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1)

(a) The Halachah that if ...

1. ... a woman says to a man 'Ten Manah li'P'loni ve'Akadesh Ani Lecha', she is Mekudeshes (even though she did not receive anything) - is based on the Din of an Areiv (a guarantor for a loan) who obligates himself to pay the loan, even though he receives nothing in exchange.
2. ... a man says to a woman 'Heilech Manah, ve'Hiskadshi li'P'loni', she is Mekudeshes (even though the Mekadesh has not given anything away) - is based on the Din of an Eved Cana'ani, who goes free on the basis of money that others pay on his behalf (as we shall see later in the Perek).
3. ... a woman says to a man 'Ten Manah li'P'loni va'Akadesh Ani Lo', she is Mekudeshes (even though neither did she receive anything, nor did he receive) - is based on the Din of an Areiv and that of an Eved Cana'ani combined.

(b) In the second of the three above-mentioned cases, it is possible for Reuven to betroth a woman on behalf of Shimon, even with his own money - if he appointed him a Sheli'ach.

(a) Rava asked whether, if the woman gives the man a Manah and says to him 'Heylech Manah va'Akadesh Ani Lecha', the Kidushin will be effective. The man, in turn - accepted the money and said 'Hiskadshi Li ... '.

(b) Mar Zutra quoting Rav Papa, says - 'Mekudeshes'.

(c) We object to this ruling - on the basis of the Mishnah later, which teaches that one can acquire Metaltelin Agav Karka, and not vice-versa, as would appear from Rav Papa.

(d) As a matter of fact, we misunderstood Rav Papa, who is not referring to Kinyan 'Agav' at all. What Rav Papa is referring to - is an Adam Chashuv, who gives her a P'rutah's worth of pleasure by merely accepting her money (in any event, she gains the P'rutah she would be willing to pay someone to get him to accept her money).

(a) Rava, who taught us earlier by Kidushin 'mi'Din Areiv and mi'Din Eved Cana'ani, adds 've'Chein le'Inyan Mamona'. This will apply to ...

1. ... Din Areiv - where Reuven says to Shimon 'The Manah that you give to Levi will acquire my field for Shimon'.
2. ... Din Eved Cana'ani - where Levi gives Reuven a Manah and says to him 'Let this Manah acquire your field for Shimon.
3. ... Din Sh'neihem - where Reuven says to Levi 'Let the Manah that you give to Shimon acquire my field for him.

(b) Had Rava made his statement (with regard to Din Areiv) by ...

1. ... Kidushin - where a woman wants to get married to such an extent, that she will be willing to give herself to a husband even when she receives nothing in exchange (and we have already learned a number of times that the basis of Kinyanim is the Da'as (the genuine consent) of both parties for the transaction to take place, we would not have applied it in the case of a sale - where the owner does not really mean to part with his field unless it is he who receives the money.
2. ... Mamona - where a person has the authority to forego the money of the sale (and where, as a result, we consider the seller as having given his field to the purchaser as a gift), we would not have applied it to Kidushin - where the woman has no authority to forego the money of Kidushin.

(c) We have a principle that the desire of a woman to get married - is stronger than that of a man. In fact, based on the motto 'Tav le'Meisav Tan Du mi'le'Meisav Armelu' ('It is better to live with anyone else than to remain a widow [on one's own]'), she is even prepared to marry someone who is not suitable. Note: It is possible that, nowadays, with the radical change in the age of marriage, and due to other factors, this principle does not apply to the same degree as it did then.

(a) Rava maintains that if a man says 'Hiskadshi li le'Chetzyi' - the woman is Mekudeshes, whereas if he says 'Chetzyech Mekudeshes Li' - she is not.

(b) Based on the words "Ki Yikach *Ish* *'Ishah*", Abaye asked Rava - that just as "Ishah" implies "Ishah", 've'Lo Chatzi Ishah', so too, does "Ish" imply "Ish", 've'Lo Chatzi Ish'?

(c) Rava replied that Abaye had misunderstood him, and - that it was not from the Pasuk that he learned his Din, but from a S'vara. The reason for his distinction lies in the fact - that whereas a woman cannot be married to two men, a man can have two wives.

(d) What the man therefore meant when he said 'Hiskadshi Li le'Chetzyi' was - that he reserves the right to marry a second woman.

(a) If someone declares the leg of a Kasher animal Hekdesh - the Kedushah spreads to the entire body (which one then brings as a Korban).

(b) Even those who argue here, will concede that the Kedushah would spread - were he to declare Hekdesh the heart or any other organ without which the animal could not survive.

(c) We cannot however, apply the same S'vara in the case of 'Chetzyech Mekudeshes Li', and say that the Kidushin automatically spreads to the entire woman rendering her Mekudeshes - because the woman herself only agreed to half of her being Mekudeshes, and the Kidushin cannot spread against her will (as opposed to an animal, whose Da'as is not required).

(a) We compare Kidushin to the case cited by Rebbi Yochanan, of the partner who declared his half of the animal Hekdesh. Rebbi Yochanan says that, should he ...

1. ... not buy the second half from his partner - the Kedushah will not spread to the other half (because the Da'as of the second partner prevents it from doing so). In fact, only Kedushas Damim would take effect (obligating him to pay the value of his half to Hekdesh.
2. ... buy his partner out and declare the second half of the animal Hekdesh - then the entire animal will be Hekdesh Kedushas Damim but cannot be brought as a Korban.

(b) If he then declares another animal a Temurah on this one - his declaration is effective ...

(c) ... but the Temurah, whose Kedushah came only from a rejected Kedushah - is Kedushas Damim, like the original animal, It cannot be brought as a Korban.

(a) We learn three things from Rebbi Yochanan's previous statement. We learn that ...

1. ... 'Ba'alei Chayim Nidachin'. Others say - that only a Shechted animal can be rejected, but not a live one.
2. ... 'Dichuy Me'ikara Havi Dichuy'. Others say - that only something that was Kasher before being rejected, can be permanently rejected.

(b) According to them, the moment the first partner bought out the second one and declared the other half Hekdesh (and perhaps even that is unnecessary [see Me'iri), the entire Kedushah spreads to the other half, and it is brought as a Korban.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan's third Chidush is - that even an animal that is initially sanctified only for its value (Kedushas Damim) is also subject to being permanently rejected.

8)

(a) Rava asked whether a woman will be betrothed if the man said 'Chetzyech ... be'Chatzi P'rutah, ve'Chetzyech be'Chatzi P'rutah'. She might ...

1. ... not be betrothed - because he is trying to effect two transactions with half a P'rutah each.
2. ... nevertheless be betrothed - because he is counting out two half-P'rutos to effect the Kidushin with one P'rutah.

(b) Based on the assumption that, in the previous She'eilah, he was counting the half-P'rutos (and she is betrothed), Rava asks what the Din will be if the man said 'Chetzyech bi'P'rutah, ve'Chetzyech bi'P'rutah'. Perhaps here, where he specifies a whole P'rutah for each half, he thinks that he can acquire her in halves (unlike in the previous case, where everyone knows that one cannot acquire a woman with half a P'rutah (even in two lots).

(c) Assuming that whatever he says on the same day is considered counting (and she is betrothed), he then asks what the Din will be if he said 'Chetzyech bi'P'rutah ha'Yom, ve'Chetzyech bi'P'rutah le'Machar'. The Kidushin might be effective even though he specifically asks for the second P'rutah to take effect the next day - because what he may have meant was that the Kidushin should begin today and conclude tomorrow.

(d) Rava's last She'eilah in this set, which he remains with 'Teiku', is - 'Sh'nei Chetzyech bi'Prutah'. In his previous stance, there would have been no question at all that, in this case, where he made the statement in one go, the woman would have been betrothed. Now however, he contends with the possibility that any mention of 'half' will invalidate the betrothal.

(a) In a second set of She'eilos, Rava asks 'Sh'tei Benosayich li'Sh'nei Banai Mahu'? It was the (grown-up) sons themselves - who gave their father the authority to arrange their betrothal, by appointing him a Sheli'ach.

(b) The two sisters might ...

1. ... not be betrothed - because we go after the ones on whose behalf the money is being given (in which case, seeing as the father is receiving the money for the betrothal of two daughters, there is only half a P'rutah for each daughter).
2. ... nevertheless be betrothed - because we go after the recipient (in which case there is a P'rutah - seeing as the money for both of them goes to their father).

(a) Rav Papa asked what the Din will be in the case of 'Bitcha u'Parascha bi'P'rutah'. If the man meant to acquire the woman with one half of the P'rutah and to pay for the cow with the other half (see Tosfos DH 'Bitcha'), it is obvious that the woman would not be betrothed. The other side of the She'eilah is - that he meant to acquire the woman with the 'P'rutah and the cow with the Meshichah that he had yet to make (and to pay the going market price for the cow).

(b) Rav Ashi asks a similar She'eilah regarding acquiring a woman and a piece of land - whether he intends to acquire the woman with half a P'rutah and the land for the other half, or the woman with the P'rutah and the land with the Chazakah that he had yet to make (and pay the market price for the piece of land).

(c) The outcome of both She'eilos is - 'Teiku'.

(a) In a case where a man betrothed a woman with silks, Rabah did not require their assessment prior to the Kidushin - Rav Yosef did.

(b) If the man had specifically stipulated that he is betrothing her with them ...

1. ... irrespective of their value - they would both agree that no assessment was necessary.
2. ... provided they were worth fifty Zuz, and they were found to be worth less - then even if there had been an assessment, the Kidushin would be Batel.

(c) We therefore establish Rabah and Rav Yosef's dispute - when he stipulated that the silks were worth fifty Zuz, and they were subsequently found to be worth fifty Zuz.

(d) Rav Yosef's reasoning (bearing in mind that the silks were worth fifty Zuz) is - due to the fact that the woman, who is generally not an expert in assessing, does not rely on his assessment, unless it is backed up by official assessors (and whenever there is no Da'as on the part of one of the parties, the Kinyan is Batel).

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