Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Chulin, 14

1) RELYING ON THE "SHECHITAH" OF A SHABBOS-DESECRATER

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that Shechitah performed on Shabbos is a valid Shechitah, even though the Shochet desecrated Shabbos by performing the Melachah of Shechitah. The Gemara (15a) says that the Shechitah is valid even if the Shochet desecrated Shabbos intentionally (b'Mezid) by slaughtering the animal.

How can we eat from this Shechitah? The Shochet, who slaughtered the animal intentionally on Shabbos, is a "Mumar l'Chalel Shabbos," and his Shechitah is invalid (see 5a)! (TOSFOS)

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS answers that the Mishnah is referring to a Shochet who slaughtered an animal on Shabbos in private. A person becomes a "Mumar l'Chalel Shabbos" only when he desecrates Shabbos in public.

(b) Tosfos answers further that a person does not become a Mumar by slaughtering one time on Shabbos. Only when he slaughters two times on Shabbos is he considered a Mumar.

(c) The RAN maintains that one does become a Mumar after one Shechitah. However, he explains that the status of Mumar takes effect only *after* the Shechitah has been completed. Before the Shechitah is completed, the cut in the neck of the animal is Mekalkel, a destructive act, for which one is not Chayav mid'Oraisa on Shabbos. Consequently, at the time of the Shechitah, the person was not yet a Mumar.

(d) The RAMBAM in PERUSH HA'MISHNAYOS writes that if the Shochet slaughtered on Shabbos intentionally, the Shechitah indeed is *not* valid. The Shochet is considered a Mumar from the moment that he begins to cut the esophagus or the trachea. (It is not clear how the Rambam understands the Gemara later (15a) that says that the Mishnah's ruling applies even when the Shechitah was done on Shabbos intentionally. See CHASAM SOFER there.) (Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Shabbos (156b) that states that a person may slice gourds for animals on Shabbos, and one may cut up a carcass to feed to dogs on Shabbos.

Why would we have thought that slicing gourds for animals is prohibited, such that the Mishnah needs to tell us that it is permitted?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI here (DH Es) and in Beitzah (2a, DH Mechatchin) writes that we might have thought that it is prohibited because the preparation of fodder involves unnecessary hard work, and it is prohibited to do such unnecessary hard work on Shabbos (as the Gemara in Shabbos 155a teaches). The Mishnah is teaching that cutting gourds does not involve excessive exertion and thus it is not in this category. This is also the approach of TOSFOS here (end of DH Mechatchin) and in Beitzah.

(b) TOSFOS quotes RABEINU TAM who asserts that the Mishnah is referring to a case of gourds that were cut from their stems on Shabbos. The Mishnah is teaching that the guards are not Muktzah, even though they were picked on Shabbos, because the owner could have fed the gourds to his animals even while they were still attached to the ground, before they were picked. The Mishnah is also teaching that the gourds are not included in the Isur d'Rabanan that prohibits eating fruit that fell from a tree on Shabbos.

According to both of these explanations, Rebbi Yehudah, who says in the Mishnah in Shabbos that one may not cut up a carcass on Shabbos to feed to dogs, agrees with the first part of the Mishnah and permits slicing gourds on Shabbos.

(c) RASHI in Shabbos (156b) suggests that gourds, before they are cooked, are too hard for people to eat, and thus they can be eaten raw only by animals. However, people do not generally feed gourds to animals (perhaps because they are too expensive). Since gourds are "Muchan l'Adam" and not "Muchan l'Behemah" -- they are designated for human consumption and not for animals, the Tana Kama -- who does not require that an object be specifically designated before Shabbos for use on Shabbos -- permits feeding them to animals, while Rebbi Yehudah -- who requires that an object be designated before Shabbos for use on Shabbos -- prohibits feeding them to animals, and they follow their respective opinions in the case of an animal that died on Shabbos. (See also TOSFOS 15b, DH Kegon, and GILYON HA'SHAS.)

OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that Shechitah performed on Shabbos is a valid Shechitah, even though the Shochet desecrated Shabbos by performing the Melachah of Shechitah. Rav explained that the Mishnah means that although the Shechitah is valid, the animal may not be eaten on that day. The scholars of the Yeshiva asserted that that Rav was explaining the Mishnah according to the view of Rebbi Yehudah. The Gemara asks which ruling of Rebbi Yehudah demonstrates that he maintains an animal slaughtered on Shabbos is prohibited to be eaten on that Shabbos.

Rebbi Aba suggests that the Mishnah is like the teaching of Rebbi Yehudah in Shabbos (156b) with regard to preparation of food before Shabbos. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that we may not cut up a carcass on Shabbos to feed to dogs if the animal died on Shabbos. Only if the animal died before Shabbos may we cut it up and feed it to dogs. We see from there that Rebbi Yehudah prohibits using something on Shabbos that was not prepared before Shabbos. Even though Rebbi Yehudah permits slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov (when there is no Isur of Shechitah) even though it apparently was not designated for that purpose, that is because the slaughtering of the animal on Yom Tov clarifies retroactively that it indeed was designated for that purpose. In contrast, since it is forbidden to slaughter an animal on Shabbos, when Shabbos arrives and the animal is alive, that animal is not designated for being eaten (but rather for keeping alive to produce offspring). If it is then slaughtered on Shabbos, it may not be eaten since it was not designated for that purpose before Shabbos.

The Gemara asks that Rebbi Yehudah holds "Ein Bereirah." The principle of "Ein Bereirah" means that when the status of an object is not clear at the present time, a future occurrence cannot determine its status retroactively. Consequently, Rebbi Yehudah should not permit slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov, since before Yom Tov, the animal was not designated to be slaughtered unless we apply "Bereirah." Slaughtering the animal on Yom Tov cannot determine retroactively that it was designated to be slaughtered, since Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of "Bereirah."

The Gemara searches for the source that Rebbi Yehudah holds "Ein Bereirah," and concludes that the Mishnah in Eruvin (36b) is the source for his opinion (and Rebbi Yehudah permits slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov for a different reason).

In the various Sugyos that discuss the topic of Bereirah, it is unclear what the *result* is when a person utilizes Bereirah to determine a status retroactively, according to the opinion that holds "Ein Bereirah." (The Halachah follows the opinion that holds "Ein Bereirah" with regard to matters that are mid'Oraisa.)

(a) RASHI (DH Osrin) explains that when Rebbi Yehudah rules that one may not drink the wine now in the case in which a person announces that he will separate a certain amount of wine as Terumah later, Rebbi Yehudah is concerned "that the person will be drinking wine of Terumah." Why does Rashi say that Rebbi Yehudah holds that since Bereirah does not work, the person will be drinking wine that is *Terumah*? If Bereirah does not work, then no Terumah was separated from the wine, and the person will be drinking *Tevel*, and not Terumah!

It is clear from the words of Rashi here and in a number of other places (Gitin 24b, DH l'Eizo, and Gitin 73b, DH u'Meshani) that Rashi clearly maintains that even if we rule "Ein Bereirah," the change of status still takes effect. However, but the details which were dependent upon the outcome of the future event remain in doubt. For example, in a case in which a person had two fruits in front of him and he said, "If it rains tomorrow, the one on the right will be Terumah, and if it does not rain tomorrow, the one on the left will be Terumah," most Rishonim say that neither fruit is Terumah, because "Ein Bereirah" dictates that a present status cannot be made dependent on a future event. Rashi, however, says that one of the fruits is certainly Terumah, but it remains in doubt which one is Terumah. The change of status is effected, but the details which were dependent upon the future event remain in doubt, even when the future event occurs. The reason for this is that when a Kinyan is made dependent on a future event, it is not really dependent on what actually happens in the future (since the change of status, or Kinyan, must take place *right now*). Rather, it is dependent on what *is destined to happen* in the future *at this point* in time. Therefore, even if it does rain tomorrow (in the above example), according to Rashi those who rule "Ein Bereirah" maintain that we cannot know on the previous day, when the stipulation was made, that *it was destined* to rain tomorrow or not. (TOSFOS in Eruvin 37b, DH Ela, cites a similar ruling in the name of MAHARI; see also CHIDUSHEI REBBI AKIVA EIGER in Ma'arachah #4, to Eruvin 38a, DH v'Nir'eh d'Vein; we discussed this further in our Insights to Eruvin 37:1, Gitin 25:1, Gitin 73:2, and Zevachim 3:1.)

(b) TOSFOS (Eruvin 37b, DH Ela, see also Tosfos in Gitin 73b, DH Tana) and most Rishonim explain that "Ein Bereirah" means that one cannot effect a Kinyan, or a change of status, at the present moment based on the outcome of a future event. A Kinyan must take effect completely at the time that the Ma'aseh Kinyan is performed. If one attempts to make a Kinyan dependent upon a future event, the Kinyan will not take effect *at all* (see RAN in Nedarim 45b). This is in contrast to the view of Rashi, who says that the Kinyan does take effect but we cannot determine in which way it takes effect.

This also seems to be the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aser 7:1). The Rambam quotes the case mentioned in the Gemara here regarding one who announces that he will separate a certain amount of wine as Terumah later, and he rules that one may not drink the wine after such an announcement, but rather he must separate Terumah properly and then he may drink the wine. The fact that the Rambam says that one may perform a second act of separating Terumah and then drink the wine indicates that the wine does not become Safek Terumah after the first announcement, but rather it remains Tevel and can be rectified with a proper act of Hafrashas Terumah. (See Insights to Eruvin loc. cit., and Gitin loc. cit. for further discussion of this subject.)

The KEHILOS YAKOV (#8) has difficulty with this opinion. There are many cases in the Gemara in which the future action *does* have an effect on the present status, even according to those who hold "Ein Bereirah." For example, the Gemara in Gitin (25a) says that Rebbi Yochanan holds "Ein Bereirah," and yet we find in Menachos (78b) that Rebbi Yochanan rules that when one brings eighty Chalos for a Korban Todah (which requires only forty Chalos) and declares that forty of the eighty Chalos should be Kadosh, Rebbi Yochanan agrees that his words take effect, and the forty Chalos that he later designates are Kadosh. How, though, can his words take effect, if the declaration of the Kedushah of the forty Chalos depends on the future act of designating which Chalos he intended?

Similarly, the Gemara in Menachos (108b) says that if one has three animals and is Makdish one of them without specifying which one, we say that the largest of the three animals is definitely Kadosh, and we also suspect that the middle animal might be Kadosh as well (see Insights to Menachos 108:2). If, at the moment that the person declares that one of the three animals is Kadosh, it is unclear which animal is becoming Kadosh, then why should any of them become Kadosh?

The Kehilos Yakov cites many other examples of cases in which we see that Bereirah has an effect, even according to those who hold "Ein Bereirah." Moreover, the Kehilos Yakov quotes the KESONES PASIM's alternative way of learning the Rambam, seemingly in an effort to answer these questions.

The Kehilos Yakov answers that Tosfos also holds that there are times when Bereirah is effective. When a person says that a portion of a larger amount should have a certain status (for example, forty out of eighty Chalos should become Kadosh), his designation is effective. This is because he statement involved no designation of any specific, exact items, but rather it involved merely a quantity. In contrast, when a person says, "The two Lugin that I will separate later should be Terumah," he is describing a specific item -- the Lugin that he will separate. It is impossible to identify the Lugin now. The specific description of the object in his statement makes it impossible to identify now, before he has separated the two Lugin, which Lugin are Terumah. In such a case, the Bereirah does not take effect at all. Similarly, in the case of the fruits in Eruvin (37b), the person says that if it rains tomorrow, then "*this* one should be Terumah for the other one." The combination of a reference to a specific fruit with an uncertain situation which cannot be clarified until later makes the Bereirah ineffective. However, the Kehilos Yakov says, if a person generalizes his statement in a way in which there will never be any distinguishing qualities, and simply says that some of a mixture should have a certain status, even Tosfos agrees that Bereirah works. (Y. Montrose)

14b

OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Shabbos (124b) that discusses the status of broken pieces of utensils on Shabbos. The Tana Kama says that these pieces are Muktzah, unless the pieces themselves can be used as a utensil for some purpose, even if it is not the original purpose of the utensil. Rebbi Yehudah argues and maintains that the pieces must serve a purpose similar to that of the original function of the utensil in order not to be Muktzah. It seems that everyone agrees that a broken piece that has *no* practical purpose, such as a button which falls off an article of clothing, is Muktzah.

However, there seems to be a contradictory implication in the previous Mishnah in Shabbos (122b). The Mishnah there states that "all utensils may be carried on Shabbos, and their doors with them, even though the doors have become detached." The Gemara explains that this law applies whether the door became detached before Shabbos or during Shabbos. This Mishnah is saying that the door of the utensil, which is no longer connected to the utensil, is not Muktzah. This seems to contradict the Mishnah later that says that a broken piece of a utensil that no longer serves any purpose *is* Muktzah!

(a) TOSFOS in Shabbos (122b, DH Aderabah) explains that the door "is still considered a utensil, as it is still fit for its original purpose, and it is fit to be reconnected to the utensil." Tosfos implies that the doors of utensils are themselves considered utensils (and thus are not Muktzah) because they are fit in their present state to be reconnected to the utensil. The MISHNAH BERURAH (OC 308:35) says that according to Tosfos, even if they are *completely useless* in their detached state on Shabbos, they are not Muktzah and may be moved (this does not apply to doors or windows of a house; see Mishnah Berurah there).

The Mishnah Berurah's logic would seem to apply to a button that falls off an article of clothing and can be sewn back on (as opposed to a button that was never sewn on clothing, or a button that falls off and will not be returned to this article of clothing; see BADEI HA'SHULCHAN 109:8). Even if it is not fit for any use on Shabbos, it should not be Muktzah since it will be sewn back onto the garment after Shabbos, and it should have the same status as the garment, which is not Muktzah. The MINCHAS SHABBOS (88:2) indeed rules that such a button that falls off clothing is not Muktzah.

(b) RASHI in Shabbos (126b, DH Hachi Garsinan), the ME'IRI, CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN, RI MI'LUNIL (on the Mishnah in Shabbos) and other Rishonim maintain that the reason that the door of the utensil is not Muktzah is because it serves a useful purpose in its present state. It can be used as a mat to sit on, or as a cover for a utensil, and so on. In that way it differs from a broken piece of a utensil mentioned in the later Mishnah in Shabbos, which has no useful purpose in its present state. Accordingly, only something that has a useful purpose in its present state is not considered Muktzah. A button that fell off a garment should be Muktzah, since it has no use in its present state.

There is also reason to say that even according to Tosfos a button is not the same as a vessel. The SHALMEI YEHUDAH (4:2, note 3) quotes RAV YOSEF SHALOM ELYASHIV shlit'a who says that a button is not comparable to a door of a utensil. The door of a utensil is usually returned with ease to its utensil, and that is why it is considered part of the utensil even when it is not attached. A button, however, requires considerable effort to sew it back onto the clothing, and thus it is not clear that the button should be considered part of the clothing when it needs so much effort to be reconnected to its "utensil."

Moreover, HE'OROS B'MASECHES CHULIN quotes RAV ELYASHIV shlit'a who says that there is another reason to differentiate between the detached doors of a utensil and the fallen button of a garment. Returning the doors to their utensils requires only a Melachah d'Rabanan to snap them back on (because we rule "Ein Binyan b'Kelim"). Therefore, they are considered to be a part of their utensil even when they are detached. A button, however, requires a Melachah d'Oraisa of sewing in order to be reconnected to the clothing. (The source for this difference seems to be the TOSFOS RID on the Mishnah in Shabbos 122b.)

HALACHAH: What is the Halachah with regard to a broken part of a larger item that has no use in its present state, but has potential use if it is reconnected to the larger item, such as a button that fell off an article of clothing?

The Shalmei Yehudah and SHEMIRAS SHABBOS K'HILCHASAH (15:68) conclude that a button is not Muktzah, but it is "appropriate" and "good" to be stringent and not to handle the button. The KITZUR HILCHOS SHABBOS (pg. 139, #36) also concludes that it is good to be stringent. The AZ NIDBERU (7:46), however, rules that a button is not Muktzah, and one does not have to be stringent. (Y. Montrose)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the ruling of Ayo, who says that one may make an Eruv Techumin with a stipulation only by saying that if the Chacham comes to one side or the other side of the town, the Eruv will be to that side. If one stipulates that if two Chachamim come to each side of the town then he reserves the right to choose the side on which his Eruv will take effect, the Eruv does not work.

In either case, asks the Gemara, one is utilizing Bereirah! Why, then, is the stipulation in the second case not valid while the stipulation in the first case is valid? The Gemara answers that in the first case, the Chacham has already arrived in one of the towns, and therefore the location of the Eruv is not being determined by a future event, but it is being determined by the present location of the Chacham (which will only be known when the word reaches this town).

Why does the Gemara not suggest a very simple difference between the two cases of Ayo? Perhaps even when one stipulates, "If the Chacham comes from the east my Eruv is to the east," the Eruv is valid, since it involves no more than a normal case of stipulating a "Tenai" ("yes" or "no" condition)! It is comparable to saying, "If you do such and such, this Get will be a valid Get, and if you do not do it, it will not be a valid Get." However, when the person says "If two Chachamim come, I will choose tomorrow where I want my Eruv to be retroactively," Bereirah is involved, and not a simple condition, and therefore the Eruv is not valid! Why does the Gemara consider the first case to be a case of Bereirah, and not a normal case of a Tenai?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (Gitin 25b, DH ul'Chi Mayis) writes that any Tenai, condition, works only because it is in the hands of one of the parties involved to fulfill the condition, and it was his intention that the condition be fulfilled at the time that he stipulated the Tenai. (That is, because he plans on fulfilling it and wants the transaction to be consummated, the event contingent upon the condition being fulfilled takes effect *immediately*, even before the Tenai has been fulfilled. If the Tenai ends up not being fulfilled, then the event that was contingent upon it is uprooted retroactively. It is possible to uproot an event retroactively, but not to cause it to take effect retroactively.)

That is not how the condition works in the case of Eruv Techumin. In the cas e of making an Eruv, the condition (that the Chacham comes from this side) is not in the power of the person making the statement to fulfill. It is dependent on the Chacham, who has nothing to do with making the Eruv. Since the Eruv does not depend on something which is in the person's hands to fulfill, it is considered a case of Bereirah.

(b) The RAMBAN in Gitin (25b) argues with Rashi and explains that a Tenai is when there are two possibilities -- either the event will occur or it will not occur. In contrast, when trying to make something happen which can occur in one of several ways, it is not a case of Tenai but a question of Bereirah. The case of the Eruv dependent on the Chacham coming to one of two sides is such a case, and therefore it involves Bereirah. The event -- the Eruv taking effect -- is going to happen in one of two places; the arrival of the Chacham will determine where the Eruv takes effect.

Still, why is the case of the Chacham a case of Bereirah? We can view it as two completely separate conditions: (1) If the Chacham comes to the east, then the Eruv will be to the east, and if he does not come to the east, then the Eruv will not be to the east. (2) If the Chacham comes to the west, then the Eruv will be to the west, and if he does not come to the west, then the Eruv will not be to the west. (REBBI AKIVA EIGER, Ma'arachah #4, to Eruvin 38a.) TOSFOS (end of Yoma 56a), in fact asks this question on the explanation of the Ramban.

Apparently, the Ramban maintains that the establishment of the two Eruvei Techumin cannot be viewed as two independent events. Rather, one event is taking place (making an Eruv), and there are two possibilities as to how it will take place (to the east or to the west). The reason for this is that one cannot make two Eruvim to be Koneh Shevisah in two places (since a person lives only in one place at a time). Therefore, when the person adds that if the Chacham comes to the other side then his Eruv will be to that side, it is viewed as an addendum to his first condition.

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Shabbos that says that it is forbidden to squeeze fruit on Shabbos in order to extract the juice. RASHI (DH Sechitah) comments that Sechitah "is an Av Melachah." As the marginal note points out, Rashi elsewhere (Beitzah 3a, and Shabbos 143b) explains that squeezing fruit is not an Av, but rather it is a Toldah of "Dash" (threshing)! How are we to understand the words of Rashi here?

ANSWER: Rashi is using the term "Av Melachah" in a manner consistent with his opinion elsewhere. Rashi understands that the term "Av Melachah" does not always refer to an Av, as opposed to the Toldah, but rather it means "a category of Melachah which the Torah prohibits on Shabbos," whether it is an Av or a Toldah (Rashi to Shabbos 68a, DH Av Melachah; see also Rashi to Shabbos 18a, DH she'To'anin). (See also Insights to Shabbos 2:2, Shevuos 5:3.)

Rashi here is emphasizing that Sechitah is Asur mid'Oraisa in order to explain the next part of the Mishnah in Shabbos, which mentions the Gezeirah d'Rabanan that prohibits the use of juice that flowed from a fruit by itself on Shabbos. The basis of that Gezeirah is in order to prevent a person from transgressing the Isur d'Oraisa of squeezing the fruit.