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1)

(a) We already discussed the Mishnah 'ha'Sefeikos Nichnasos le'Dir le'His'aser'. The Tana cannot be referring to Safek Bechoros - because the Torah writes in Bechukosai (in connection with Ma'aser Beheimah) "ve'Hayah Kodesh", and not an animal that is Kodesh already.

(b) He must therefore be referring to Safek Pitrei Chamor. What makes a Safek Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor different in this regard than a Safek Bechor is - the fact that the lamb of Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor has no Kedushah.

(c) This ruling is based on a statement of Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah, who stated that someone who has ten Safek Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor in his house - is obligated to separate ten lambs to redeem them, which he then Ma'asers and eats.

(a) We finally resolve the She'eilah of the bathhouse (where one of the disputants declared it Hekdesh, and the Rabbanan stopped frequenting it) from a case that occurred with Rav Huna, who quoted Rav Nachman, who ruled - that if someone declares money that one cannot extract in Beis-Din Hekdesh, his declaration is invalid.

(b) The problem with the obvious inference (that when it comes to money that one *can* extract in Beis-Din, then his Hekdesh is valid [which would resolve our She'eilah of the bathhouse]) is that it clashes with a statement of Rebbi Yochanan, who rules - that if Reuven robbed Shimon who has not yet been Meya'esh - then neither of them can declare the stolen article Hekdesh, Reuven, because it is not his, and Shimon, because it is not under his jurisdiction.

(c) We reconcile the case of the bathhouse and Rav Nachman's ruling with Rebbi Yochanan - by establishing the former by a bathhouse, which is Karka and the latter by a bath-tub, which is Metaltelin.

(d) The distinction between a bathhouse that is Metaltelin and one that is Karka is based o the fact - that whereas the former remains in the owner's domain (as long as he is able to extract it Halachically from the current holder), the latter is in the domain of whoever has it in his possession, and not of the owner (even if he is able to extract it ... ).

(a) Rav Tachlifa quoting a Beraisa says that if two people are holding a Talis - then each one takes whatever he is holding in his hand, and the rest, they divide.

(b) Rebbi Avahu, in front of whom he was quoting the Beraisa, - signalled to him that they require a Shevu'ah, too.

(c) According to Rav Tachlifa, our Mishnah, which says nothing about each one taking whatever he is holding, must be speaking - when they are holding the tassels at the edge of the Talis.

(a) Rav Mesharshaya extrapolates from Rav Tachlifa - that when the seller takes hold of three finger-breadths of the purchaser's Sudar, he has fulfilled "ve'Nasan le'Re'eihu" and effected the Kinyan, because the piece of cloth that he is holding is considered as if it was detached (like the piece of Talis that each one is holding according to Rav Tachlifa).

(b) A Mashehu will not however, suffice - because a Kinyan Sudar requires a vessel, as we learned in Kidushin, and the minimum size of a garment is three finger-breadths.

(c) Rav Chisda says that if a woman is holding the Get, but the strings are still in the hands of her husband - then as long as he can pull the Get to him with the strings, she is not divorced.

(d) We cannot say there too, that since the woman is holding the Get, it is as if it was detached from the string - because whereas a Kinyan constitutes giving the object, the criterion of a Get is 'K'riysus' (a distinct separation).

(a) Rava says that if the Talis is made of gold, they divide it. He is not coming to exclude anything with that statement - only to extend the Din of our Mishnah to a golden Talis.

(b) Of course the material of which the Talis is made makes no difference. The Tana however, is speaking in a case when there is a golden patch in the middle, but slightly to one side. We might have thought - that Reuven, to whom the gold is closer, can insist on dividing the Talis widthways, in which case he will receive the entire golden patch. The Chidush is that Shimon can counter that they divide it lengthwise, so that they each receive half the gold.

(a) According to ...

1. ... Rebbi, if Reuven and Shimon are holding on to a Sh'tar, Reuven claims that he is the creditor who he lost it and subsequently found it, whereas the debtor counters that it was indeed Reuven's Sh'tar, but that he had repaid his debt, Reuven had returned him the Sh'tar and that he was the one to have lost it, the Sh'tar is confirmed by its signatories. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says - 'Yachloku'.
2. ... the Tana Kama, if the Sh'tar falls into the hands of the Dayan, it can never be claimed. Rebbi Yossi says - that it needs to be confirmed by its signatories.

(b) In the Reisha, Rebbi rules that the Sh'tar is confirmed by its signatories. If the Beraisa was speaking about a confirmed Sh'tar, he would concede 'Yachloku' like out Mishnah. But Rava Amar Rav Nachman establishes the Beraisa by an unconfirmed Sh'tar.

(c) When Rebbi says ''Yiskayem be'Chosamav' - he (does not mean that if the witnesses do confirm the Sh'tar, then the creditor takes all. What he) means (is) that if they don't confirm the Sh'tar, he gets nothing, in spite of the fact that the debtor admits to having written the Sh'tar (because the debtor [who after all, is the one to validate it in the first place] is believed when he claims that he paid).

(d) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel however, holds - that once the debtor admits to having written the Sh'tar, he is no longer believed to claim that he paid. Consequently, he rules 'Yachloku', whether the witnesses confirm the Sh'tar or not.

7)

(a) According to the Tana Kama of the Beraisa, if the Sh'tar falls into the hands of the Dayan, it can never be claimed. In fact however, there is no difference between a Sh'tar that is found by a Dayan or one that is found by anybody else. We therefore establish the Seifa - when the Sh'tar is found by a third person (any third person), and it had a Henpek (meaning that it has been verified by the Beis-Din and contains their official stamp).

(b) The reason that the Sh'tar is not returned is in spite of the fact that it has been verified by Beis-Din (not because of it).

(c) Rebbi Yossi is not worried that the Sh'tar may have been paid - because a debtor who receives the Sh'tar upon payment normally takes precautions and tears it up immediately.

(a) In another Beraisa, the Tana'im discuss a Sh'tar Kesuvah that is found in the street. The finder must return it to the woman, even if she is already divorced - provided the husband admits that it has not yet been paid.

(b) According to Rebbi Yossi, the criterion for returning the Kesuvah is - that she is not yet divorced (because then, it has probably not yet been paid).

(c) We see from this Beraisa that Rebbi Yossi is concerned that a lost Sh'tar may have been paid. To solve the discrepancy in Rebbi Yossi - we switch the opinions in the first Beraisa, in which case, it is now Rebbi Yossi who holds 'Lo Yotzi'u Olamis'.

(d) However, this creates a problem with the Rabbanan, who are now of the opinion that we are *not worried* that a lost Sh'tar might be paid, whereas in the Beraisa, they hold that we *are*.

(a) We conclude that the Rabbanan are indeed not concerned that a lost Sh'tar may have been paid, and that the sole opinion in the second Beraisa is Rebbi Yossi, who maintains - that it is only after the woman is divorced that we believe the husband when he claims that the Sh'tar has been paid, but not if they are still married.

(b) According to Rav Papa, Rebbi Yossi is indeed not concerned that a lost Sh'tar may have been paid, like the original version of his statement in the first Beraisa. In that case, when in the second Beraisa, Rebbi Yossi differentiates between whether the Sh'tar Kesuvah was found before the divorce or afterwards, he is really saying to the Rabbanan - 'In my opinion, it makes no difference, because either way, the Kesuvah ought to be returned (even if the husband claims that it has been paid). But won't you at least concede that as long as they are married, the Sh'tar must be returned, and the husband is not believed to say that it has been paid'?

(c) The Rabbanan do not in fact concede this to Rebbi Yossi - because they suspect that, in the course of the marriage, the husband may have given her 'Tzareri' (bundles of money to put away as advance payment of her Kesuvah) ...

(d) ... to spare his children from having to pay her Kesuvah in the event of his death.

(a) Ravina reverts to the original explanation, switching the opinions in the first Beraisa. He reconciles the Rabbanan in the second Beraisa with the Rabbanan in the first - by switching the husband's claim that the Kesuvah has already been paid (which they *would not believe*), to where he claims that he wrote her a new Kesuvah, which they *do*.

(b) Rebbi Yossi - does not believe that claim either, because if he had written her a second Kesuvah, there would have been a 'Kol' and everyone would have known about it (Shitah Mekubetzes).

(a) Rebbi Elazar establishes Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Reisha of the Beraisa, who rules (in the case where the creditor and the debtor enter Beis-Din holding the Sh'tar) 'Yachloku' - when they are either both holding the Toref, or the Tofes.

(b) The ...

1. ... Toref of a Sh'tar - is the main part of the document, containing the names, the amount and the date.
2. ... Tofes - contains the rest of the data.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan says - 'Le'olam Cholkin'.

(d) What Rebbi Yochanan really mean when he says 'Yachloku' is - that 'Cholkin' applies even when the Toref is in the middle. What makes us so certain that he is not coming to argue with Rebbi Elazar is - the Beraisa which teaches that each disputant takes whatever he is holding.

(a) When Rebbi Yochanan says that 'Cholkin' pertains to even when the Toref is in the middle - he is referring to a case where it slightly to one side, and the Chidush is that the one who is closest to it, cannot insist that they divide it length-ways ... , as we explained above.

(b) According to Rebbi Elazar, who holds that if one of them is holding the Toref and the other, the Tofes, each takes what he is holding, the debtor gains by this (not just a bottle-stopper, but) - a fair reduction in the debt. Because they do not just cut the Sh'tar in two, but assess the independent value of the Toref and of the Tofes, and, assuming that the debtor is holding the Tofes, he pays the difference.

(c) The advantage that the Toref has over the Tofes is - the fact that it contains the date, which enables the creditor to claim from Meshubadim, making the Sh'tar more valuable.

(d) Despite the fact that the ...

1. ... Toref contains the main points of the Sh'tar, the Tofes has its own intrinsic value - seeing as the basic Toref is repeated in the Tofes (but not the date).
2. ... Tofes contains the signature, and not the Toref, the Toref nevertheless has its own intrinsic value - due to the fact that we are speaking where the debtor confessed to having written the Sh'tar, and according to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds 'Modeh bi'Sh'tar she'Kasvo, Ein Tzarich Le'kaymo'.

(a) We try to prove that 'Yachloku' in the Beraisa must also mean value-wise (meaning that they sell it and share the proceeds or that one of them takes the Sh'tar, and pays the other, half its value) from 'Shenayim Ochzin be'Talis' in our Mishnah - because otherwise, of what use is a cut-up Talis?

(b) We refute ...

1. ... this proof - by pointing out that a cut-up Talis might make a perfectly good Talis for a small child.
2. ... a similar proof from Rava, who rules 'Cholkin' in the case of a golden Talis too - on the grounds that a small golden Talis (may not be appropriate for a regular child, but it) is fit for a young prince.

(c) We cannot prove that 'Cholkin' means 'li'D'mei', from the case in our Mishnah where the two disputants claimed the cow that they were riding - because a cow can be Shechted and shared by two people.

(d) We finally prove it - from the case where they ride into Beis-Din on a donkey which they both claim is theirs and which would have n use if it were cut into half.