Previous daf

1)

(a) Rav Nachman establishes Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri in our Mishnah (who requires the majority of the town's inhabitants' wives and daughters to be Kasher li'Kehunah for the raped girl to be Kasher too) 'bi'K'ronos shel Tzipori', adding 'u'che'de'Rebbi Ami ... u'che'de'Rebbi Yanai ... '. Rebbi Ami adds to the Rov of 'Rov Anshei ha'Ir Masi'in li'Kehunah' -'Si'ah shel B'nei Adam Kesheirin Overes le'Sham' (most of whom were Kasher).

(b) When Rebbi Yanai says 'Niv'eles bi'K'ronos, Kesheirah li'Kehunah' - he means that the rape took place *at the time* when the caravan passed (not 'in the K'ronos').

(c) Had we known that it was a resident from the town (which had a Rov Masi'in li'Kehunah) that raped her - she would be forbidden to marry a Kohen.

(a) When Rav Dimi Amar Ze'iri Amar Rebbi Chanina ... arrived from Eretz Yisrael, he said 'Holchin Achar Rov ha'Ir, ve'Ein Holchin Achar Rov Si'ah', a statement which is unacceptable - because if we go after Rov ha'Ir, whose inhabitants are static, then we would certainly go after Rov Si'ah which moves!

(b) What he really said therefore, was - 'Holchin Achar Rov ha'Ir, ve'Hu de'Ika Rov Si'ah Bahadah'.

(c) Strictly speaking, the woman should really be permitted no less than by Rov Si'ah, in a case of Rov ha'Ir - if it was the man who went out to the woman (because of the principle 'Kol de'Parish me'Ruba Parish').

(d) Rebbi Yehoshua permits neither of them on its own - on account of where she visited the man in his home (where we will apply 'Kol Kavu'a ke'Mechtzah al Mechtzah Dami').

(a) If someone ...

1. ... purchased a piece of meat from a butcher in a town where nine butcher-shops sell Kasher meat, and one, non-Kasher meat, and (presumably unaware of the existence of the non-Kasher store) he cannot recall from which store he purchased it - the meat is forbidden (because of the principle 'Kol Kavu'a ... ').
2. ... finds a piece of meat lying on the street in the same town - the meat is permitted (because of 'Kol de'Parish ... ').

(b) In the latter case - it will make no difference whether the gates of the city were open (creating the possibility that the meat came from a passing butcher or from another butcher in the same country [of whom the majority are Kasher]), because Rebbi Zeira established the Beraisa even when the gates of the city are shut.

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua requires a double Rov in our Mishnah - because he maintains that Chazal were stringent by Yuchsin (cases of marriage regarding Kehunah).

(a) Rebbi Zeira, who teaches us the Din of 'Kol Kavu'a ke'Mechtzah al Mechtzah Dami' - makes no distinction between le'Kula and le'Chumra (he holds of the principle - even le'Kula).

(b) The Beraisa forbidding the meat that one purchased from a butcher in a town where nine stores sold Kasher meat, and one non-Kasher meat, is not an absolute source for Rebbi Zeira's principle - because it speaks only le'Chumra (which is not such a great Chidush).

(c) Neither is the Beraisa which renders Tamei someone who touched one out of a pile of nine frogs and one toad a better source - for the same reason.

(d) The source for Rebbi Zeira's principle is the reverse case - where the Beraisa renders Tahor someone who touched one out of a pile of nine toads and one frog in a Reshus-ha'Rabim (because in a Reshus ha'Yachid, we learn from Sotah that he is Tamei). If not for 'Kol Kavu'a', the Rov would have rendered him Vadai Tamei.

(a) Rebbi Shimon learns from the Pasuk "ve'Arav Lo ve'Kam Alav" - that one is not Chayav if one throws a stone at Reuven and kills Shimon.

(b) 've'Rabbanan Amri de'Bei Rebbi Yanai P'rat le'Zorek Even le'Gav'. This cannot be speaking when ...

1. ... the majority of the group are Nochrim - because then he would be Patur anyway, seeing as a majority are Nochrim.
2. ... half were Jews and half are Nochrim - because he would still be Patur because of the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah".

(c) The case therefore speaks when he threw a stone into a group of people comprising a majority of Jews and a minority of Nochrim.

(a) Rav Chiya bar Ashi Amar Rav rules like Rebbi Yossi (and Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri) in our Mishnah. According to Rav Chanan bar Rava Amar Rav - the ruling in our Mishnah was a Hora'as Sha'ah (a momentary concession, but generally, a double Rov is required).

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked on them from a Mishnah in Machshirin which (according to Rav himself) does not permit a castaway child whom one found in a town with a majority of Jews to marry li'Kehunah (on the basis of one majority). According to Rebbi Yirmiyah - our Mishnah speaks when there is only one Rov (Rov ha'Ir). Consequently ...

1. ... Rav Chiya bar Ashi rules - that one Rov will always suffice.
2. ... Rav Chanan bar Rava Amar Rav says - that our Mishnah was a Hora'as Sha'ah, but that generally, a double Rov is required when it comes to Yuchsin.

(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah erred inasmuch as - he was unaware of Rav Yehudah Amar Rav's statement ('bi'K'ronos shel Tzipori Havi Ma'aseh').

(d) What ...

1. ... Rav Chiya bar Ashi really rules is - that one always requires a double Rov for Yuchsin (like our Mishnah).
2. ... Rav Chanan bar Rava Amar Rav really says - is that although our Mishnah speaks when there was a double Rov, that was a Hora'as Sha'ah. Normally, one Rov will suffice (even for Yuchsin). There is no way of reconciling this statement of Rav with Rav himself, who comments, with regard to the Beraisa of 'Matza Bah Tinok' 'Aval le'Yuchsin, Lo'. He either said one, or the other, but not, both.

7)

(a) We just cited the Mishnah in Machshirin: that if one finds a baby in a town which has a majority of Jews, assuming that it is a girl, one majority is insufficient to permit her to marry a Kohen. The Tana does not contend with the possibility that the baby may be a foundling (in which case she would be Pasul li'Kehunah anyway) - because he is speaking in a case when the baby's limbs were well-formed (a clear indication that she is not a foundling).

(b) When Rav comments 'Lo Shanu Ela le'Hachyoso, Aval le'Yuchsin, Lo', he is referring to the case of 'Rov Yisrael' (as we just explained). Shmuel, who comments 'af Mefakchin Alav es ha'Gal', cannot be referring to the same case - because he holds that, in matters of Piku'ach Nefesh, we do not follow the majority (in which case, the Beraisa would not require a Rov Yisrael to permit digging away the rubble on Shabbos, seeing as this is a case of Safek Piku'ach Nefesh).

(c) In fact, Shmuel is referring to the previous case in the Beraisa - 'Im Rov Ovdei Kochavim, Oved Kochavim, to which he adds 'u'le'Fakei'ach Alav es ha'Gal, Eino Kein'.

(a) According to Shmuel's previous statement, the Tana considers the child to be a Nochri, by Rov Nochrim, says Rav Papa - with regard to feeding him Neveilos ...

(b) ... and certainly with regard to not returning him his lost articles and concerning damages.

(c) And the Tana rules 'Im Rov Yisrael, Yisrael', says Rav Papa - with regard to returning him his lost articles.

(d) Besides the fact that one would be depriving the finder of the article, it would also be forbidden to return a lost article to this child were he to be a Nochri - because Chazal in Sanhedrin, have forbidden this, quoting the Pasuk in Nitzavim "Lo Yoveh Hashem S'lo'ach Lo".

(a) The Tana says 'Mechtzah al Mechtzah Yisrael, regarding damages, explains Resh Lakish. The difference between a Jew and a Nochri in this regard is - that a. if the property of a Jew damages that of a Jew, he is Chayav; of a Nochri, he is Patur. b. That if an ox of a Jew gores that of a Jew he is obligated to pay only half damages (the first three times), whereas, if the ox of a Nochri gores that of a Jew, he is obligated to pay full damages.

(b) The Tana cannot be referring to a case where an ox belonging to a Jew gored one belonging to a Nochri - because in that case (based on the principle 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro, Alav ha'R'ayah'), the Jew could say to the Safek, 'Prove that you are a Jew, and I will pay you damages'.

(c) Consequently, it must refer to a case where it is the Safek's ox that gored the ox of a Jew. He pays half damages anyway (just like a Jew), and when the Jew claims the other half, he replies 'Prove that I am a Nochri, and I will pay you'.

10)

(a) If a divorced woman claims that, when her husband married her she was a Besulah, and he claims that she was an Almanah, she will receive a Manah, unless she can produce witnesses. To enable her to receive two hundred Zuz - the witnesses will need to testify that she went to the Chupah as a Besulah, either with a Heinumah (which will be explained later) or with her hair let loose over her shoulders.

(b) If her husband died, and she has the same argument with his heirs - then the Din will be exactly the same.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah adds another sign that she was a Besulah to that of the Tana Kama - the fact that they distributed 'K'layos' (ears of corn that were dried when they was still moist [a process that ensures that they remain constantly sweet]) when to the children.

(a) Rebbi Yehoshua concedes that 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir' is believed. The case is - if a man points to a certain field, and says to his friend that at one stage, it had belonged to his (friend's) father, but that he had bought it from him.

(b) He is believed - because if he had not said anything, it would have been his, anyway (we only know that it had previously belonged to his friend's father through his testimony).

(c) He will not be believed however - if there are witnesses who testify that the field had originally belonged to the other man's father, because then it is no longer a 'Peh she'Asar'.