THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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CHULIN 4-5 - Two weeks of study material have been dedicated by Mrs.
Estanne Abraham Fawer to honor the fourth Yahrzeit of her father, Reb
Mordechai ben Eliezer Zvi (Weiner), who passed away 18 Teves 5760. May the
merit of supporting and advancing Talmud study during the week of his
Yahrzeit serve as an Iluy for his Neshamah.
1) RESOLVING CONTRADICTORY IMPLICATIONS IN A BERAISA
QUESTION: Rava and Abaye argue about the intention of the Beraisa (end of
3b). The Beraisa first states that the Shechitah of a Kusi is valid when a
Jew is supervising him. The Beraisa then states that if no Jew was
supervising the Kusi, then we cut a piece of meat and give it to the Kusi
to eat. If he eats it, then he may rely on his Shechitah. Abaye infers
from the first statement that the Shechitah is valid only when a Jew is
there supervising the Kusi's Shechitah, which implies that if a Jew is not
there but might enter at any moment ("Yotzei v'Nichnas"), then the
Shechitah is not valid.
2) BUYING "CHAMETZ" FROM A JEW AFTER PESACH
Rava infers from the second statement that the Shechitah is invalid only
when no Jew was expected to come in at all, which implies that if a Jew
might enter at any moment ("Yotzei v'Nichnas"), the Shechitah is valid.
There is a general rule (Kidushin 5b; TOSFOS to Bava Metzia 34a, DH Ela)
concerning a Beraisa or Mishnah in which the implication of the first half
contradicts the implication of the second half, such as in the case of the
Beraisa quoted here. In such a case, we are to understand the Beraisa as
saying, "Na'aseh k'Omer" -- the implication of the first statement is the
correct one, while the second part of the Beraisa is "Lav Davka."
Why does the Gemara here not apply that rule to prove that Abaye's
interpretation of the Beraisa is the correct one? The implication of the
first statement of the Beraisa is correct, and the Shechitah is not valid
(unless the Kusi himself eats the meat) not only when there is no
supervision of the Kusi at all, but even when a Jew is going and coming?
(a) Rava understands that there actually is no contradiction at all
between the beginning and end of the Beraisa. The phrase, "a Jew is
standing over the Kusi," can be interpreted to mean that the Jew is
standing over the Kusi *part* of the time, and not necessarily all of the
This clearly is Rashi's understanding of Rava's explanation of the Beraisa
answer. Rashi (DH k'Omed) writes explicitly, "The phrase 'a Jew is
standing over the Kusi' in the Beraisa means that the Jew is going and
coming [according to Rava]." (That is, Yotzei v'Nichnas is not just
*compared* to the law mentioned in the first half of the Beraisa. It *is *
the law mentioned there.)
This may explain the change in the Gemara's phraseology. When the Gemara
explains the second statement of the Beraisa according to Abaye, the
Gemara says that Yotzei v'Nichnas "is also called Bo u'Matza'o." That is,
the case of "Bo u'Matza'o" in the Beraisa includes a case of Yotzei
v'Nichnas (but the two actions are not actually the same). When explaining
Rava, however, the Gemara says that Yotzei v'Nichnas "is similar to Omed
Al Gabav." That is, the act of Yotzei v'Nichnas is physically similar to
the act of standing over the Kusi, and the words "standing over him"
include standing over him even part of the time.
(b) The RITVA, however, notes this difference in phraseology and reaches
exactly the opposite conclusion. He infers from the Gemara that according
to Abaye, "Bo u'Matza'o" actually means that the Jew was Yotzei v'Nichnas,
going in and out, while, according to Rava, the words "Omed Al Gabav" in
the beginning of the Beraisa do not literally mean Yotzei v'Nichnas.
Rather, the Ritva explains that since going in and out is similar,
logically, to standing over the Kusi, the laws of the two must be similar
as well (see also RASHASH).
The Ritva, therefore, must answer our original question from the rule of
"Na'aseh k'Omer" differently. He must learn that, according to Rava, the
cases of Yotzei v'Nichnas and Omed Al Gabav have so much in common that we
override the normal rule of "Na'aseh k'Omer" and prefer to follow the
inference of the second statement of the Beraisa. (M. Kornfeld)
QUESTION: The Gemara here cites Rava's teaching (3a) that the Shechitah
performed by a "Mumar l'Tei'avon," a Jew who transgresses the Torah due to
his lusts, is valid when a Jew examines the knife and gives it to him.
Such a person will not sin if Kosher meat is readily available, and as
long as a valid knife for Shechitah is available, he will perform the
Shechitah properly in order to eat Kosher meat. If, however, no valid
knife is available, then one may not eat from his Shechitah, because the
Mumar l'Tei'avon will not make the effort to look for a valid knife.
(Abaye (3b) argues with Rava and maintains that the Mumar l'Tei'avon is
never careful to slaughter the animal properly, even when one gives him a
The Gemara cites a Beraisa to support the view of Rava. The Beraisa
teaches that, after Pesach, it is permitted to buy Chametz from a sinful
Jew who did not destroy his Chametz during Pesach. The sinful Jew knows
that the Chametz is Asur, and therefore he gives it to a Nochri in return
for the Nochri's Chametz. We see from this Halachah that even Jews who do
not destroy their Chametz during Pesach (because of their concern for
monetary loss) are careful not to transgress the additional prohibition of
eating Chametz that was in the possession of a Jew during Pesach, when
they have the opportunity to trade it with a Nochri.
However, this proof seems to *refute* the second part of Rava's ruling,
that if no valid knife is available, then one may not eat from the
Shechitah of a Mumar l'Tei'avon, because he will not make the effort to
look for a valid knife! The Beraisa implies that a sinful Jew will make
some effort to avoid sinning!
(a) The RAMBAN cites a variant Girsa in the Beraisa which says, "It is
permitted to derive benefit from Chametz of sinners immediately after
Pesach." According to this text, it is permitted only to derive benefit
from the Chametz (such as by feeding it to one's animals), but not to eat
it (this is in contrast to RASHI's explanation on 4b, DH Mutar). The
assumption that a Jewish sinner will abandon an Isur if a Heter is
available is strong enough only to permit deriving benefit from the
Chametz, but not to permit eating it. This is become some effort is
involved in obtaining the Heter (such as finding a Nochri who will agree
to trade his Chametz). Since some effort is involved, we may rely on the
assumption that the sinful Jew abandons Isur when Heter is available only
with regard to permitting benefit from the Chametz, but with regard to
permitting consumption. We may infer from there that when there is *no*
effort involved whatsoever (such as giving an examined knife to a Mumar
l'Tei'avon), this logic is strong enough even to allow the meat to be
(b) The Ramban, however, rejects the variant Girsa for the following
reasons. First, the Gemara infers from the words of the Beraisa, "...
because they exchange [their Chametz]," that we are *certain* that they
exchange their Chametz. According to the other Girsa, it is only an
assumption that they exchange their Chametz, and thus we should not rely
Second, according to that Girsa, we cannot bring proof for Rava's opinion.
If the Halachah is that we may not eat the Chametz of a sinful Jew when
exchanging it involved a small effort, even though the Safek involves only
an Isur d'Rabanan (of Chametz that was in the possession of a Jew during
Pesach, according to Rebbi Shimon), then it is logical that we should be
stringent for a Safek involving an Isur d'Oraisa (of eating meat from an
invalid Shechitah) even when there is no effort involved in obtaining
The Ramban, therefore, explains that our original question is not a
difficulty at all. The Jew who is performing Shechitah is doing so because
he wants to eat meat right away. If he does not find a valid knife for
Shechitah now, he is not prepared to wait. In contrast, with regard to
Chametz after Pesach, the sinful Jew does not necessarily want to eat all
of his Chametz immediately after Pesach. Therefore, he is prepared to wait
a while until he finds a Nochri with whom to exchange his Chametz. (The
Ramban disagrees with Rashi who maintains that it is permitted to buy
Chametz from the sinful Jew immediately after Pesach.) (D. Bloom)
3) THE "SHECHITAH" OF A "MUMAR L'ARELUS"
QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that states, "Everyone may perform
Shechitah, even a Kusi, even an Arel (an uncircumcised Jew), and even a
Mumar." The Gemara suggests that the "Arel" mentioned in the Beraisa
refers to a Mumar l'Arelus, a Mumar who rejects the Mitzvah of Milah.
RASHI explains that the Jew "rebels against" ("Meva'et") the Mitzvah of
Milah, meaning that he has contempt for the Mitzvah. Rashi's explanation
implies that the Beraisa is referring to a Mumar l'Hach'is, a Mumar who
intentionally sins in order to anger Hashem. Why, though, does Rashi
insist that the Beraisa is discussing a Mumar l'Hach'is for Milah, and not
a Mumar l'Tei'avon? In fact, the KESEH MISHNEH (Hilchos Shechitah 4:14),
when explaining the view of the RAMBAM, understands that when the Gemara
says that the Beraisa is discussing a Mumar l'Arelus, it means that he
rejects the Mitzvah because he wants to avoid the pain of Milah, and not
due to contempt.
(a) Perhaps wanting to avoid the pain of Milah is such a strong incentive
not to perform Milah that one who refrains from Milah for that reason is
not even considered a Mumar at all. He is not comparable to a person who
sins out of a desire to have pleasure.
(b) RAV YAKOV KAMINETSKY zt'l in EMES L'YAKOV explains that in order to be
considered a Mumar, one must constantly perform acts of transgression of
the Aveirah. One who refrains from fulfilling the Mitzvah of Milah does
not perform an act of transgression repeatedly. (Even according to the
Rambam, who maintains that he transgresses the Mitzvah of Milah every day
that he fails to circumcise himself, he nevertheless does not perform
multiple *acts* of transgression.) Therefore, he is not considered a Mumar
whose Shechitah is invalid, unless he rebels ("Meva'et") against the
Mitzvah, which means that he was warned several times to fulfill the
Mitzvah, and he refused to fulfill it (either l'Tei'avon or l'Hach'is).
(See also CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER, Mahadura Basra.)
(c) Rashi might mean that, indeed, the Beraisa is discussing a Mumar
l'Hach'is. However, Rashi does not mean to limit the case of the Beraisa
to a Mumar l'Hach'is. Rather, Rashi is saying that *even* a Mumar
l'Hach'is is not considered a Mumar l'Chol ha'Torah and his Shechitah is
acceptable. Rashi is following the opinion (in Horayos 11a) that maintains
that a Mumar l'Hach'is is not considered a heretic.