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Kidushin, 54

1) THE "HETER HANA'AH" OF "BIGDEI KEHUNAH"

OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that it is permitted for a Kohen to remain dressed in the Bigdei Kehunah even after he has completed the Avodah. The reason the Gemara gives is that "the Torah was not given to ministering angels," but rather to humans, for whom it is impossible to remove the sanctified clothing of Bigdei Kehunah immediately upon completion of the Avodah without any time passing.

The reason for allowing personal benefit to be derived from Bigdei Kehunah is because of the human inability to remove them in a split second without deriving benefit from them after performing the Avodah. Are we to understand this reasoning in a literal manner, and permit the Kohen to wear the Bigdei Kehunah only for the shortest possible amount of time, or may we add more leeway and permit the Kohen to wear the Bigdei Kehunah for a longer amount of time once it is already permitted to wear them for a moment after the Avodah is completed?

(a) The BEIS HA'LEVI (IV:13-14) points out that there is a Machlokes in TOSFOS on the matter. The Gemara later (66a) relates that Yanai ha'Melech donned the Tzitz in front of the Chachamim. Tosfos there asks how could this be permitted? The allowance of our Sugya to don the Bigdei Kehunah applies only for the amount of time that it takes to remove the Bigdei Kehunah; it does not permit donning the Bigdei Kehunah l'Chatchilah! From the words of Tosfos there it is evident that Tosfos maintains that it is not permitted for a Kohen to wear the Bigdei Kehunah any longer than necessary.

(b) In contrast, Tosfos in Yoma (69a) makes no mention of any limit to the amount of time that a Kohen is permitted to remain wearing the Bigdei Kehunah. Tosfos there asks merely that since the reason for the allowance is the difficulty in removing the Bigdei Kehunah immediately, it does not permit them to wear them l'Chatchilah with no intention of performing the Avodah.

(c) It seems from RASHI later (66a) that he is of the opinion that there is no prohibition of deriving benefit at all from the Bigdei Kehunah. Rashi seems to have been bothered with a question. The reasoning that "the Torah was not given to ministering angels" teaches that when the Torah initially gave the status of Hekdesh to the Bigdei Kehunah, it left room for the Kohen to continue wearing the Bigdei Kehunah even after the Avodah is completed. That is, the Torah allows for the Kohen to wear the Bigdei Kehunah after performing the Avodah by not giving them the status of Hekdesh with regard to deriving personal benefit. Since this allowance is not one derived from a verse written with regard to any specific case, but rather it is an allowance that results from a circumstance that requires the item not to be Hekdesh, perhaps the allowance to derive personal benefit is a blanket allowance and no longer requires any special circumstance! Why, then, are the Bigdei Kehunah still considered Hekdesh?

For this reason, RASHI maintains that this is, indeed, the status of the Bigdei Kehunah -- they are not considered Hekdesh for this reason (with regard to deriving personal benefit from them). As we mentioned above, Yanai ha'Melech donned the Tzitz in the presence of the Chachamim. Rashi there asks how could he do so not at the time of performing the Avodah, and he answers by mentioning the allowance of our Gemara to wear the Bigdei Kehunah. Even though our Gemara states specifically the reasoning of "the Torah was not given to ministering angels," Rashi maintains that once the Bigdei Kehunah have not become Hekdesh in this regard, the Bigdei Kehunah is not considered Hekdesh with regard to all forms of personal benefit, even when that personal benefit is being derived not at the time of the Avodah, nor for the sake of the Avodah, and even if the benefit is derived intentionally (b'Mezid).

It is interesting to note that the exact circumstance of the case in the Mishnah, of the Kohen who is Mekadesh a woman with the Bigdei Kehunah, depends upon these three opinions. According to the view of Tosfos in Kidushin (66a), the act of Kidushin must be done within a few minutes after the Kohen has completed the Avodah, because if it is done after that time, there would no longer be an allowance to derive benefit from it, and by using it for his personal benefit the item would leave the domain of Hekdesh through Me'ilah.

According to the view of Tosfos in Yoma (69a), the act of Kidushin with the Bigdei Kehunah must take place following the day's Avodah, while the Kohen is still wearing the Bigdei Kehunah as a result of performing the Avodah (for he may not don the Bigdei Kehunah otherwise).

According to Rashi, the case of the Mishnah can be when the Kohen is Mekadesh a woman with the Bigdei Kehunah on any day, at any time.

We might add that perhaps this is why Rashi chose to explain the Heter Hana'ah of the Bigdei Kehunah in this way. The Mishnah states, according to Rebbi Meir, that if a Kohen, b'Shogeg, used Hekdesh (i.e. Bigdei Kehunah) to be Mekadesh a woman, the Kidushin is not valid. The Mishnah makes no mention of any conditions or circumstances to which this Halachah is limited. This implies that it applies at all times. It must be that once the Heter Hana'ah was given, it can be applied even where the initial reasoning of "the Torah was not given to ministering angels" does not apply. (A. Kronengold.)

QUESTION: The Mishnah (52b) differentiates between inadvertent (Shogeg) use of items of Hekdesh to be Mekadesh a woman, and intentional (Mezid) use of such items to be Mekadesh a woman. According to Rebbi Meir, when one is Mekadesh a woman, b'Mezid, with an item of Hekdesh, the Kidushin is valid, but when done b'Shogeg, the Kidushin is not valid. The Gemara here explains the Mishnah as referring to one who is Mekadesh a woman with Bigdei Kehunah.

If we follow the reasoning of "the Torah was not given to ministering angels," then we can easily understand the difference between Mezid and Shogeg. The allowance to derive personal benefit from the Bigdei Kehunah applies only when the Kohen is deriving benefit even against his will (i.e. after he has completed the Avodah and he, per force, must wear the Bigdei Kehunah until the time that it takes for him to remove them). Similarly, an act done b'Shogeg is an act done without intention, and thus it is comparable to an act done against one's will. In contrast, an act done b'Mezid is not done against one's will because the person does it intentionally.

How, though, will RASHI explain the Mishnah? Rashi maintains that it is permitted to derive all types of personal benefit from the Bigdei Kehunah, even b'Mezid. What, then, is the difference between being Mekadesh a woman with the Bigdei Kehunah inadvertently (b'Shogeg), and doing so intentionally (b'Mezid)? In either case, the Kidushin should take effect, because the Bigdei Kehunah are not considered Hekdesh with regard to deriving benefit!

ANSWER: The PNEI YEHOSHUA address this question. He points out that in Rashi's comments, Rashi does not differentiate between "Shogeg" and "Mezid," but rather he differentiates between "Shogeg" and "Miskaven l'Chalelan" -- one who has intention to take the item out of the domain of Hekdesh. The act's element of "Mezid" is not in the person's intentionally deriving benefit from the item, but rather the element of "Mezid" is in the person's intentional removal of the item from the domain of Hekdesh! In the case of Bigdei Kehunah, therefore, the term "Mezid" has a new meaning -- it does not mean "intentionally deriving benefit," but rather it means "intentionally removing the item from the domain of Hekdesh." (A. Kronengold.)

54b