ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous dafEruvin 46
ERUVIN 46 - was generously dedicated by an anonymous donor
in Los Angeles.
(a) The water of rivers and fountains cannot be Koneh Shevisah - because
it is constantly moving.
(b) Perhaps, suggests the Gemar, Rebbi Ya'akov bar Idi heard from Rebbi
Yehoshua ben Levi - that the Halachah is always like the more lenient
opinion by Eruv (from which he deduced that the Halachah is like Rebbi
Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that a sleeping man is Koneh Shevisah).
(c) The Chumra that emerges from Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's ruling is -
'Cheftzei Hefker Konin Shevisah'.
(d) Had he only ruled ‘Halachah ke’Divrei ha’Meikil be’Eruv' - we would
have confined that ruling to an individual who argues with an individual,
or a number of Tana'im who argue with a number of Tana'im, but not to an
individual who argues with a number of Tana'im (where the regular
principle of following the majority will apply). That is why he needed to
add the ruling 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri', even when he is the
(a) Rebbi Eliezer holds that a young woman who sees blood after ninety
days - is not Temei'ah retroactively (as most women are). Consequently,
any Taharos which she handled prior to her sighting blood, remain Tahor.
According to the Rabbanan, we only say this with respect to an older
woman, who has reached the age of menopause.
(b) 'After he remembered' means after Rebbi remembered that it was not an
individual who argued with Rebbi Eliezer, but the Rabbanan, he decided
that nevertheless, Rebbi Eliezer was sufficiently worthy to rule like him
in case of an emergency. It cannot mean after he remembered that the
Halachah was not like Rebbi Eliezer (in fact, no ruling had as yet been
issued), - because in that case, how could he rely on his opinion, even in
a case of emergency?
(c) Rebbi considered that case one of emergency - because it was a year of
drought, and it would have been a big loss to have declared the food in
(d) From here we see, asked Rav Papa on Rava - that even by a de'Rabanan
(such being Metame a woman retroactively), we will not follow a minority
opinion to be lenient (since Rebbi only relied on Rebbi Eliezer because it
was a case of emergency).
(a) Shiv'ah - refers to the prohibition of washing oneself and one's
clothes; Sheloshim - to having a haircut and ironing one's clothes.
(b) Shemu'ah Rechokah, according to Rebbi Akiva - applies for only *one*
(c) Rabah bar bar Chanah in the name of Rebbi Yochanan - rules that
whenever an individual argues with a majority to take on a more lenient
approach (even by a de'Rabbanan), we follow the majority opinion, except
for this case - because itconcerns Aveilus, and Rebbi Yochanan concurs
with Shmuel, who holds 'Halachah ke'Divrei ha'Meikil be'Avel'.
(d) So we se once again, asks Rav Mesharshaya on Rava, that even by a
de'Rabbanan, we do not accept the minority ruling to go to the lenient
side, when it clashes with a majority opinion?
(a) Rebbi Yehudah, who requires the knowledge of the person making the
Eruv Techumin, concedes that this is not necessary by Eruvei Chatzeros.
The reason for this is because, whereas making an Eruv Techumin in the one
direction may cause him a loss (by disallowing him the two thousand Amos
that he was initially permitted in the opposite direction - and one cannot
cause someone a loss without his knowledge and consent), making an Eruv
Chatzeros on someone's behalf, cannot possibly so him any harm, and does
not therefore, require his consent.
When Rebbi Yossi said ‘ve’Lo Amru le’Arev Chatzeros Ela Kedei she’Lo
Leshakach Toras Eruv min ha’Tinokos - he meant to say that intrinsically,
it is only Eruv Techumin that Chazal found important to institute. They
only instituted Eruv Chatzeros (even when a Shitufei Muva'os has already
been made) in order that the concept of Eruv Chazteros should not become
forgotten from the children. Consequently, they were more lenient in
connection with the leftovers of the Eruv.
(b) Had Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi issued only the one ruling (that of
'Halachah ke'Divrei ha'Meikal be'Eruv') - we would have established that
by the food of an Eruv that diminished to less than the initial two meals
required for an Eruv. There, Rebbi Yossi declares the Eruv to be still
valid, since initially, the Eruv contained the full amount. But regarding
other disputes that concern the initial status of an Eruv, he will perhaps
take the stringent view. Therefore, he needed to rule like Rebbi Yochanan
ben Nuri, who speaks about the initial status of an Eruv.
(a) The Gemara always rules like Rebbi Akiva, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi,
whenever they argue with a contemporary.
The Gemara asks whose opinion we follow, when Rebbi Meir argues with Rebbi
Shimon - and the Sha'aleh remains unresolved.
1. ... 'Matin' means - that we will inform an individual who comes to ask
for a ruling that the Halachah is like Rebbi Yossi, but we will not
announce this ruling in public.
2. ... 'Nir'in' means - that we will not even inform an individual of this
ruling, but that, if someone does rule like him, we will not rescind that
1. The Halachah is not like Rebbi Meir, neither when he argues with Rebbi
Yehudah nor when he argues with Rebbi Yossi.
(d) When Rebbi Shimon argues with Rebbi Yehudah, the Halachah is like
Rebbi Yehudah - so how much more so when he argues with Rebbi Yossi.
2. When Rebbi Yehudah argues with Rebbi Yossi - the Halachah is like Rebbi
There is no proof for Rav Mesharshaya, who disagrees with the above
principles (in 6) from the fact that Rav is quoted as ruling (in the
Mishnah on 45b) like Rebbi Shimon, in spite of the fact that it is Rebbi
Yehudah who argues with Rebbi Shimon - because it may well be that the
rules only apply, when no other ruling has been issued, but it does
deprive the Amora'im of the right to rule otherwise (Rebbi Yochanan's
rulings come in to effect when no ruling was issued to the contrary.
(a) An Ir shel Rabim ve'Na'asis shel Yachid - is a town whose residents
(including guests) decreased from more than six hundred thousand Jews to
(b) One cannot make an Eruv to cover the whole town - because the main
street is not considered a proper Reshus ha'Rabim, since it is not similar
to the camp of Yisrael in the desert. Each Mavoy or area, must therefore
arrange its own independeant Eruv.
(c) Rebbi Shimon says that one does not require fifty residents to live
outside the town, but three courtyards, each consisting of two houses,
will suffice. The excess people living outside the town serve as a
reminder that this is better than an Ir shel Yachid.
(d) The answer here (why we have no proof for Rav Mesharshaya) is as above
in question 8 - i.e. because it may well be that the rules only apply when
no other ruling has been issued, but not in face of a specific ruling.