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1)

(a) The Rabbanan in our Mishnah do not consider freeing a slave a liability, since the owner could have stopped feeding him anyway, had he so wished. We try to prove from here that a master can force his slave to work without feeding him - meaning that the slave would have to go knocking on doors begging for alms.

(b) In fact, there is no proof from here that he may - because the Tana could be speaking when the master said to the slave 'Use the proceeds of your work to sustain yourself'.

(c) He cannot say the same to his wife - because it speaks when she is unable to make ends meet.

(d) The case of Sh'tar Shichrur cannot be speaking in he same circumstances, because, if it were, and the master would be obligated to supplement the slave's work (as he does in the case of his wife) - what would be the point of keeping a slave who costs the master more than he produces?

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa exempts a master from feeding a slave who had to run to a city of refuge - and the master receives what he produces.

(b) In this case too, we refute the apparent proof that a master can force his slave to work without feeding him, by establishing the Beraisa when the master said to the slave 'Use the proceeds of your work to sustain yourself'. Nevertheless, the master receives what the slave produces - in a case where the slave produces more than his needs.

(c) This is not obvious at all - because we might have thought that seeing as when he does not produce extra, he does not need to give his master anything, when there is, he is not obligated to give it to him either.

(d) The Tana chose to teach us this Halachah specifically in connection with a slave who has to run to a city of refuge - to teach us that, in spite of the Pasuk "ve'Chai Bahen" (from which we learn the obligation of helping the fugitive in the city of refuge), the master nevertheless receives the extra sustenance that the slave produces, and we do not put it away for the benefit of the slave (as a safety measure for a day when he does not manage to make ends meet).

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa says in the Seifa that, should a woman be obligated to run to a city of refuge - it is her husband who provides for her there.

(b) We can extrapolate from there - that the Tana is speaking when her husband did not instruct her to use the proceeds of her work to sustain herself, and presumably, the Reisha (in the case of the slave) speaks in such a case too, clashing with the way we just explained it.

(a) So we establish the Beraisa when the master and the husband instructed the wife and the slave respectively to use the proceeds of the work to sustain themselves, and the Seifa speaks when she is unable to makes ends meet (though the Reisha does not - see Tosfos DH 'Mesapekes ... '), teaching us that her husband is obligated to supplement her income.

(b) Despite the fact that the Seifa (de'Seifa) goes on to describe what the Din will be if he instructs her to use the products of her hands for her sustenance, we cannot infer that the Reisha speaks when he does not - because the Seifa switches to a case where the woman is able to fend for herself (teaching us the intrinsic Chidush that a husband is permitted to avoid sustaining his wife, in which case it is not open to inferences).

(c) This is not so obvious. We might have thought - that, based on the Pasuk in Tehilim "Kol Kevudah bas Melech Penimah", Chazal obligated a husband to sustain his wife, whether he likes it or not.

(a) In another Beraisa - Raban Shimon ben Gamliel authorizes a slave during years of famine to issue his master with an ultimatum - either to sustain him or to set him free.

(b) The Chachamim disagree. In their opinion - it is the master who can dictate his terms, not the slave.

(c) We propose - to connect their Machlokes to the She'eilah (currently under discussion), whether a master is permitted to instruct his slave to use what he produces to sustain himself (Raban Shimon ben Gamliel) or not.

(a) We refute this proposition however, partially on the basis of the ultimatum's wording. The problem we have ...

1. ... with the wording of the ultimatum is - that it should then have read 'Either sustain me or give me the produce of my hands to sustain myself' (rather than 'Either sustain me or set me free').
2. ... with the case itself is - why then, did the Tana present the case specifically when there is a drought?

(b) We therefore establish Raban Shimon ben Gamliel when, on the one hand, the master instructed the slave to sustain himself with the produce of his hands, and on the other, when, due to prevailing circumstances, he is unable to make ends meet. Hence the ultimatum!

(c) The basis of their Machlokes lies in the people's feelings - Raban Shimon ben Gamliel allows the slave the ultimatum because people will not have pity on a slave (therefore unless his master sustains him, the only way he can survive is to be set free and then to go begging for alms); whereas the Chachamim reckon that someone who takes pity on a free person will take no less pity on a slave.

(d) The reason for this is - because slaves too, are obligated to perform Mitzvos (the same as women).

7)

(a) Rav says that a slave whose master declared all the work of his hands Hekdesh - should borrow, and pay back with the work that he produces.

(b) We refute the proof from here that a master can make his slave work without sustaining him - by establishing the case when his master is feeding him.

(c) In spite of the fact that effectively, the slave belongs to Hekdesh, he is nevertheless permitted ...

1. ... to eat more than his basic needs, at the expense of Hekdesh - because it is to Hekdesh's advantage if he eats well, becomes healthier and works better.
2. ... to use what he produces (which is Hekdesh) to pay for the luxury foods that he is now eating - provided he pays with less than a P'rutah's-worth at a time (which he pays as he produces it, because Hekdesh does not take effect on less than a P'rutah's worth).

(a) To resolve Rav's current ruling with his ruling 'ha'Makdish Yedei Avdo, Oso Eved Oseh ve'Ochel' - we establish the current ruling when the master sustains him, and the second ruling when he does not. Both maintain that a master cannot instruct his slave to work without sustaining him.

(b) When Rav adds 'de'I Lo Avda. Ma'an Palach Lei' - he means that if he cannot work for himself, who will provide for him?

(c) We cannot establish Rav's first statement when the master does not sustain his slave, but he has the right to make him work without feeding him - because then why should we care whether someone will work for him or not, the Hekdesh should take effect and he should not be allowed to eat what his hands produce.

(d) We have now proved, that, according to Rav - a master cannot make his slave work for him without sustaining him.

(a) Rebbi Yochanan says that someone who cuts off the arm of his friend's slave - is obligated to pay the master, Sheves (work loss) and Refu'ah, and the slave is fed from Tzedakah.

(b) This proves - that according to Rebbi Yochanan, a master can make his slave work for him without feeding him.

(c) We cannot refute this proof by establishing the case when the master is sustaining his slave - because if that is so, why would he be fed from Tzedakah?

(d) From the Lashon used by Rebbi Yochanan 've'Oso ha'Eved *Nizon* min ha'Tzedakah' - we rule out the suggestion that he is fed *extras* from Tzedakah, because then, Rebbi Yochanan should have said *'Misparnes* min ha'Tzedakah' (implying luxuries).

(a) Rebbi Yochanan says 'Nosen Shivto u'Refu'aso le'Rabo' - mentioning Shivto (which is obvious) because of Refu'aso.

(b) The Refu'ah goes to the master (and not to pay for the slave's healing costs) - because we are speaking when the initial assessment of the time period required was for five days, and, by using stronger medications, he was healed in three.

(c) The recipient of ...

1. ... the Nezek is - the master.
2. ... Tza'ar is - also the master.

(d) The master receives the Tza'ar - because whatever is due to the slave, goes to his master.

(a) When Rebbi Elazar pointed out to Rebbi Meir that it is an advantage for a slave to go free, and not a liability - he retorted that it is a liability, because if he was the slave of a Kohen, he would no longer be permitted to eat Terumah.

(b) The Beraisa concludes with the words 'Aval Ishah Chov Hu Lah' - which is what the Rabbanan (Rebbi Elazar) concede to Rebbi Meir.

(c) The two reasons for this are - 1. because she loses the right to eat Terumah; 2. because she loses the right to Mezonos.

(a) When Rebbi Meir retorted to the Rabbanan's Kashya 'Mah Im Yirtzeh she'Lo Lazuno ... ', with 'u'Mah Ilu Eved Kohen she'Barach ve'Eishes Kohen she'Mardah, al Ba'alah, ha'Lo Ochlin bi'Terumah' - he meant 'You answered me with regard to Mezonos, but what will you answer me with regard to Terumah?

(b) In anticipation of the Kashya that the master could always throw him a Get Shichrur, invalidating him from Terumah anyway, Rebbi Meir said - that as soon as the slave realizes his master's intentions, he could run away and continue to eat Terumah.

(c) Rebbi Meir's argument seems very sound. The Rabbanan (in our Mishnah) counter it - by saying 'Mipnei she'Hu ke'Kinyano', which Rava explains, means that it is not to the slaves detriment, since he belongs to his master, who his permission to sell him anyway.

(a) Rebbi Meir has a good explanation for the slave of a Kohen. The Shichrur of the slave of a Yisrael is a liability, explains Rebbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak - because he becomes forbidden to live with a Shifchah Kena'anis.

(b) He does not consider the fact that, on the other hand, he will be free to marry a bas Yisrael - because a slave prefers to live with a Shifchah Kena'anis.

(c) When we say that, according to Rebbi Meir ...

1. ... 'Zila Lei' - we mean that she is 'cheap' in his eyes (he has no respect for her, to treat her with dignity).
2. ... 'Shechicha Lei' - that she is always availabe to him.
3. ... 'P'ritza Lei' - that she has no scruples about behaving immodestly with him.