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1)

(a) The Beraisa says that, in a case where witnesses testify about a woman who is marrying for the second time, she and her first husband were *not secluded* together (before he died) - her second husband does not have a Ta'anas Besulim.

(b) The second case in the Beraisa, which speaks even if they *were* - refers to when they were not secluded together long enough to have been intimate.

(c) We know that she will receive a Kesuvah of one Manah from her second husband - from the fact that he does have a Ta'anas Besulim (without which she cannot lose her Kesuvah).

(d) Rav Ashi refute Rabah's proof from here that someone who marries a woman who has a Chezkas Besulah and turns out to be a Be'ulah, receives a Kesuvah like a Be'ulah - because the current case is different, since her first husband married her (but where there was no marriage, she will not receive anything).

(a) We ask why the Tana of the Beraisa denies the husband Ta'anas Besulim. Why do we not suspect that she may have committed adultery during the period of their betrothal? Rav Sh'ravyah - therefore establishes the Beraisa when the man betrothed the woman and married her immediately.

(b) Others cite the entire Sugya (Rabah, Rav Ashi and Rav Sh'ravyah) on our Mishnah, 'Besulah ... min ha'Nisu'in K'subasan Manah, ve'Ein Lahem Ta'anas Besulim'. The difference between the case in our Mishnah and the case in the Beraisa is - the witnesses who testify in the Beraisa that the Chasan and Kalah were not secluded before the Chasan died.

(c) If our Sugya pertained to the Mishnah, Rav Ashi would agree with Rabah that the Tana of the Beraisa holds 'Kansah be'Chezkas Besulah, ve'Nimtzeis Be'ulah, Yesh Lah Kesuvah Manah' - because there, she receives a Manah in spite of the man claim that, even though she had been married to her first husband, he relied on the witnesses that there had been no seclusion.

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah states that someone who eats by his father-in-law (to be) in Yehudah, does not have a Ta'anas Besulim - because they would seclude themselves before the wedding, in which case they may well have been intimate, too.

(b) The Minhag in Yehudah - was not absolute; some practiced that Minhag, others did not.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa presents three Minhagim that were practiced in Yehudah, but not in Galil. In Yehudah, they used to seclude the Chasan and Kalah (just before the wedding) - in order to break the ice, and become familiar with each other.

(b) They also used to designate two 'Shushbinim' during the night of the wedding - to make sure that the Chasan and Kalah did not exploit each other: one to see that the Chasan should not hide the blood-stained cloth, and the other, to see that the Kalah should not bring a blood-stained cloth from outside.

(c) We now know that the Minhag to seclude the Chasan and Kalah before the wedding was not absolute - because if it was, what was the point of the Shushbinim, seeing as he did not have a Ta'anas Besulim anyway? In other words, the two Minhagim do not go hand in hand. It is either the one, or the other.

(d) The third Minhag that they practiced exclusively in Yehudah was - (an extension of the second one) that the Shushbinim would sleep in the same room as the Chasan and Kalah.

(a) The Beraisa concludes 'Kol she'Lo Nahag ke'Minhag ha'Zeh, Eino Yachol Lit'on Ta'anas Besulim'. This cannot refer to the first of the three Minhagim - because the Tana should then have said 'Kol she'Nahag ... ' (rather than Kol she'Lo Nahag ... ').

(b) On the other hand, had it referred to the second Minhag, the Tana should have said 'Kol she'Lo Mushmash ... ' (seeing as this pertains to the Shushbin appointed by the Kalah's father, whose job it was to ensure that the Chasan did not lose the cloth).

(c) Abaye therefore establishes it in connection with the *first* Minhag, amending the Beraisa to read 'Kol she'Nahag ... '. Rava does not like that amendment - on the grounds that one cannot simply erase the word 'Lo' (a key word in any statement) from a text.

(d) Rav Ashi finally accepts the wording of 'Kol she'Lo Mushmash ... ', like we stated earlier the Tana ought to have said. Rava interprets the Beraisa to read 'Kol she'Lo Nahag Minhag Galil be'Galil, Ela Minhag Yehudah be'Galil, Eino Yachol li'T'on Ta'anas Besulim'.

(a) There is no difference between the Kesuvah of an Almanah who is a Yisre'eilis and one who is a Kohenes - both are entitled to a Manah.

(b) The Beis-Din of Kohanim used to claim four hundred Zuz for a Besulah who was a Kohenes - even if she married a Kohen, and certainly, if she married a Yisrael.

(c) The Chachamim did not object to that.

(a) We reconcile our Mishnah (which specifically places an Almanah who is a Kohenes on a par with a Yisre'eilis) with the Beraisa, which specifies the Kesuvah of a Kohenes as *two hundred* Zuz - by describing a sequence of Takanos. Initially, they instituted one Manah for a Kohenes. They then decided that their husbands were taking advantage of the small amount involved and divorcing them too easily, so they changed the sum to two hundred Zuz. Then, when they realized that people preferred to marry a Bas Yisrael who was a Besulah (for the same price), they reverted to the sum of a Manah (one hundred Zuz).

(b) They changed her Kesuvah from one hundred to two hundred Zuz, despite the fact that an Almanas Yisrael also receives a hundred Zuz - because, due to the status of a Kohenes, the stigma attached to her was considered greater than that of a Yisre'eilis.

8)

(a) The Takanah of the Beis-Din of Kohanim was not exclusive to Kohanos - because Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel stated that the elite families of Yisrael were also entitled to add to the Kesuvah, should they so wish.

(b) When the Beraisa includes a bas Yisrael to a Kohen, or vice-versa, in the list, and not a bas Yisrael to a Yisrael, it does not come to preclude her from this concession. On the contrary - if in the case of a bas Yisrael to a Kohen, where her status is being raised, they permit raising her Kesuvah, then how much more so a bas Yisrael to a Yisrael.

(a) We have already cited the Mishnah, where Raban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer rule that if the woman claims that she was raped after the betrothal and the man claimed that the rape preceded the betrothal, *she* is believed. Initially, we attribute this ruling to the principle 'Bari ve'Shema, Bari Adif'.

(b) Rebbi Yehoshua says - that 'we do not live by her mouth'. In fact, she is considered as having been a Be'ulah already from before the betrothal, and as having tricked him into believing that she was not.

(c) If Reuven claims that Shimon owes him a Manah, and Shimon cannot remember whether he does or doesn't, Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna obligate him to pay - because of the principle 'Bari ve'Shema, Bari Adif'.

(d) Rav Nachman and Rebbi Yochanan exempt Shimon from paying - because we place the money in the Chazakah of the original owner (until the claimant proves his claim). He is only exempt however, after having sworn a Shevu'as Heses (a light Shevu'ah de'Rabbanan that every defendant who completely denies a claim is obligated to swear).

(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules like Raban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer in the Mishnah later, who rule that if a pregnant woman claims that she is pregnant from so-and-so, and that he is a Kohen- he is believed.

(b) When Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah remarks to Rav Yehudah 'Halachah ke'Raban Gamliel af ba'Rishonah' - he is referring to our Mishnah, where she claims that she was raped after the betrothal, and he claims that the rape took place before (and where we believe her in spite of the Chezkas Mamon of the husband).

(c) In light of Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah's statement - Abaye tries to establish Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna (who hold Bari ve'Shema Bari Adif') like Raban Gamliel, and Rav Nachman and Rav Yochanan (who place the money in the Chazakah of the owner), like Rebbi Yehoshua.

(a) We reconcile Rav Nachman, who holds 'Manah Li be'Yadcha ve'Halah Amar Eini Yodei'a, Patur', with Raban Gamliel in our Mishnah, who believes the woman (that she was raped *after* the betrothal) on the basis of a 'Migu' - since she could have claimed to be a Mukas Eitz, saying instead that she was raped; and in the case where she claims to be a Mukas Eitz from *before* the betrothal, when she could have claimed to have become a Mukas Eitz only *afterwards*.

(b) The Ta'anah of 'Mukas Eitz' ...

1. ... is a better argument than that of rape - since the latter invalidates her from Kehunah, whereas the former does not.
2. ... *now* (after the betrothal) is better than that of Mukas Eitz *from before* - because the latter is entitled to a Kesuvah of only *one* hundred Zuz), whereas the former will receive *two*.

(c) Alternatively, Rav Nachman can hold like Raban Gamliel - because there (in our Mishnah), the woman has a Chezkas Besulah (we know that she was a Besulah, so that is what she will remain until we know her situation to have changed) which is stronger than a Chezkas Mamon; whereas in Rav Nachman's case, there is no Chazakah to counter the Chezkas Mamon of the defendant.

(a) There is no alternative explanation to Rav Yehudah and Rav Huna, other than 'Bari ve'Shema Bari Adif' (against a 'Migu' and against a Chezkas Mamon) - like Rebbi Yehoshua.

(b) We finally substantiate the two ways of reconciling Rav Nachman with Raban Gamliel on the grounds that otherwise, we would have a clash of Halachos - because, on the one hand, we always rule Rav Nachmon in money-matters, whilst on the other, Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel has issued an unopposed ruling like Raban Gamliel.