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1)

(a) What does the Tana of our Mishnah say about ...

1. ... a Shomer Chinam stipulating that he will be Patur from a Shevu'ah, and a Sho'el that he will exempt from paying?
2. ... a stipulation that contravenes what the Torah says?
3. ... a condition that is preceded by the act that the condition comes to qualify?

(b) What is an example of this ruling?

(c) What can we infer from the Mishnah's statement 've'Chol she'Efshar Lo Le'kaymo be'Sofo, ve'Hisneh Imo bi'Techilaso, Tena'o Kayam'?

(d) What is the reason for all these stringencies?

(a) What problem do we have with our Mishnah, which permits a Shomer Chinam to stipulate that he will be Patur from a Shevu'ah and a Sho'el from paying?

(b) We answer by establishing the author as Rebbi Yehudah.
What does Rebbi Yehudah say in the Beraisa 'ha'Omer le'Ishah Harei At Mekudeshes Li al-M'nas she'Ein Lach Alai She'er, K'sus ve'Onah ... ?

(c) What is the basis for Rebbi Yehudah's distinction between Isur and Mamon?

(d) How do we then reconcile Rebbi Yehudah with the Seifa 'Kol ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil'?

(a) We have a problem with establishing our Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah from the continuation of the Mishnah.
Which Tana holds 'Kol T'nai she'Yesh Bo Ma'aseh bi'Techilaso, Tena'o Bateil'?

(b) So we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Meir.
What does Rebbi Meir say in the Beraisa 'ha'Omer le'Ishah Harei At Mekudeshes Li al-M'nas she'Ein Lach Alai She'er, K'sus ve'Onah ... '?

(c) How do we then reconcile Rebbi Meir's opinion by Kidushin with his opinion by Shomer?

5)

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a condition that cannot be fulfilled is void. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah ben Teimah, in a Beraisa quoted by Rav Tivla Amar Rav in a case where a man gives his wife a Get on condition that he ascends to the Heaven, goes down to the depths or swallows a cane a hundred Amos long.
What do the Chachamim say there?

(b) Which fourth case does the Beraisa cite?

(c) Rav Nachman Amar Rav rules like Rebbi Yehudah ben Teimah.
What does *he* say there?

(d) What does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak infer from our Mishnah 'Kol she'Efshar Lo Lekaymo be'Sofo ... Tena'o Kayam'? What does he prove with this?

6)

(a) What does the Tana of our Mishnah say if someone borrows a cow together with the owner?

(b) Will it make any difference if he ...

1. ... (does not borrow, but) hires the owner as he borrows the cow?
2. ... hires or borrows the owner *before* borrowing the cow?

(c) If however, he borrows the cow first, and then borrows or hires the owner, he will be Chayav.
What is the Tana coming to teach us?

(d) And what does our Mishnah say about someone who hires a cow together with the owner?

7)

(a) Our Mishnah discusses a case of borrowing the owner and the cow simultaneously.
How do we know that 'simultaneously' must be taken literally ?

(b) What problem do we then have with that?

(c) We give two answers to the Kashya; one of them, that the Tana speaks when the cow is already standing in the borrower's domain, and requires no Kinyan (in which case, he will acquire both at the same time, by agreement).
What is the other answer?

(a) We already learned the Mishnah which discusses the four Shomrim.
What two Shevu'os does a Shomer Sachar need to make if an O'nes occurred?

(b) If the third of the three Parshiyos of Shomrim specifically mentions a Sho'el ("ve'Chi Yish'al Ish ... "), how do we know that the second Parshah is talking about a Shomer Sachar, and the first, about a Shomer Chinam, and not vice-versa?

(c) Perhaps the first Parshah is speaking about a Shomer Sachar, because it contains the Chumra of paying Kefel by To'en Ta'anas Ganav (as we learned in Bava Kama), following a Shevu'ah; (whereas the second Parshah obligates the Shomer to pay the Keren as soon as the object is stolen or lost)?

(d) How do we prove this from Sho'el?

(a) How can we say that a Sho'el has *all* the benefits? Does the animal not require ...

1. ... feeding?
2. ... looking after?

(b) How do we alternatively ...

1. ... amend the statement even if we are speaking about a borrowed animal?
2. ... establish the case without the above problems and without the amendment?

(a) If we know that a Shomer Sachar and a Socher are liable to pay for Geneivah, because the Torah writes "Im Ganov Yiganev me'Imo, Yeshalem li'Be'alav", from where do we initially learn that they are also liable for Aveidah?

(b) And where did the B'nei Eretz Yisrael learn it from, according to those who hold that the Torah tends to speak in human terms?

(c) Now that we have a 'Kal va'Chomer', why does the first opinion quote a Pasuk?

(a) The Torah writes in connection with a Sho'el "ve'Nishbar O Meis".
Why can we not learn Shevuyah (taken captive) from ...

1. ... Shevurah u'Meisah? Why might the Sho'el not have been liable by the former even though he is liable by the latter?
2. ... the fact that the Torah gives it the same Din (of Patur) as Shevurah u'Meisah by a Shomer Sachar and a Socher?

(b) So we cite Rebbi Nasan, who learns Shevuyah from "ve'Nishbar *O* Meis". What problem do we have with this? What else might we need to learn from "O"?

(a) So we establish Rebbi Nasan like Rebbi Yonasan.
How does Rebbi Yonasan interpret the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Aviv ve'Imo Kilel ... "?

(b) What is the basis of his opinion?

(c) Rebbi Yoshiyah agrees with Rebbi Yonasan's ruling, but from a different source.
From where does *he* learn it?

(d) What would be the Din according to Rebbi Yoshiyah, were it not for the dual mention of 'K'lalah'?

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