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1)

(a) We learned in a Beraisa that if a Nochri claimed one's Eved or a Sikrikun took him, the Eved does not go free. The case of Sikrikun is - when at a time when the murder of Jews was common, someone threatened a Jew's life, and he offers him his slave to leave him be.

(b) The Chachamim did not decree in these two cases - because he neither sold the Eved nor borrowed money against him. It was purely an O'nes.

(c) The Tana of another Beraisa says that if the king claimed one's granary ...

1. ... for his debt - he is obligated to Ma'aser it (from another source).
2. ... although the owner owed him nothing - he is Patur.

(d) The criterion for this is - whether he benefits from the claim (in which case, it is as if he sold it) or not.

(a) We reconcile the first of the two previous Beraisos, which does not seem to consider an Eved that is claimed against a debt, a sale, with the second Beraisa, which does - by switching the criterion of the first Beraisa to the fact that he was an O'nes, rather than the fact that it was not a sale.

(b) Rav rules that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri Forhang, the Eved goes free. A Forhang is - someone who takes people's fields by force.

(c) We resolve Rav's ruling with the Beraisa that does not obligate the master to set free an Eved claimed by the king for his debt - by pointing out that in Rav's case, he should have appeased the Forhang by offering him money and retaining the Eved, something that is not possible when it is the king who is claiming.

(d) We do not have a proof from Rav that if someone sells his Eved for thirty days the Eved goes free (since it was common for the Forhang to return the field after thirty days) - because Rav is speaking about a Forhang who does not return what he claims.

(a) We ask whether if a master sells his Eved 'Chutz mi'Melachto', he goes free. The case is that he only sells him to live with a Shifchah, to provide his master with slaves, but not to work.

(b) We also ask from 'Chutz min ha'Mitzvos' and from 'Chutz mi'Shabbasos ve'Yamim-Tovim'. Apart from 'le'Ger Toshav Mahu?' wew also ask - what the Din will be if he sold him to a Kuti or a Yisrael Mumar.

(c) The only one of the above She'eilos that we resolve is that of Ger Toshav, of which the Beraisa says 'Harei Hu ke'Oved-Kochavim'.
We conclude with regard to a Kuti and Yisrael Mumar - that according to some, they are considered like a Yisrael (and do not go out to frredom), whereas according to others, they are like an Akum (and they do).

(a) They asked Rebbi Ami whether, if an Eved cast himself upon a band of robbers and the master is unable to retrieve him either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court - he is permitted to accept payment for him or not.

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah told Rebbi Zerika to look into the matter. Rebbi Zerika quoted a Beraisa, which says - that ...

1. ... if someone sold a house to a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael) - he is not permitted to accept payment for it.
2. ... if someone's house was taken by force and he is unable to retrieve it either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court - he may.

(c) He is even permitted to take it to a Nochri court to have the deal substantiated - because he is merely saving his money from falling into their hands.

(d) We might have thought that this at least, would be forbidden at all costs - because it raises the esteem of the Nochrim and their gods (see Rashi at the beginning of Mishpatim).

(a) The Eved (of our current She'eilah) might well be more stringent than the house in the latter case - because whereas an Eved is not indispesible, a house is. Consequently, it is unusual to sell it (and Chazal often waived decrees in unusual cases).

(b) Rebbi Ami however, was convinced that he knew the Halachah. He sent them - that an Eved had exactly the same Din as a house in this regard.

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi states that that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri, we penalise him by forcing him to redeem for anything him up to a hundred times his value. We try to prove from Resh Lakish, who said that if someone sells a large animal to a Nochri (which Chazal forbade in Avodah-Zarah), we penalise him by forcing him to buy it back up to ten times its value - that Rebbi Yehoshua did not mean literally a hundred times as much.

(d) We reject this proof on the grounds - that a slave might have a more stringent ruling that a large animal, because every day, he is prevented from observing Mitzvos (in which case Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi too, is literal).

(a) Others - reverse the two Halachos. According to them, one is obligated to pay up to ten times for selling an Eved, and a hundred times for a large animal.

(b) After again asking whether Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi meant literally ten times as much, and attempting to prove that he did not from Resh Lakish, we try to reject the proof on the grounds that he has to pay less for the Eved, because when he redeems him, he goes free, whereas the animal returns to him. We reject this S'vara however, on the grounds that - that would account for eleven times more than its value (instead of the Eved's ten); but a hundred!

(c) We finally establish that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, like Resh Lakish, meant literally ten times. The reason that Chazal were so much more lenient by an Eved than by a large animal is - because it is unusual to sell an Eved to a Nochri, and whatever is unusual, Chazal tended to treat more leniently (as we just explained).

(d) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked Rebbi Asi whether, if someone sold his Eved and died, the penalty extends to his sons. We cannot learn from the case of ...

1. ... a Kohen who chipped the ear of a Bechor, where they penalized his children, forbidding them to Shecht it just like he was - because there he contravened a La'av d'Oraysa ("Kol Mum Lo Yiheyeh Bo" - Emor), whereas here, he only contravened an Isur de'Rabbanan.
2. ... someone who performed work on Chol ha'Mo'ed that will cause a loss if it is not performed, if he could have been performed it before Yom-Tov or afterwards, where they did not, and his children are permitted to benefit from that work - because there, he did not actually perform an Isur, whereas here, he did.

7)

(a) The basis of Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah whether the penalty for selling one's slave extends to the master's children or not is - whether Chazal penalized the sinner (and not his children), or the object with which the sin was performed (irrespective of whether it is owned by the sinner himself or by his sons).

(b) The Mishnah permits a field from which the thorns were removed in the Sh'mitah year to be sown in the following year. They did not penalize the owner - because there is nothing wrong with removing thorns in the Sh'mitah-year.

(c) The Tana does however - forbid sowing in the following year, a field that one manured (manually) or by placing animals there to manure it in the Sh'mitah.

(d)

1. Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina says that - if someone did so and then died, Chazal did not penalize his sons after him (which also resolves our She'eilah regarding selling his Eved to a Nochri).
2. Abaye says that if someone rendered Tamei his friend's Taharos and then died - Chazal did not penalize his sons after him, because, seeing as the damage is not discernible, the obligation to pay is only a K'nas mi'de'Rabbanan, and as we just learned, the Rabbanan punished the sinner and not the article.

(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that if someone sells his Eved to Chutzah la'Aretz, the Eved goes free and he requires a Get Shichrur - from the purchaser.

(b) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel makes a distinction ... . 'P'loni Antuchi' means - 'so-and-so who lives in Anti'och' (a town in Syria).

(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that, if the master sold him ...

1. ... 'li'P'loni Antuchi' - he does not go free, because it merely means that the purchaser was born there, but not that he currently lives there.
2. ... 'le'Antuchi she'be'Antuchya' - he goes free, because it is clear that the purchaser intended to take him back to Anti'och.

(d) The Tana of another Beraisa nevertheless writes 'Machartihu le'Antuchi, Yeitzei' - because he speaks when the Antuchi does not own a house in Eretz Yisrael, but is only renting there (in which case, he clearly intends to return, with the Eved, to Anti'och), whereas the previous Beraisa speaks when he owns a house in Eretz Yisrael.

(a) The Tana of the latter Beraisa concedes that 'le'Antuchi' does not go free - if he adds 'le'Antuchi ha'Sharuy be'Lud', in which case, he clearly did not intend the purchaser to take the Eved to Anti'och.

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether, if a ben Bavel who married a woman in Eretz Yisrael who brought Avadim and Shefachos into the marriage, and who, we assume, intends to return to Bavel - they go free or not.

(c) If we hold (with regard to Nechsei Tzon Barzel) ...

1. ... that, in the event of divorce, 'ha'Din Imah' (she is entitled to take back the articles that she brought in) - Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be that the Avadim might nevertheless be considered her husband's, since they are Meshubad to him.
2. ... that 'ha'Din Imo' (her husband is entitled to give her money and retain the articles) - Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be that the Avadim might nevertheless be considered the wife's, since the husband does not acquire the body of the Eved.

(d) The outcome of the She'eilah is - 'Teiku'.

(a) Rebbi Avahu quoted Rebbi Yochanan that if an Eved follows his master to Syria, and the master then sells him there, he goes free. Rebbi Chiya quotes a Beraisa which says 'Ibad es Zechuso' - meaning that, by leaving Eretz Yisrael of his own accord, the Eved loses his right to go free should his master sell him there.

(b) We reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa - by establishing his case when the master intended to return to Eretz Yisrael, in which case, the Eved expected to return with him, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he had the intention of remaining in Chutz la'Aretz.

(c) We cite another Beraisa which makes this very distinction. The problem with the initial text '*Yotze* ha'Eved Achar Rabo le'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor Kofin Oso ... ' is - that the Mishnah in Kesuvos teaches us that the members of a person's household are not obligated to follow him to Chutz la'Aretz.

(d) Consequently, the correct text is '*Yatza* ha'Eved Achar Rabo le'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor Kofin Oso ... '.

(a) Rav Anan heard two things from Shmuel. One of them is the same Halachah as stated by Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan. The other follows a Statement by Rav that if someone sells a field in the Yovel year, the sale is valid, but it reverts to the seller immediately. Shmuel argue with Rav. He holds 'Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar' - because, if a field that has been sold returns to the owner in the Yovel year, it stands to reason that a field that has not been sold cannot be sold then.

(b) Rav Anan says about the two statements of Shmuel - that by one of them, the sale is valid and the money is returned to the owner immediately, and by the other, the money remains where it is, only he could not recall which was which?

(c) What Rav Anan could not remember, Rav Yosef extrapolated from a Beraisa. The Beraisa says that an Eved whose master sold him to Chutz la'Aretz goes free, and requires a Sh'tar Shichrur from his second master.

(d) Rav Yosef extrapolates from the fact that the second master is obligated to give him a Get Shichrur indicates that the sale is valid (and the money remains where it is) - then it must be in the case of someone who sells a field in the Yovel that Shmuel holds that it is invalid.

(a) Rav Anan did not think of extrapolating from the Beraisa like Rav Yosef - because he had not seen the Beraisa.

(b) Neither did he extrapolate from Shmuel himself, who said in the case of 'ha'Mocher Sadeihu bi'Sh'nas ha'Yovel' Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar', that the sale is invalid (implying that the money returns to the buyer) - because that does not preclude the possibility of the money remaining in the hand of the seller.

(c) The precedent for saying that the transaction is Bateil, yet the seller retains the money is - a case where someone marries his sister, where Shmuel holds that the money is considered a gift and the woman retains it.

(d) Rav disagrees. According to him - she must return the money.

(a) In the previous case, we ask why the Chachamim chose to punish the buyer, rather than the seller. We initially answer 'La'av Achb'ra Ganav, Ela Chora Ganav - meaning that even though it is the seller who sins (like a mouse who steals one's food), if not for the purchaser (who offers to purchase his goods), the seller would not be able to sin (just like the hole in the Mashal, which enables the mouse to steal).

(b) We reject this answer however, on the grounds - that the opposite is true; if not for the mouse, there would be no hole, and similarly, if people did not offer to sell their property, there would be no purchasers (in other words, the ultimate culprits are the mouse and the seller).

(c) The reason that the purchaser is penalized and not the seller is -because Chazal decided to punish the one who is currently holding the Isur.