Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Chulin, 130

1) HALACHAH: "MATNOS KEHUNAH" IN CHUTZ LA'ARETZ

OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that the laws of Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah apply both in Eretz Yisrael and in Chutz la'Aretz. RASHI (DH ha'Zero'a) points out that the Mishnah is not teaching anything new with this statement, and it mentions it only tangential to its discussion of where these Matnos Kehunah do *not* apply (i.e. Mukdashin).

REBBI AKIVA EIGER in Gilyon ha'Shas refers to Rashi later (138b, DH Levad), where Rashi explains that the reason why the Mishnah states that these Matnos Kehunah apply in Chutz la'Aretz is in order to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Ila'i, who maintains that the Matnos Kehunah were given only in Eretz Yisrael.

What is the Halachah regarding giving Matnos Kehunah in Chutz la'Aretz?

(a) The TUR (YD 61) and SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 61:21) cite the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Bikurim 9:1) and MAHARAM MI'ROTENBURG (quoted by the ROSH 11:1) who rule that the obligation to give Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah to a Kohen applies at all times and in all places, including Chutz la'Aretz.

(b) The Tur and Shulchan Aruch also cite the opinion of RASHI (Chulin 136b, DH b'Reishis ha'Gez; Shabbos 10b, DH Haveh) who says that Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah are not given in Chutz la'Aretz. Rav Ila'i (Chulin 136b) rules that Reishis ha'Gez and Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah do not apply in Chutz la'Aretz. In the time of Rav Nachman, people started to conduct themselves in accordance with Rav Ila'i with regard to Reishis ha'Gez and no one protested. Similarly, Rashi says, we do not protest when we see people conducting themselves like Rav Ila'i with regard to Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah.

HALACHAH: The Shulchan Aruch (YD 61:21) rules in accordance with the opinion of Rashi.

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that the laws of Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah apply both in Eretz Yisrael and in Chutz la'Aretz. While there are various opinions regarding the obligation of giving these Matnos Kehunah in Chutz la'Aretz (see previous Insight), it is clear that in Eretz Yisrael, even today these Matnos Kehunah must be given to a Kohen.

However, we find that almost no slaughterhouse in Eretz Yisrael sets aside these Matnos Kehunah for a Kohen. What is the basis for this practice?

ANSWERS:

(a) It is the common practice to sell female cattle in whole or in part to a Nochri, thereby exempting their first born calves from the law of Bechor (see Insights to Bechoros 3:1). Partial Nochri ownership of the female cattle also exempts these animals from the obligation of Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah.

However, male animals are not sold to Nochrim, and it is not permitted to sell them solely for the purpose of exempting the animals from Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah. (This practice was permitted only with regard to the laws of Bechor, because an animal that has Kedushas Bechor would require many difficult restrictions to be observed.)

(b) It may be suggested that no Kohen today is "Muchzak" (proven) to be a genuine Kohen with regard to the rights to collect Matnos Kehunah. Since no Kohen can prove that the Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah belong to him, the owner of the animal may keep them ("ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah).

However, we find that we do not apply this logic to exempt a father from performing the Mitzvah of Pidyon ha'Ben by giving five silver Shekalim to a Kohen to redeem his firstborn son. Apparently, the Kohen's Chazakah as a Kohen is reliable enough to obligate us to give him the five Shekalim. Why, then, should Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah be treated differently?

(c) RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a explained that there may be a basic difference between Pidyon ha'Ben and all other Matnos Kehunah. The obligation to redeem a firstborn son is independent of the five-Shekel payment to the Kohen. Even when the five Shekalim are not given to a Kohen, it is necessary to "remove the Kedushah" from a Bechor by separating five Shekalim as a Pidyon. Since it is necessary to separate five Shekalim regardless of whether or not it will be given to a Kohen, we give them to a Kohen even though he is not fully Muchzak. In contrast, Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah (and Reishis ha'Gez) involve nothing more than a monetary obligation to the Kohen. There is no obligation to declare the Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah or to separate them from the animal if they are not going to be given to a Kohen. Since we do not need to give them to a Kohen who is not Muchzak, we therefore do not separate them from the animal.

(NOTE: It is not at all certain that there is some form of actual Pidyon of Kedushah involved with Pidyon ha'Ben. The Mishnayos and Sugyos in Bechoros imply that Pidyon ha'Ben is nothing more than a monetary obligation, like Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah, and that it does not need to be separated if the obligation is in question. However, other sources (ROSH to Bechoros 47b, SHITAH MEKUBETZES to Bava Kama 11b) do imply that Pidyon ha'Ben must be separated in a case of a Safek; see Insights to Bechoros 47b for further discussion of this matter. -M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: The Gemara says that we cannot learn that the Halachah of Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah applies to Kodshim from male animals of Chulin, because male animals of Chulin have a stringency that animals of Kodshim do not have -- they have the obligation of Reishis ha'Gez, the Mitzvah to give the first shearings to a Kohen.

RASHI (DH Reishis ha'Gez) explains that "Reishis ha'Gez" is referred to as "Reishis" ("first") in the Torah (Devarim 14:4) just as Terumah is called "Reishis Degancha" (ibid.).

What does Rashi want to teach us? Why would we have been bothered with the usage of the word "Reishis" for this Mitzvah? The word "Reishis" is obviously appropriate, since the *first* shearings are given to the Kohen!

ANSWERS:

(a) Rashi's intention is to teach that the Mitzvah is called "Reishis ha'Gez" even though it is performed multiple times on the same sheep. Reishis ha'Gez does not applies only the first time in the sheep's life that it is shorn. We might have thought that the reason it is called "Reishis" is because it applies only the "first" time that the sheep is born. Therefore, Rashi teaches that it is called "Reishis" just as Terumah is called "Reishis," and Terumah is separated each year from produce of the same field, and it is not limited to the first produce that a field ever produces. (See also RASHI 135a, DH Reishis.)

(b) Rashi is also teaching us that we should not mistakenly think that the words "Reishis ha'Gez" refer specifically to the *first* shearings from the flock. Terumah and Reishis ha'Gez may be separated from *any* portion of the shearings that the owner wants to give to the Kohen, whether it is the first or the last. "Reishis" means "the first of the Matanos that are separated from your produce or shearings." That is, the first amount of wool that is separated from all of the wool that is shorn must be given to a Kohen, but not that the first wool that is shorn must be given to a Kohen. Rashi (here, and 135a, DH Reishis) makes a point of saying that "a small amount of the shearings" must be given to the Kohen," and not "the *first* of the shearings."

Support for this interpretation can be found in the Tosefta (Chulin 10:1) which teaches that although it is better to give to the Kohen the first of the actual shearings, it is permitted to give whatever part of the shearings that one wants.

130b

OPINIONS: The Gemara (end of 130a) derives from the verse (Devarim 18:3) that the laws of Chazeh v'Shok apply only to Kodshim and not to Chulin. The Gemara asks that no verse should be needed to teach that the laws of Chazeh v'Shok do not apply to Chulin. Chazeh v'Shok cannot apply to Chulin, because Chazeh v'Shok require Tenufah (waving) "Lifnei Hashem," inside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. It is forbidden to bring Chulin into the Azarah, and thus Tenufah cannot be done with the Chazeh v'Shok of Chulin.

Does the rule that Chulin may not be brought into the Azarah apply to all types of Chulin, or only to specific types of Chulin? (See also Insights to Nedarim 9:2)

(a) TOSFOS here (DH Iy) and in a number of other places (Pesachim 66b, DH Mevi'ah; Bava Basra 81b, DH v'Dilma) says that the prohibition of bringing Chulin into the Azarah applies only to objects with which some form of Avodah is being performed (such as Tenufah or Hagashah). Bringing an ordinary animal of Chulin into the Azarah is not prohibited unless one does Shechitah to the animal, which is a form of Avodah, or he does some other form of Avodah with it.

Tosfos proves this from the Gemara in Menachos (21b) that says that the Kohanim would bring spices and condiments into the Azarah with which to eat their Menachos, so that they should be eaten with appetite. Moreover, Tosfos points out, we find that the Kohanim were permitted to enter the Azarah (but not to perform Avodah) while wearing their Bigdei Chol, clothing of Chulin (see Yoma 30a).

(b) The RAN in Nedarim (9b) clearly disagrees with Tosfos and does not allow bringing Chulin into the Azarah at all, even when no form of Avodah is done with it (see also TOSFOS in Beitzah 20b, DH v'Hevi, and RASHI in Temurah 23a, DH Yochlu). This is also the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shechitah 2:3) who rules that it is not permitted to bring any Chulin into the Azarah, whether it is a live animal or whether it is merely meat, fruit, or bread.

How, though, do the Ran and Rambam understand the Gemara in Menachos that says that the Kohanim were permitted to bring spices of Chulin into the Azarah?

The RASHBA here suggests that perhaps the Rambam, when he mentions "fruit and bread" of Chulin, is referring specifically to bread such as Lechem ha'Panim or fruits such as Bikurim, with which Tenufah and Hagashah are done, and he actually agrees with Tosfos. However, the Ran in Nedarim clearly is not of that opinion. How, then, does the Ran understand the Gemara in Menachos?

1. The RITVA suggests that the Mitzvah d'Oraisa not to bring Chulin into the Azarah is transgressed only when some form of Avodah is done with the Chulin, as Tosfos explains. However, even if an Avodah is not done with the Chulin, an Isur *d'Rabanan* still prohibits its entry into the Azarah unless it is needed for the performance of a Mitzvah (such as spices for Korbanos) or it is necessary for some other reason.

2. The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Shechitah 2:3, DH v'Im Tomar) explains that spices are added only to Kodshim Kalim, which may then be eaten *outside* of the Azarah. Similarly, Rashi in Temurah says that the spices are eaten outside of the Azarah, and then immediately afterwards the Kohanim entered the Azarah to eat the Minchah.

3. Perhaps the Ran and Rambam learn that the prohibition applies only to items which could be brought upon the Mizbe'ach as offerings, such as animals, fruit (which are placed on the Mizbe'ach as Bikurim), and bread (such as the Minchah). Things that cannot be offered upon the Mizbe'ach are not subject to the prohibition of bringing them into the Azarah. (This also explain why Bigdei Chol are permitted in the Azarah.) (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: Rav Chisda teaches that one who damages or eats Matnos Kehunah is exempt from compensation. The Gemara gives two reasons for Rav Chisda's ruling. First, the verse (Devarim 18:3) teaches that only the actual Matnos Kehunah must be given to a Kohen, but not compensation for them. Second, since there is no claimant (since no specific Kohen can claim the damages), one is exempt from paying.

Is there any practical difference between these two reasons?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH v'Iy Ba'is Eima) explains that according to the second reason, there remains an obligation to pay compensation, but since there is no one who can legally claim the money, the person in practice is exempt from paying. However, the person must give the value of the damages to the Kohanim in order to fulfill his obligation in Shamayim ("la'Tzeis Yedei Shamayim").

According to the first reason, there is absolutely no obligation to pay the Kohanim for damaged Matnos Kehunah, even "la'Tzeis Yedei Shamayim."

QUESTION: Rebbi Yonasan rules that one may not give Matnos Kehunah to a Kohen who is an Am ha'Aretz. This ruling seems to contradict a Mishnah in Chalah (4:9). The Tana Kama in the Mishnah there states that one is allowed to give different types of Matnos Kehunah to any Kohen. Rebbi Yehudah argues and says that Bikurim may not be given to any Kohen. Rebbi Yonasan here seems to be ruling like neither the Tana Kama nor Rebbi Yehudah, since he rules that *no* Matnos Kehunah may be given to an Am ha'Aretz! How can we reconcile Rebbi Yonasan's ruling with the Tana'im in Chalah?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH Minayin) and the CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN answer that Rebbi Yonasan agrees with the Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Chalah. The Tana Kama is discussing a case in which there is no Kohen who is a Chaver (who is careful to Matnos Kehunah while Tahor), or a case in which there is a Kohen who is a Chaver but he is not willing to accept the gift. In that case, one is permitted to give the Matnos Kehunah to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz. Rebbi Yonasan is discussing a case in which one has a choice to give the Matanos to a Kohen Chaver or to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz. In such a case, one should not give the Matanos to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz.

It seems that Tosfos learns that Rebbi Yehudah in Chalah maintains that it is always forbidden to give Bikurim to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz, even when there is no other Kohen available to receive the gift.

The SEFER YOSHEV OHALIM (beginning of Ki Savo) writes that this explanation of the Mishnah in Chalah answers a question that the RAMBAN asks on RASHI in Chumash. When the verse says that should take Bikurim to the Kohen "who will be in those days" (Devarim 26:3), Rashi comments that the verse is telling us that one may bring Bikurim only to the Kohen who is serving in his time. The Ramban there asks that the Torah earlier (Devarim 17:9, 19:17) uses the same terminology with regard to Dayanim (judges). With regard to Dayanim, it makes sense that the Torah must tell us to bring our disputes to the judges of our time, because we might have refrained from going to the judges, thinking that there are no judges qualified to rule in the case. However, why does the Torah need to use this terminology with regard to Kohanim? Why would we have thought that we should not bring a gift to a Kohen? The only qualification that a Kohen needs is to be a descendant of Aharon!

It seems that Rashi's intention is to teach that we do not rule like Rebbi Yehudah who says that it is always forbidden to bring Bikurim to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz. Rather, Rashi explains, the verse is teaching that any Kohen ("who will be in those days") suffices.

(b) The RASH in Chalah (4:9) seems to understand that the Mishnah in Chalah is discussing an entirely different case. He explains that the Mishnah there is discussing whether one is allowed to give his Matanos to a Kohen who is generally careful about Tum'ah and Taharah, but he is not careful to eat his Chulin b'Taharah. The Tana Kama says that one may give his Matanos to any Kohen he wants, while Rebbi Yehudah says that one is not allowed to give Bikurim to such a Kohen. According to the Rash, Rebbi Yonasan is discussing a different case. He is not discussing different levels of stringency regarding eating foods b'Taharah. Rather, he is saying that one may not give Matanos to a Kohen who is not learned in Torah.

The CHIDUSHIM U'VI'URIM says that this explanation seems to be more consistent with the wording of the Gemara. Rebbi Yonasan does not say that one should give *preference* to a Kohen Chaver over a Kohen Am ha'Aretz (as Tosfos explains), but rather he says simply that one may not give Matnos Kehunah to a Kohen Am ha'Aretz. Rebbi Yonasan does not contradict the Mishnah in Chalah, because both Tana'im there may agree that one may give only Matanos to a Kohen who is a Talmid Chacham.

(c) The LEV ARYEH points out that the RAMBAM does not mention this Halachah of Rebbi Yonasan. He suggests that the Rambam does not record the ruling of Rebbi Yonasan because the Rambam understands that Rebbi Yonasan follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah in Chalah, and the Halachah does not follow the view of Rebbi Yehudah.

(However, it is possible that the Lev Aryeh may have overlooked the ruling of the Rambam in Terumos (6:2), where he writes that one should give only Terumah that is Tahor, whether it is Terumah Gedolah or Terumas Ma'aser, to a Kohen who is a Talmid Chacham, since it is forbidden to eat Terumah that is Tamei. The KESEF MISHNEH writes that the source for the Rambam is clearly the statement of Rebbi Yonasan! If the Lev Aryeh does not agree that this is the source of the Rambam, then he should have at least recorded his argument with the Kesef Mishneh. It seems, therefore, that he overlooked the ruling of the Rambam there.) (Y. Montrose)

The Gemara quotes a Mishnah in Pe'ah (5:4) that says that if a wealthy person was traveling and he became stranded with no money, he is considered to be "poor" and he may accept Leket, Shikechah, Pe'ah, and Ma'aser Ani. RAV CHAIM OF VOLOZHIN (in Chut ha'Meshulash #17) suggests that he may take ordinary charity money as well.

Rav Chaim of Volozhin adds, however, that the VILNA GA'ON pointed out to him that even when a rich man is on the road and penniless, he is not always considered to be "poor." As long as he can obtain loans, he is considered "rich" and should not take charity.

The CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER (#131) rules that when a wealthy person takes money from charity funds (such as Ma'aser Kesafim) when on the road, he is obligated to pay it back. He explains that this cannot be compared to the case of the Mishnah in Pe'ah. In that case, when one is permitted to eat Matnos Aniyim, he does not have to return the Matanos upon returning home, because the Matanos have been totally consumed. Ma'aser Kesafim, however, is transferable legal tender and therefore other money must be returned in its place.