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1)

(a) We just learned in our Mishnah that if, at the Sho'el's behest, the owner sends his cow with his Eved, and an O'nes occurs on the way, the Sho'el is liable. The problem with this is - that based on the principle 'Yad Eved ke'Yad Rabo', the cow remains in the owner's domain until it reaches the Shoel, so why should the Sho'el be liable?

(b) According to Shmuel, the Tana is referring to an Eved Ivri - whose master does not acquire him (and to whom the principle 'Yad Eved ke'Yad Rabo' does therefore not apply).

(c) Rav establishes the Mishnah even by an Eved Cana'ani - because when the Sho'el asked the owner to send him the cow with the Eved, it is as if he explicitly told him to hit it with a stick and it will go to him with the Eved in attendance.

(d) To accommodate the Beraisa 'ha'Sho'el Parah ... be'Yad Avdo, Patur' however, we will have to amend it to read (not that it is 'as if he explicitly told him to hit it with a stick ... ', but) that he actually told him to do so, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he did not.

(a) In a case where the Sho'el tells the owner ' ... Hikishah be'Makel, ve'Tavo', Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah Amar Rav rules - that he is Chayav.

(b) The Beraisa seems to echo Rav's statement, yet Rav has no proof from there for his ruling - because the Tana might be speaking when the Sho'el's field leads directly into that of the owner, where the Sho'el accepts responsibility because he knows that the cow has nowhere else to go. But in his case, where the cow has to find its way to his field, he does not place his trust in it's ability to achieve that.

(c) The Chidush of the Beraisa will then be - that although there are various nooks and crannies in the owner's field, where the cow might run to hide, nevertheless, the Sho'el trusts that, if the owner hits it with a stick and guides it towards the entrance of his field, the cow will ultimately make its way there, so he undertakes to guard it immediately.

(d) 'Gazyasa' means - hiding-places.

(a) Rav Huna states that someone who borrows a chopper from his friend only acquires it - once he actually chops with it.

(b) It is not feasible to interpret this in terms of when he becomes liable to pay - because why should the Din differ here from that of a person who borrows a cow, who becomes liable as soon as he acquires it (with Meshichah).

(c) Rav Huna must therefore be speaking - with regard to being able to retract. In other words, from the moment he acquires the chopper he is liable to pay for Onsin, though he is still able to retract until he actually chops with it.

(a) Rav Huna clearly disagrees with Rebbi Ami, who rules - that as soon as Reuven inadvertently lends Shimon a chopper belonging to Hekdesh ...

1. ... he is Mo'el, and ...
2. ... Shimon is permitted to use it (because it has already gone out to Chulin).

(b) Reuven is obligated to pay Hekesh - as much as he would pay to find favor with Shimon in this way?

(c) This does not conform with Rav Huna's previous ruling, because, according to Rav Huna - since Reuven can still retract, why should he be Mo'el, and why should Shimon be permitted to use the chopper?

(d) Nor does Rav Huna hold like Rebbi Elazar, who rules - that just as the Chachamim instituted Meshichah with regard to a purchaser (to forbid him to retract), so too, did they institute it with regard to a Sho'el.

(a) We know for sure that Rebbi Elazar's opinion is Halachah - because it has the support of a Beraisa.

(b) In light of what the Tana just said in the Reisha, when the Tana continues that just as Karka is acquired with Kesef, Sh'tar and Chazakah, so too is Sechirus acquired in those three ways, he must be referring to - Sechirus Karka.

6)

(a) In a case where somebody stole a bunch of pressed dates which, collectively, are worth forty-nine P'rutos, but if sold one at a time, they go for fifty, Shmuel rules that, if he stole them from ...

1. ... a Hedyot - he pays forty-nine P'rutos.
2. ... Hekdesh - he pays fifty P'rutos plus the extra fifth that is Hekdesh's due.

(b) The Din regarding Hekdesh would differ if he *damaged* Hekdesh - inasmuch as, based on the Pasuk "ve'Ish Ki Yochal Kodesh" ("Ki Yochal", 'P'rat le'Mazik'), he would not need to pay the extra fifth.

(c) In the case of Hedyot, the owner cannot demand fifty P'rutos, on the grounds that he would have sold them them one by one, because we learn from the Pasuk "ve'Ish Ki Yav'er Sadeh O Kerem" - that we reckon the damages done to a row of vegetables, say, as part of a Beis-Sa'ah, and not on its own, from which we see that the Torah takes a lenient line with regard to assessing damages.

(a) The Mishnah in Me'ilah absolves from Me'ilah the treasurer of Hekdesh who took a stone or beam belonging to Hekdesh - because it was already in his domain, in which case he has not taken them out of the domain of Hekdesh.

(b) The Tana rules furthermore, that in a case where the treasurer ...

1. ... gave it to his friend - he (the treasurer) is Mo'el (and not his friend when he subsequently uses it [because it already left Hekdesh's domain when it was handed to him]).
2. ... built it into his mansion - the treasurer is not Mo'el until he sits underneath it (because that is when he benefits from it).

(c) Rebbi Avahu quoting Shmuel extrapolates from this latter Din - that someone who resides in his friend's Chatzer without his consent is obligated to pay him (because he extrapolated Hedyot from Hekdesh).

(a) This latter ruling of Shmuel appears to contradict his previous set of rulings concerning the pressed dates regarding Hedyot and Hekdesh - because whereas here, he learns Hedyot from Hekdesh, there he declined to learn one from the other.

(b) We resolve this discrepancy - by pointing out that Shmuel retracted from the latter statement (according to some, this is even what Rebbi Yochanan told Rebbi Avahu).

(c) We know that it is from the latter statement that he retracted, and not from the earlier one, from a statement by Rava, who said 'Hekdesh she'Lo mi'Da'as - ke'Hedyot mi'Da'as Dami'.

(d) By that he means - that anyone is able to take Hekdesh at any time, and the Owner of Hekdesh knows about it but declares that he is Mo'el. Consequently, we cannot learn the case of 'ha'Dar ba'Chatzar Chaveiro she'Lo mi'Da'ato' from there - since there, the owner doesn't know and perhaps doesn't mind his friend living there.

(a) In a case where porters broke a barrel of wine belonging to a storekeeper, assuming that the barrel could be sold for five Zuz on market-day and four on other days, if he paid him on market-day, Rava rules that they must pay a barrel of wine. By 'on market day' - he means any time before market-day (since he will able to sell it when market-day arrives [see Tosfos DH 'Ahadru Lei']).

(b) If they come to pay only after market-day - then they will have to pay five Zuz (see also Hagahos ha'G'ra 2).

(c) They will only need to pay him back a barrel of wine, even after market day however - if, after market-day, the storekeeper was left with barrels of wine which he had been unable to sell.

(d) When they pay him five Zuz, they deduct 'Agar Tircheih' and 'D'mei Karzanyasa' or 'D'mei Barzanyasa'. 'Agar Tircheih' is the amount of money the storekeeper would be willing to accept not to have to sit in his store and sell the wine (ke'Po'el Batel, seeing as in fact, he was spared from having to do this).

1. 'D'mei Karzanyasa' means - the cost of the man he would have had to hire to announce that he had wine to sell.
2. 'D'mei Barzanyasa' means - the cost of drilling a hole or of installing a tap in the barrel.