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1)

(a) We just explained that Rebbi Yochanan holds 'Ein B'reirah'. He says that if brothers divided the inheritance they received from their father - they are obligated to redistribute the entire property when Yovel arrives, as if they had purchased their respective rights from one another.

(b) If he held 'Yesh B'reirah' - the brothers would be able to retain what they initially received (because then they would be 'Yorshin' and not 'Lekuchos'.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan found it necessary to teach us 'Ein B'reirah' both in the case of brothers and in the case of Get, because, had he only taught it to us in the case of ...

1. ... Get, but not by brothers - we would have said confined it to Get, where the Torah writes "Lah" 'Lish'mah', but not in the case of brothers who inherit, since it is only a *sale* that goes back in the Yovel, but not an *inheritance*.
2. ... brothers, but not by Get (if we read 'Mishum de'le'Chumra') - we would have perhaps thought that Rebbi Yochanan has a Safek (whether 'Yesh B'reirah' or 'Ein B'reirah). Consequently, he rules 'Yesh B'reirah' le'Chumra (in the case of brothers who inherit), but not le'Kula (in the case of a Get).

(d) If we read 'ki'Techilah' (instead of 'Mishum de'le'Chumra') in the last distinction, then we will say - that had Rebbi Yochanan not repeated his ruling by the case of Get, we would have thought that maybe his ruling in the case of brothers inheriting is not due to 'Ein B'reirah', but because that is how Yehoshua bin Nun distributed the land originally, one portion to one person (not to many people). But elsewhere, he maintains 'Yesh B'reirah'.

(a) Rav Hoshaya asked Rav Yehudah whether, in the case of the man (whose two wives had the same name) who asked the Sofer to write a Get in the name of whichever wife came out of the door first - the Get was valid (because 'Yesh B'reirah'), or not (because 'Ein B'reirah').

(b) Rav answered him from our Mishnah - where, in he case when the husband asked the Sofer to write the Get for whichever wife he would ultimately decide, the Tana invalidates it, because he holds 'Ein B'reirah'.

(a) In the case cited by the Tana in the Beraisa, of the man who informed his children that he was Shechting the Korban Pesach on behalf of the first one to arrive in Yerushalayim - the Tana concludes that, whoever arrives in Yerushalayim first, merits a portion for himself as well as for all his siblings.

(b) Rav Yehudah refuted Rav Hoshaya's proof from there (that we hold 'Yesh B'reirah') with Rebbi Yochanan - who explains that the father's sole intention was to encourage his children to hurry to Yerushalayim, and not to exclude any of his children from the Korban Pesach.

(c) Rav Yehudah proves Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation from the very words of the Tana - who adds that the one to arrive first in Yerushalayim, merits a portion in the Korban Pesach for all his siblings too. Now if the father really meant what he said, how could the other siblings be permitted to receive a portion of the Korban Pesach, seeing as they were not designated on it when it was Shechted?

(d) We further substantiate this with another Beraisa, where the Tana relates how in an actual case, the daughters arrived in Yerushalayim first - and he concludes by praising the daughters and denigrating the sons. He did not say however, that the daughters earned themselves a portion in their father's Korban Pesach, and the sons did not.

(a)The problem that Abaye has with the inconsistency of Rav Hoshaya's She'eilah (regarding whichever wife leaves the house first), Rav Yehudah's reply (from whichever wife he decides to divorce), and Rav Hoshaya's subsequent Kashya (from the case of the Korban Pesach) - is that the She'eilah concerns a case of Toleh be'Da'as Acheirim, the reply, a case of Toleh be'Da'as Atzmo (where there is more reason to say 'Ein B'reirah', as we shall see), and the subsequent Kashya again from a case of Toleh be'Da'as Acheirim.

(b) There is less reason to say 'Yesh Bereirah' in a case of 'Toleh be'Da'as Atzmo' than Toleh be'Da'as Acheirim' - because in the former case, the very fact that he made such a condition demonstrates that he is currently undecided which to choose. That being the case, it is not possible to say that when he decides, his decision will work retroactively; whereas in the latter case, where he relied entirely on circumstances outside his jurisdiction, it may well be that he does intend it to.

(c) Rava rejects Abaye's Kashya on the grounds that - Abaye must prove that such a distinction exists. Otherwise, we will say that those who hold 'Yesh B'reirah', do so in all circumstances, and the same holds for those who hold 'Ein B'reirah'.

(a) Rebbi Meir permits drinking wine that one purchased from Kutim (on Erev Shabbos and he was unable to separate the Ma'asros before Shabbos arrived). He says that, assuming that he purchased one hundred Lugin, he is obligate to verbally separate ...

1. ... two Lugin as Terumah.
2. ... ten (actually a bit less, see Tosfos DH, 'Asarah') as Ma'aser Rishon.
3. ... and ten (a bit less still) as Ma'aser Sheini.

(b) In spite of what we have learned that Amei ha'Aretz are not suspect on Terumah, it was nevertheless necessary to separate Terumah from produce purchased from the Kutim, because Kutim were suspect on Terumah, too (in fact they were suspect on whatever they sold to a Yisrael, because they were not particular about the La'av of 'Lifnei Iver').

(c) This entire Halachah is not applicable nowadays - because Chazal later discovered that the Kutim were idolaters and they declared them Nochrim in all respects.

(a) Rebbi Meir permits drinking the wine - even before having actually separated the Ma'asros from it, because he holds 'Yesh B'reirah' (in which case the Ma'asros that he separates later will take effect retroactively.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon - forbid drinking the wine before Ma'asros have actually been taken.

(a) According to Rav Mesharshaya, Rebbi Yehudah's reason is because of 'Ein Bereirah'.

7)

(a) Rebbi Yehudah states in a Mishnah later that if someone says to his wife 'Zeh Gitech Me'achshav Im Meisi me'Choli Zeh', she has the status of a married woman during the interim period, even if he does die from the illness. The ramifications of Rebbi Yehudah's ruling ...

1. ... assuming the husband is a Kohen is - that she is permitted to eat Terumah.
2. ... even if he is not - that she is Chayav Misah, should she commit adultery during that period.

(b) We can extrapolate from the fact that Rebbi Yehudah nevertheless validates the Get should he die from the illness, that Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Yesh B'reirah' by Toleh be'Da'as Acheirim - because otherwise, due to the principle 'Ein Get le'Achar Misah', the Get would not be valid.

(c) If not for B'reirah, the Get would be invalid because of 'Ein Get le'Achar Misah' - because we are dealing with a situation that will be determined by circumstances beyond his control. This differs from other conditions that need to be fulfilled after the Get takes place, and when they are, the Get is valid retroactively, even without B'reirah - because there, we have a situation where he definitely wants the Get to take place, but under certain conditions that are within his jurisdiction to fulfill (conditions which could not have been fulfilled earlier).

(a) In another Beraisa, in a case where a man says to a woman 'Hareini Bo'alech al-Menas she'Yirtzeh Aba', the Tana Kama says that she is betrothed even if the woman's father did not consent to the betrothal - because of the principle 'Ein Adam Oseh Be'ilaso Be'ilas Z'nus'.

(b) Rebbi Shimon (who concurs with the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa of 'ha'Lokei'ach Yayin mi'Bein ha'Kutim') disagrees. Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah quotes him as saying - that she is not betrothed unless her father agrees to the Kidushin.

(c) We extrapolate from here that Rebbi Shimon holds 'Yesh B'reirah' - because it is clear that even Rebbi Shimon will agree that she is betrothed retroactively, in the event that her father agrees.

(a) Rav Mesharshaya now extrapolates from this Beraisa - that Rebbi Shimon holds 'Yesh B'reirah' by Toleh be'Da'as Acheirim, and from that of 'ha'Lokei'ach Yayin' - that he holds 'Ein B'reirah' by Toleh be'Da'as Atzmo' (a Kashya on Rava, who maintains that the Tana'aim make no distinction between the two, as we learned above).

(b) Rava replies that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon hold 'Yesh B'reirah', and the reason they forbid the person who purchased wine from a Kuti to drink it before having actually separated it is not because they hold 'Ein B'reirah' but - because they suspect that the flask containing the wine might break, before he has a chance to separate the Ma'asros that he already declared. And since he did not actually separate them, it will transpire that he drank Tevel.

(c) The Tana'im who argue with Rebbi Meir specifically gave this reason in another Beraisa - to which Rebbi Meir replied 'le'she'Yibaka!' 'We will worry when it breaks!' because it is unusual for the flask to break in such a short space of time, so we do not content with it.