QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that according to Papuna'i, we learn that
women are exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama from the verse that
compares all of the Mitzvos in the Torah to the Mitzvah of Tefilin. Just as
women are exempt from the Mitzvah of Tefilin, so, too, they are exempt from
all Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama.
This Hekesh teaches only that women are exempt from Mitzvos that are
dependant upon a certain time. How, though, do we know that women are
*obligated* in Mitzvos Aseh *she'Ein* ha'Zeman Gerama? The Gemara says that
this Halachah can be inferred from the first: if the Torah exempts women
from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, then obviously it obligates them in
Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama.
The Gemara's assumption seems to contradict what the Gemara says earlier
(34b). After the Gemara there cites a source to teach that women are exempt
from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama (a Binyan Av from Tefilin), the Gemara
then asks for a different source to teach that women are obligated in
Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama! The Gemara there implies that we
*cannot* infer from the fact that women are exempt from Mitzvos Aseh
sheha'Zeman Gerama that they are obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman
Gerama, and that it is possible that they are exempt from both! How can
these two Gemaras be reconciled?
ANSWERS:
(a) The simple answer seems to be that the Gemara earlier does not infer
from the Binyan Av that if women are exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman
Gerama then they must be obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama,
because even if women are exempt from all Mitzvos, the verse would still
have to teach that they are specifically exempt from Tefilin. We might have
thought that women are obligated in Tefilin since it is written together
with the Mitzvah of Mezuzah which women are certainly obligated to fulfill
(as the Gemara says on 35b). Therefore, we need a special source to exempt
them from Tefilin, even if they are exempt from all other Mitzvos. In
contrast, the Hekesh of Papuna'i explicitly compares Tefilin to all other
Mitzvos in the Torah. It is clear that the verse is not just exempting women
from Tefilin, but it is exempting them from all other Mitzvos that are
comparable to Tefilin (i.e. Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama). If women were
exempt from all Mitzvos, even those that are not comparable to Tefilin, then
the verse would not need to compare Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama to
Tefilin.
TOSFOS (DH Michlal), however, points out that this does not fully answer our
question. Perhaps women are indeed exempt from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman
Gerama as well. The reason the verse needs to teach that women are also
exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama is because we might have thought
that they are obligated in such Mitzvos (and, Kal v'Chomer, they are
obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama), due to a Binyan Av from
the Mitzvos of *Matzah* and *Hakhel* (since the Gemara at this point holds
that "Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Melamdin"). The verse therefore teaches
that women are exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, meaning that we
do not learn their obligation in other Mitzvos from Matzah and Hakhel.
Hence, we do not have a source that women are obligated in Mitzvos Aseh
she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama; perhaps this Hekesh exempts them from all Mitzvos
Aseh.
(b) TOSFOS (DH Michlal) and the other Rishonim answer that the Gemara learns
that women are obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama as follows.
If the Torah meant to exempt women even from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman
Gerama, then it should have compared that type of Mitzvah to the rest of the
Mitzvos. It should not have compared Tefilin, which is a Mitzvas Aseh
*sheha'Zeman Gerama*, to the other Mitzvos. From the fact that the Torah
chose Tefilin to compare to all other Mitzvos, we can infer that the Torah
exempts women only from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama.
(c) The SHITAH LO NODA L'MI cites the RA'AVAD who explains that this part of
the Gemara argues with the logic of the Gemara earlier (34b). The Gemara
there suggested that perhaps women are exempt even from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein
ha'Zeman Gerama, just like the Torah exempts women from the Mitzvos of
Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'ben (which are Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman
Gerama). However, as TOSFOS (DH v'Neilaf) and other Rishonim ask, the logic
for this question seems to be flawed. We know that women are obligated in
some Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama (such as "Mora Av v'Em") and they
are exempt from others (Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'Ben). Under such
circumstances we normally make a Binyan Av *l'Chumra*, which would teach
that a woman *is* obligated in all Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama,
rather than a Binyan Av *l'Kula* to teach that she is not obligated.
The Rishonim (34b) offer various answers to this question. The Ra'avad
suggests that our Gemara argues with those answers and maintains that there
is no reason to exempt women from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama in
the first place. If there is no verse that exempts them explicitly from such
Mitzvos, then we assume that they are obligated (because the Limud is used
l'Chumra).
QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that had the verse not taught specifically that
a woman is obligated in the Mitzvah of "Mora Av v'Em" (fearing one's
parents), we would have thought that a woman is exempt, because, when
married, she does not have the wherewithal to fulfill that Mitzvah ("Lo
Sipek b'Yadah La'asos"). RASHI explains that because of this we would have
thought that the Torah exempts a woman from the Mitzvah of "Mora Av v'Em"
even when she is not married. Therefore, a verse is necessary to teach that
she is obligated.
This logic serves as a source for the AVUDRAHAM's way of understanding the
Gemara's distinction between a woman's obligation in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein
ha'Zeman Gerama, and their exemption from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama.
The reason the Torah exempts a woman from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama is
because she is Meshu'abad to her husband; because of her responsibilities to
her family, the Torah does not obligate her in Mitzvos that can be performed
only at a limited time period, since she needs to be free to occupy herself
with her other responsibilities.
This also explains why an Eved Kena'ani is exempt from Mitzvos. He, too, is
Meshu'abad to his master. The Torah takes into consideration his obligation
to his master and exempts him from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama like
women.
According to the Avudraham, how are we to understand why Tefilin and Tzitzis
are called Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama merely because they do not apply
at night or, in the case of Tefilin, on Shabbos? When the Torah does not
require a person to wear Tefilin or Tzitzis at night, it is not limiting the
Mitzvah to a specific time period and making it more difficult to fulfill.
On the contrary, the Torah is *exempting* a person from the obligation to
wear Tzitzis and Tefilin at night! The fact that these Mitzvos do not apply
at night should not be a reason to exempt a woman from these Mitzvos, and
yet the Mitzvah of Tefilin serves as a source for a woman's exemption from
all Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama!
In addition, in the case of Tzitzis no added action is required of the woman
at the time she fulfills the Mitzvah. She simply puts on her shirt, or
cloak, as usual, but there are Tzitzis tied to its corners! Why, then,
should her familial obligations prevent her from fulfilling this Mitzvah?
ANSWER: It could be that the Mitzvah of Tefilin has two different parts. The
first part of the Mitzvah is that a person fulfills the Mitzvah any time he
wears Tefilin, but he does not transgress a Mitzvah if he does not wear them
(for a number of reasons; for example, because he has not prepared himself
by cleansing his body property, which is a prerequisite for wearing Tefilin;
see TOSFOS in Rosh Hashanah 17a, DH Karkafta). This would not seem to be the
part of the Mitzvah that is affected by the fact that a woman is Meshu'abad
to her husband, since, her Shi'abud to her husband would not cause her to
transgress a Mitzvah (because there is nothing to transgress).
The second element of the Mitzvah of Tefilin is that a person must wear
Tefilin at least once during his lifetime, and if he fails to do that then
he *has* transgressed a Mitzvah (see RIF in Rosh Hashanah 17a). If the
Mitzvah of Tefilin would apply on Shabbos and at night, then the Torah's
Mitzvah to don Tefilin could be fulfilled by wearing Tefilin a single time
in a person's lifetime. If the Mitzvah of Tefilin does not apply on Shabbos
or at night, then this divides each week, and each day, into separate,
independent Mitzvos to wear Tefilin (see Beitzah 30b, "d'Mafseki Leilos").
Consequently, one fulfills the Mitzvah of Tefilin only by wearing them at
least once each day. That is why the Torah exempts women from this
Mitzvah -- since night is not the time for the Mitzvah of Tefilin, it causes
the Mitzvah to become limited to once a day, rather than being a Mitzvah
that can be fulfilled at any time.
Alternatively, even with regard to the first part of the Mitzvah of Tefilin,
that one fulfills a Mitzvah whenever he wears them, we can understand the
logic of why the Torah exempts women from Tefilin because it is a Mitzvah
limited to a certain time. Perhaps the Torah exempts women not because it
would be "overtaxing" to them to *require* them to fulfill the Mitzvah, but
rather because the Torah does not *see it necessary* to obligate them in a
Mitzvah which, practically, they would not be expected to fulfill (because
of her obligations to her family and husband). A woman, who is Meshu'abad to
her husband, cannot be expected to fulfill -- in addition to all of her
other responsibilities -- the Mitzvah of Tefilin. Therefore, the Torah does
give them the Mitzvah in the first place.
This, however, does not explain why the Mitzvah of Tzitzis should be
affected by a woman's Shi'abud to her husband. Firstly, it is clear that
there is *never* a Mitzvah to put on a four cornered article of clothing *in
order* to wear Tzitzis. Secondly, it does not require more time or effort to
don clothing with Tzitzis, than it does to don the same clothing without
Tzitzis on its corners. To fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis, one simply
dresses the way he normally dresses, but with a garment that has Tzitzis on
it. As for the effort that must go into *tying* the Tzitzis in the first
place, even if nighttime is not a time to fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis,
Tzitzis can certainly be tied at night. If so, a woman can tie Tzitzis onto
her garment at any free time she has, at any time of day, when she is not
fulfilling her other responsibilities. What difference does it make if the
actual fulfillment of the Mitzvah is done only during the day, if she does
not have to do any extra actions during the day in order to fulfill the
Mitzvah?
The answer might be that a person does not think about his obligation to
wear Tzitzis, or to do any other Mitzvah, except during the time that he is
obligated to do the Mitzvah. Therefore, the Torah does not expect a woman to
think about tying the Tzitzis during the night if there is no obligation to
wear them at night. (M. Kornfeld)