of
a Sh'tar) to his son 'from today and after his death', his son is not
permitted to sell the property during his father's lifetime, because it is
still in his father's Reshus.
Is the father permitted to sell it?
(b) That is Lechatchilah. Bedieved, is the sale valid if ...
(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba establishes the inference (that when the father
dies, the son's sale is valid) even when the son died before the father.
This is the opinion of Resh Lakish.
- ... the father sold the property?
- ... the son sold it?
What is the reason for this?
(d) What does Rebbi Yochanan hold? How does he interpret the Mishnah as
opposed to Resh Lakish?
(a) Why do we assume that both Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba and Rav Yehudah both
hold like Resh Lakish against Rebbi Yochanan (despite the principle that the
Halachah is generally like the latter)?
(b) If indeed, Rav Yehudah does hold like Resh Lakish, he will have to
explain why he sided with Rebbi Aba against his son Rav Shmuel in the
When confronted with this Kashya, what did he quote
Shmuel as saying?
(c) Rav Yosef initially interprets Shmuel's statement to mean that the proof
for Resh Lakish would have been acceptable had the Mishnah reversed the
What does he mean by that?
(d) If, on the other hand, the Tana's reason for validating the son's sale
even when he died first, is not because of 'Kinyan Peyros La'av ke'Kinyan
ha'Guf, then what is?
(a) On what grounds do we refute Rav Yosef's argument? Why is there no real
difference between whether it is the father who is the recipient of the
field or the son? So how is the Tana speaking?
(b) What do both cases therefore have in common? Why would each of them
bequeath his property to the other one during his lifetime?
(c) So why does the Kinyan Peyros of the father not prevent the son's sale
from becoming valid when he dies, even if he (the son) died first?
(a) We conclude that when Shmuel said that the Mishnah in Bava Basra is
different, he was referring to a statement of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina.
What, according to Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina, did the Chachamim institute
Answers to questions
(b) Why did they institute this Takanah?
(c) How do we finally reconcile Rav Yehudah, who holds 'Kinyan Peyros La'av
ke'Kinyan ha'Guf', like Resh Lakish, with the fact that he placed the
property of Rav Shmuel bar Aba's mother in Rebbi Aba's possession?