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1)

(a) Rebbi Elazar learns from "ve'Chei Achicha Imach" that Ribis Ketzutzah Yotz'ah be'Dayanim'. Rebbi Yochanan learns from there - that one's own life takes precedence over that of one's fellow-Jew ("Imach", 'with you' but you come first). See Shitah Mekubetzes quoting Talmid Rabeinu Peretz.

(b) In a case where one of two travelers in a desert had a flask containing sufficient water for one, Pen Petura Darshened - that it is better for them to share the water and die, than for one of them to drink it and see his friend die.

(c) Based on the previous D'rashah, Rebbi Akiva ruled - that the owner of the water should drink, because, as we just explained, one's own life takes precedence over that of one's fellow-Jew.

(a) From the Beraisa which exempts the sons from returning the Ribis that their father left them, we infer - that their father would have been obligated to do so.

(b) This appears to clash with Rebbi Yochanan. To reconcile his opinion with the Beraisa, Rebbi Yochanan cites the Seifa of the Beraisa, which states that where the father left Ribis in the form of a cow, a Tallis or anything specific - the sons are obligated to return it because of Kavod Avihem.

(c) Consequently, we can say - that the Reisha exempts the sons from returning the Ribis that their father left them (not to preclude their father, but) in order to balance the Seifa, where the Tana obligates them to pay.

(a) The intrinsic problem with the Seifa of the Beraisa is - that the sons ought to be Patur from paying because they are only Chayav to honor their father as long as he behaves like a Jew ('be'Oseh Ma'aseh Amcha' [as we extrapolate from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ve'Nasi *be'Amcha* Lo Sa'or"), but not when he transgresses Torah La'avin (such as that of Ribis).

(b) To answer this Kashya, we cite Rav Pinchas, who establishes a similar case when the sinner did Teshuvah (in which case, their father re-enters the realm of 'Oseh Ma'aseh Amcha').

(c) Despite the fact that the father did Teshuvah, as Rav Pinchas maintains, he still had the Ribis in his possession when he died - because he died before he had a chance to return it.

(a) The problem with the Beraisa 'ha'Gazlanim u'Malvei be'Ribis, Af-al-Pi she'Gavu Machzirin' lies - in the phrase 'Af-al-Pi she'Gavu'. The Gazlan must have taken the article, otherwise why call him a Gazlan?

(b) So we amend the Beraisa to read - 'ha'Gazlanim u'Mai Niyhu, Malvei be'Ribis'.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan (who holds that the creditor *is not obligated* to return the Ribis that he claimed) - nevertheless admits that it is a Machlokes Tana'im, and that this Tana holds that he *is*.

(d) Rebbi Nechemyah and Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, in another Beraisa, exempt the creditor and the guarantor from Malkos because they have an Asei to fulfill - which we initially assume to be that of returning the Ribis to the debtor (which in turn, we learn from "ve'Chei Achicha Imach").

(a) The Tana Kama (of the current Beraisa) will then hold - that once the Ribis has been paid, there is no Asei (like the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan).

(b) We conclude however, that the Asei is to tear up the Sh'tar, and the La'av referred to by the Tana is - "Lo Sesimun Alav Neshech" ('Shuma', which all the participants transgress, as we shall see later), but which they only transgress retroactively when the debtor pays [according to this opinion]).

(c) This Tana holds 'Sh'tar ha'Omed Ligavos La'av ke'Gavuy Dami' (a Kasher Sh'tar is not considered as if it had already been claimed). Otherwise, tearing the Sh'tar would make no difference (any more than it now does after the Ribis has been paid).

(d) The Chidush of the Beraisa is - that 'Shuma Milsa Hi' (the assessment itself is a La'av (and is punishable by Malkos). And we prove it by citing a Mishnah later - that includes the witnesses, who have no hand in the actual claiming of the debt (like the creditor, the debtor and the guarantor do), among those who transgress the La'av of Ribis.

(e) Rebbi Yochanan now reconciles his opinion with the Tana of the Beraisa - by establishing that both Tana'im actually hold that if the debtor had paid the Ribis, the creditor would not be obligated to return it (though the Tana of the previous Beraisa disagrees [see also Tosfos DH 'Lo']).

(a) The criterion Rav Safra gives for the creditor to be obligated to return the Ribis is - whatever the Nochri courts would have forced the debtor to pay in the first place.

(b) Abaye queries Rav Safra from 'Sa'ah be'Sa'ah' - which the Nochri courts obligate the debtor to pay, yet we do not obligate the creditor to return the money once it has been paid.

(c) To which Rav Safra replied - that his statement was confined strictly to the obligation to pay in the form of Ribis, whereas the Nochri courts' obligation for the debtor to pay the creditor the Sa'ah, is based on their considering it a Pikadon which must be returned.

(a) Ravina asked Rav Ashi the same Kashya (as Abaye asked Rav Safra) from Mashkanta be'Lo Nachyasa, which the Nochrim force the debtor to pay, yet we do not obligate the creditor to return (because it is Avak Ribis). A 'Mashkanta be'Lo Nachyasa' is - when Reuven lends Shimon money against a vineyard, say, from which he eats the fruit, but without reducing the loan in accordance with what he eats.

(b) To which Rav Ashi replied (like Rav Safra replied earlier) - that the Nochri courts obligation is based on the fact that they consider the vineyard as being sold to the creditor (and not in the form of Ribis).

(c) When Rav Safra says ...

1. ... 'Kol she'Ilu be'Dineihem Motzi'in, be'Dineinu Machzirin' - he is referring to Ribis Ketzutzah (that is fixed together with the loan).
2. ... 'Kol she'Ilu be'Dineihem Ein Motzi'in, be'Dineinu Ein Machzirin' - he is referring to a sum that the debtor pays impromptu before or after the loan.

(d) Rav Safra holds like Rebbi Elazar.

8)

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that if Reuven owes Shimon wheat that he sold him for a Dinar Zahav, and the price rises to thirty Dinrim, he is forbidden to transfer the debt from wheat on to wine (even if the price of wine is already fixed). The problem with this is - that, seeing as the price of wine is already fixed, why is it any more forbidden than in the Reisha (due to the S'vara 'Im Ein la'Zeh, Yesh La'Zeh'?

(b) When Rabah answers by establishing the Mishnah 'be'Ba La'chov bi'Demeihen', he means - that the Tana is speaking when Shimon first transfers the debt (which has now increased due to the price of wheat having increased) on to money before transferring it again on to wine ('de'La'av ke'Isro ha'Ba le'Yado Dami' [i.e. he borrowed twenty-five Dinrim and pays back thirty]).

(c) The Beraisa forbids it - because 'de'La'av ke'Isro ha'Ba le'Yado Dami' (this is not comparable to a case where the seller received money, with which he is able to purchase the wheat or the wine; whereas in this case Shimon received nothing at the time of the transfer).

(d) The problem that Abaye has with Rabah's answer is - if that if so, it ought to be forbidden even if the seller does have wine (yet the Tana permits it?).

(a) So Abaye establishes our Mishnah like Rav Safra learned by Ribis de'Bei Rav, who said in a case where Reuven lends Shimon wheat worth a Manah instead of the Manah that he asked him for, which he then buys back from him for twenty-four Sela'im (because Shimon needs the money immediately). Rav Safra rules there that although it is basically permitted - the Rabbanan nevertheless forbade it, because it looks like Ribis (since it began with a request for a loan of money).

(b) This is not proper Ribis - because it was not Shimon who gave Reuven more than the value of the wheat as payment for the loan, but Reuven who lowered the price for his own benefit.

(c) The equivalent case in our Mishnah will be - if Reuven lends Shimon wheat worth thirty Dinrim instead of the thirty Dinrim he asked for. Shimon then asks Reuven to purchase the wheat from him for twenty-five Dinrim, and Reuven pays him the money. Then when the latter claims his thirty Dinrim (for the loan of wheat) in order to buy wine, Shimon transfers the wine that he would have given him had he possessed it, on to money.

(d) And it is forbidden - because in fact, Reuven gave Shimon twenty-five Dinrim cash and received thirty, which looks like Ribis.

(a) Rava queries Abaye's explanation from various angles. In answer to Rava's Kashya as to why the Mishnah says ...

1. ... 'Ten Li Chitai' (rather than 'D'mei Chitai) - he amends the Lashon to 'Ten Li D'mei Chitai'.
2. ... ' ... she'Ani Rotzeh le'Mochran' (rather than 'she'Mechartim Lach') - he amends it to 'she'Mechartim Lach'.

(b) And he explains 'Harei Chitech Asuyos Alai bi'Sheloshim Dinar' (seeing as that is what they were worth to begin with) as if the Tana had written - 'bi'Demei Chitecha she'Asisa Alai bi'Sheloshim Dinar'.

(c) Rava finally refutes Abaye's explanation from the words 'be'Dinar Zahav ha'Kur, ve'Chein ha'Sha'ar'. This disproves Abaye - according to whom the market-price was thirty Dinrim, when he purchased the wheat for twenty-five (at less than the market price).

(d) The problem in establishing Abaye's case when the market price was a Dinar Zahav (to conform with our Mishnah) - would be that, when Reuven initially assessed the wheat that he lent Shimon at thirty Dinrim, that would be pure Ribis.