Previous daf

1)

(a) What does Rebbi Yehudah learn from the Pasuk in Shoftim (in connection with Bo'shes) "Ki Yinatzu Anashim Yachdav Ish *be'Achiv*"?

(b) How do the Rabbanan counter this? Why do they consider an Eved 'Achiv'?

(c) In that case, bearing in mind that the Torah writes "va'Asisem Lo Ka'asher Zamam La'asos "Le'Achiv*", how does Rava Amar Rav Huna explain why witnesses who testify that an Eved murdered, for example, and who then become Zomemin, are Chayav Miysah?

(a) Based on the fact that an Eved is called 'Achicha', what do we ask from the Pasuk in Shoftim "mi'Kerev *Achecha* Tasim Alecha Melech"? What would we have thought?

(b) How do we counter this Kashya from a Ger?

(c) Why in fact, are neither a Ger nor an Eved eligible to sit on the throne?

(a) And what do we then ask from the Pasuk in Shoftim "ve'Hineh Eid Sheker ha'Eid, Sheker Anah *be'Achiv*"?

(b) We answer that if a woman, who is fit to marry into the community, is not eligible to testify, how much more so an Eved, who is Pasul.
What do we learn from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with Eidim Zomemin) "ve'Amdu Sh'nei *ha'Anashim*"? Which two people does this come to preclude?

(c) We ask on the above Limud from Ishah however, 'Mah le'Ishah she'Kein Einah be'Milah?'
How do we counter this Kashya? If we cannot learn it from a woman alone, whom will we add to turn it into a "Mah ha'Tzad'?

(d) Why do we then need Ishah? Why can we not learn it from Katan alone?

(a) What is now the Tzad ha'Shaveh between Ishah and Katan, which enables us to learn that an Eved too, is not eligible to testify? What do all three have in common?

(b) What Pircha do we ask on this 'Mah ha'Tzad'? What intrinsic advantage does an Eved have over an Ishah and a Katan?

(c) We then try and learn Eved from Gazlan.
On what grounds do we reject this Limud?

(d) So from where do we finally learn that an Eved is Pasul le'Eidus?

(a) Mar B'rei de'Ravina learns it from another source.
How does he interpret the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Lo Yumsu Avos Al Banim"?

(b) What prompts him to interpret the Pasuk like this? Why does he not interpret it literally?

(c) If that is so, we ask, why do we not also Darshen the continuation of the Pasuk "u'Vanim Lo Yumsu Al Avos" 'Lo Yumsu al-Pi Banim she'Ein Lahem Chayas Avos'?
Whom would this then preclude from testifying?

(d) We refute this Kashya on the grounds that even if a Ger does not have Yichus upwards, he does have Yichus downwards (seeing as his children are Meyuchas after him).
So what if he does? Why can the Torah not preclude an Eved (who has no Yichus at all) from testifying, from the Reisha, and a Ger (who does not have Yichus le'Ma'alah) from the Seifa?

7)

(a) To whom did Rav Shmuel bar Aba's mother bequeath her property before she died?

(b) In whose possession did Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba place the property when Rav Shmuel bar Aba came before him with his Sh'tar?

(c) Rebbi Aba, unhappy with Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba's ruling, took the case to Rav Hoshaya, who presented the case to Rav Yehudah.
What did Rav Yehudah quote Shmuel as saying?

(d) Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba replied that he had the support of a Mishnah in Bava Basra.
What does he set out to prove from there?

(a) The Tana there says that if someone bequeaths his property (by means of a Sh'tar) to his son 'from today and after his death', his son is not permitted to sell the property during his father's lifetime, because it is still in his father's Reshus.
Is the father permitted to sell it?

(b) That is Lechatchilah. Bedieved, is the sale valid if ...

1. ... the father sold the property?
2. ... the son sold it?

(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba establishes the inference (that when the father dies, the son's sale is valid) even when the son died before the father. This is the opinion of Resh Lakish.
What is the reason for this?

(d) What does Rebbi Yochanan hold? How does he interpret the Mishnah as opposed to Resh Lakish?

(a) Why do we assume that both Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba and Rav Yehudah both hold like Resh Lakish against Rebbi Yochanan (despite the principle that the Halachah is generally like the latter)?

(b) If indeed, Rav Yehudah does hold like Resh Lakish, he will have to explain why he sided with Rebbi Aba against his son Rav Shmuel in the current lawsuit.
When confronted with this Kashya, what did he quote Shmuel as saying?

(c) Rav Yosef initially interprets Shmuel's statement to mean that the proof for Resh Lakish would have been acceptable had the Mishnah reversed the case.
What does he mean by that?

(d) If, on the other hand, the Tana's reason for validating the son's sale even when he died first, is not because of 'Kinyan Peyros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf, then what is?

(a) On what grounds do we refute Rav Yosef's argument? Why is there no real difference between whether it is the father who is the recipient of the field or the son? So how is the Tana speaking?

(b) What do both cases therefore have in common? Why would each of them bequeath his property to the other one during his lifetime?

(c) So why does the Kinyan Peyros of the father not prevent the son's sale from becoming valid when he dies, even if he (the son) died first?

(a) We conclude that when Shmuel said that the Mishnah in Bava Basra is different, he was referring to a statement of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina. What, according to Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina, did the Chachamim institute in Usha?

(b) Why did they institute this Takanah?

(c) How do we finally reconcile Rav Yehudah, who holds 'Kinyan Peyros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf', like Resh Lakish, with the fact that he placed the property of Rav Shmuel bar Aba's mother in Rebbi Aba's possession?

Next daf