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1)

(a) That woman denied her husband access to her property - by writing it out to her daughter, and then explaining to witnesses that the real purpose of the document was only to deny her husband access to the property.

(b) When her daughter produced the relevant document - Rav Nachman tore it up.

(c) Rav Anan lodged a complaint with Mar Ukva - that 'that farmer Rav Nachman' was tearing-up people's documents.

(d) In reply, Mar Ukva quoted Rav Chanilai - who quoted Shmuel as saying that he had permission from the exilarch to issue rulings, and if a Sh'tar Mavrachta (the one under discussion) would come to his hand, he would tear it up.

(a) Rava thought - that the Din of Sh'tar Mavrachta ought to be restricted to a stranger, over whom one would certainly give oneself precedence, but should not apply to a daughter, who is, after all, one's own flesh and blood, and whom one would presumably give with a full heart.

(b) Rav Nachman answered him - that a person always gives himself precedence, even when it comes to a daughter.

(a) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in a Beraisa advises a woman who wants to deny her husband access to her property to write a Sh'tar Pasim - a document containing a request, asking the recipient to accept the property only in order to deny her husband access to the property, and not as a gift.

(b) According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, the document is valid, exactly the way it is written. According to the Chachamim - the recipient can laugh at the donor (the gift is valid, the condition is not), unless he writes specifically ' ... from today, and whenever it suits me'.

(c) It appears from this Beraisa that - unless he writes a Sh'tar Mavrachta in this Lashon, the recipient acquires the property, posing a Kashya on Shmuel.

(d) Rebbi Zeira resolves the Kashya - by establishing Shmuel when the donor writes *all* his property to the recipient, in which case we are witnesses that he did not mean him to acquire it fully; and the Beraisa, when he sold him only *part* of it, where this is no reason to assume that.

5)

(a) If a married woman inherits money or detached fruit - they should be used to purchase land for her husband to eat the fruit.

(b) According to Rebbi Meir, if she inherited a field with the fruit already grown, the husband must pay her however much the value of the field has increased due to the fruit - because fruit which did not grow in the domain of the husband is considered capital. Consequently, he must pay her for the fruits (which are assessed according to the increased value of the field on their account) and buy with the money land (like one always does with capital).

(c) According to the Chachamim, attached fruit belongs to the husband - because it is considered Peiros, since the woman has the land (which is the principle).

(d) When Rebbi Shimon says that ...

1. ... whenever he has the upper-hand at the time when his wife inherits the property, he has the lower-hand when he divorces her - he is referring to fruit that was still attached to the ground when she inherited it, and which belongs to the husband (like the Chachamim), but to the wife, when he divorces her.
2. ... whenever he has the lower-hand at the time when his wife inherits the property, he has the upper-hand when he divorces her - he is referring to detached fruit, which belongs to his wife when she inherit it, but to him when he divorces her.

(a) We take for granted that if a woman inherits a large sum of money with which she wants to buy houses, whereas her husband wants to buy land, or vice-versa, she buys land - because it is more lucrative than houses, nor is it subject to wear and tear, like houses are.

(b) By the same token, houses are preferable to date-palms - because the latter tend to dry-up and die.

(c) If it is a question of purchasing trees, date-palms or vines - the order of priorities is 1. date-palms, 2. trees and 3. vines.

(d) If the woman inherited a forest of Uzradin (a kind of cheap fruit - known as sperling) or a fish-pond, some consider the fruit and the fish (respectively) as fruit, others as the capital. The reason of those who consider it ...

1. ... fruit - is because she does still own the land on which the forest stands and the pond itself (which is capital).
2. ... capital - because the wood and the fish will eventually come to an end.

8)

(a) According to Rebbi Oshaya Amar Rebbi Yanai - someone who steals the baby of an animal of Nechsei mi'Lug must pay the double-payment to the woman - because (we initially think) we are afraid that the animal will die, so the baby is considered capital and not Peiros.

(b) According to the Tana Kama of a Beraisa, the baby of an animal of Nichsei mi'Lug belongs to the husband; of a Shifchah mi'Lug, to the wife. According to Chananya the son of Yashiyah's brother - the baby of an animal of Nechsei mi'Lug belongs to the husband just like the child of her Shifchah.

(c) We reconcile Rebbi Oshaya Amar Rebbi Yanai (in whose opinion the double-payment goes to the woman) with this Beraisa - by considering the baby of an animal Peiros (like both Tana'im maintain). However, Rebbi Yanai hold that, although the Chachamim instituted that the husband receives the Peiros, they did not institute on his behalf the Peiros of the Peiros (the double-payment that the thief has to pay).

(a) Chananyah considers both the baby of animals and of Shefachos mi'Lug as Peiros - because he is not afraid that the mother might die, in which case, she is considered the capital.

(b) We account for the Chachamim, who consider the former, Peiros, but the latter, capital - by pointing out that, in the former case, even if the animal were to die, the woman would still be able to benefit from the skin (which is therefore considered capital), which is not the case by a Shifchah (whose corpse is Asur be'Hana'ah).

(c) Shmuel rules like Chananyah, who concedes that, should the woman become divorced, she may claim the baby of her Shifchah (despite the fact that they are considered Peiros) - because of 'Sh'vach Beis Avihah' (in honor of her father's house, a sort of family heirloom, which has special sentimental value).

(d) She is of course - obligated to pay for them.

(a) Rav Rava Amar Rav Nachman ruled that if a woman brings into the marriage a goat for its milk, a sheep for its wool, a chicken for its eggs or a date-palm for its fruit - her husband is permitted to use the capital up completely (until they die), because the skin, the feathers and the wood (respectively) remain the principal for the woman.

(b) According to Rav Nachman, the Peiros of a coat that she brings into the marriage is its usage. It is considered Peiros - because, even if her husband uses up the coat, she will still have the rags as principal.

(c) The Tana of the Beraisa considers salt-pools (beside the sea) and sand-deposits (for building) Peiros - because they never become used-up.

(d) Rebbi Meir considers deposits of sulfur and of alum, capital - the Chachamim consider them Peiros (in which case one sells them and with the proceeds, one buys land).

(a) In the opinion of the Chachamim (whom we just quoted) the remaining pits themselves remain the capital - corroborating the opinion of Rav Nachman, because, like the worn-out clothes according to him, the empty sulfur and alum pits are of negligible value.

(b) The difference between this case and that in our Mishnah, of a woman who brings in money or detached fruit - is that, in the latter case, they are considered capital, because once they become worn out, nothing remains, whereas in the former case, the pits remain, as we explained.

(c) All this is speaking about Nechsei mi'Lug - which are not assessed and entered into the Kesuvah, and for which the husband does not accept responsibility. Nechsei Tzon Barzel are assessed, entered into Kesuvah and the husband accepts responsibility for them.

(d) Rebbi Shimon says in our Mishnah that whenever the husband has the upper-hand at the time when his wife inherits the property, he has the lower-hand when he divorces her, and whenever he has the lower-hand at the time when his wife inherits the property, he has the upper-hand when he divorces her. It is clear that the Chachamim agree with Rebbi Shimon with regard to fruit that is detached when he divorces her (which obviously goes to him). They argue with him though - by fruit that is attached at the time when he divorces her, which, according to Rebbi Shimon, belongs to her, and according to them, to him (because it grew in his domain).

(a) Old Avadim and Shefachos are considered capital because of the likelihood of them dying. Consequently, says the Tana Kama, they are sold, and with the proceeds, she buys land. Similarly, should the woman inherit old olive-trees and vines, she sells them, too.

1. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that - with regard to old Avadim and Shefachos, she is entitled to protest at their sale, because of 'Sh'vach Beis Avihah'.
2. Rebbi Yehudah - says the same with regard to old olive-trees and vines.

(b) Rav Kahana Amar Rav establishes the Machlokes Tana'im (regarding the old olive-trees and vines) when they fell to her in her own field. Even Rebbi Yehudah will agree in the event that they fell to her in someone else's field - in which case he holds that neither of them can prevent their sale, seeing as the trees are likely to die, in which case there will be no Sh'vach Beis Avuhah.

(c) If, whenever there is a likelihood of the capital dying, everyone agrees that we do nor contend with 'Sh'vach Beis Avuhah', then why does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel argue with the Chachamim in the case of old slaves and Shefachos (which are equivalent to old trees in someone else's land?

(d) So we amend Rav Kahana Amar Rav's statement to read - that they only argue by old olive-trees and vines that fell to her in someone else's field (when Sh'vach Beis Avihah may never materialize), but in her own field, even the Chachamim will agree with Rebbi Yehudah, that she has the right to protest against the sale.

(a) If a man spends a lot of money improving his wife's fields, but divorces her having reaped little benefit from it - he is not permitted to reclaim the difference from his wife. 'What he spent, he spent, and what he ate, he ate'.

(b) If however, he spent money but obtains no benefit at all in return - then he is permitted to recoup his losses.

(c) According to Rebbi Asi, even if he ate as little as a dried fig, that falls under the category of 'little benefit' - though claiming his losses will only be prohibited provided he ate it in an honorable manner (sitting in his house at table).