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1)

(a) Rav Chiya bar Avin Amar Rebbi Yochanan learns from the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki li'V'nei Lot Nasati es Ar Yerushah" - that a Nochri inherits his father.

(b)

1. Rav Chiya bar Avin is forced to discard the initial source for this (the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki Yerushah le'Eisav Nasati es Har - Se'ir") - because Eisav falls uder the category of a Yisrael (albeit a Yisrael Mumar [though one can ask on this from the D'rashah "Ki be'Yitzchak Yikarei Lecha Zara", 'be'Yitzchak, ve'Lo Kol Yitzchak'. See also Rashash).
2. He declines to learn it from Rava's source ("ve'Chishav Im Koneihu", 've'Lo Im Yorshei Koneihu') - because the Torah does not write 've'Lo Im Yorshei Koneihu' (see Rashash).
3. And Rava declines to learn like Rav Chiya bar Avin - because it may be in honor of Avraham that the Torah granted Lot's descendents the institution of inheritance.

(a) It is clear from the Mishnah that we learned earlier ('Yeseirah Alav Amah Ivriyah ... ') - that there is nothing which sets free an Eved Ivri but not an Ivriyah.

(b) Rav Sheishes therefore establishes the Beraisa 'Yesh be'Ivri she'Ein be'Ivriyah ... she'Hu Yotze be'Shanim, be'Yovel u've'Misas ha'Adon, Mah she'Ein Kein be'Ivriyah' - when the master had already performed Yi'ud with her.

(c) Even though the Tana is speaking in the Reisha when the master performed Yi'ud ...

1. ... he needs to preclude from the possible contention that Yi'ud runs concurrently with the the six-year period of work. He teaches us that it actually negates it.
2. ... in the Seifa, where he goes on to say that she goes out with Simanim (which the Eved Ivri does not) - he is speaking when there was no Yi'ud.

(d) We must infer from the Seifa of the Beraisa, which states that an Amah Ivriyah cannot be sold twice - that an Eved Ivri, can.

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa makes three D'rashos from "ve'Nimkar *bi'G'neivaso". He Darshens "bi'G'neivaso", 've'Lo bi'K'feilo', "bi'G'neivaso", 've'Lo bi'Z'mamo' - and "bi'G'neivaso", 'Keivan she'Nimkar Pa'am Achas, Shuv I Atah Rashai le'Moshro'.

(b) Rava reconciles the previous inference with this Beraisa by differentiating between one theft (where he cannot be sold twice) and two thefts (where he can, even if the two were judged simultaneously and he was found guilty in the same sitting).

(c) Abaye disagrees with him - on the grounds that "bi'G'neivaso" implies any amount of thefts (yet he can only be sold once).

(d) So *he* explains that as long as he stole from one person, he can only be sold once, whereas if he sold from two people (or even from one person, but he took him to Beis-Din on two separate occasions), he can be sold for each theft.

(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that, if ...

1. ... someone stole a thousand Zuz, and his assessed value was only five hundred - he is sold twice.
2. ... he stole five hundred Zuz, and his assessed value is a thousand - he cannot be sold.

(b) According to Rebi Eliezer - a thief cannot be sold unless his value tallies with the amount that he stole.

(c) Rava declares that Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is more powerful than the Chachamim's - because just as the Chachamim say that if he stole five hundred Zuz, and his assessed value is a thousand, he cannot be sold because "ve'Nimkar" implies "ve'Nimkar (Kulo)", 've'Lo Chetzyo', so too, does "bi'G'neivaso" imply 've'Lo be'Chatzi G'neivaso' (like Rebbi Eliezer).

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa quoted earlier, listing the differences between an Amah Ivriyah and an Eved Ivri, states 'u'Mefadin Osah Ba'al-Korchah'. Abaye dismisses Rava's interpretation of 'Ba'al-Korchah de'Adon' (by which he must have meant that the father writes a credit note for her assesssed value, and hands it to the Adon), on the same grounds that we dismissed this suggestion earlier in the Sugya, namely, because it would be inconceivable to expect anyone to give away 'a jewel for a currently worthless piece of paper'.

(b) So Abaye explains it to mean - against her father's will (due to the stigmatization of his family that his daughter's status causes.

(c) We do not force the members of the Eved Ivri's family to redeem him - because he will only sell himself again (a lucrative business).

(d) Ultimately, the difference between the Eved Ivri and the Amah Ivriyah is - the fact that a father cannot sell his daughter a second time, whereas an Eved Ivri is permitted to sell himself twice. The author must therefore be Rebbi Shimon (as we shall now see).

(a) The Tana Kama permits a man to sell his daughter for Ishus after Ishus and for Shifchus after Shifchus. He ...

1. ... permits Ishus Achar Shifchus ...
2. ... but forbids Shifchus Achar Ishus.

(b) Rebbi Shimon forbids Shifchus Achar Shifchus just like Shifchus Achar Ishus.

(a) Rebbi Akiva holds that once the father spreads his Talis over his daughter, he is no longer permitted to sell her - which is the equivalent of 'Ein Mochrah le'Shifchus Achar Ishus' (like the Tana Kama of th previous Beraisa).

(b) Rebbi Eliezer says - 'Keivan she'Bagad Bah, Ein Rashai le'Mochrah' (the equivalent of 'Ein Rashai le'Mochrah le'Shifchus Achar Shifchus' [the second of Rebbi Shimon's statements]).

(c) Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim li'Mesores'. That explains why he explains "be'Vigdo" (in the Pasuk "Lo Yuchal le'Mochrah *be'Vigdo Vah*") as if it was written "be'Vogdo Bah" (he betrayed his daughter by selling her). Because, if the Torah really meant "be'Vigdo" (in the way that Rebbi Akiva explains the word), then it should have written it with a 'Yud'.

(d) Rebbi Akiva argues with Rebbi Eliezer - inasmuch as holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' (we go after the way the word is pronounced).

(a) Rebbi Shimon - holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra u'le'Mesores'.

(b) The reason that in Sukos (in connection with "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", he Darshens 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' (and not 'li'Mesores') is - because there it is not possible to Darshen 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra u'le'Mesores', since the two clash (whereas in our Sugya, it is possible to Darshen both).

9)

(a) We ask whether Yi'ud makes Nisu'in or Eirusin. The ramifications of this She'eilah are - whether her 'husband' will immediately be obligated to bury her and whether he will inherit her (should she die), and whether he is permitted to annul her Nedarim (in the event that she lives).

(b) We extrapolate from Rebbi Akiva, who says in the above Beraisa 'Keivan she'Piresh Taliso Alehah, Shuv Eino Rashai le'Mochrah' - that he cannot sell her, but that he can betroth her.

(c) This is not a proof that Yi'ud must make Eirusin, because otherwise, how could her father then betroth her after Yi'ud - because Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak establishes 'Keivan she'Piresh Talisah Alehah' by ordinary Kidushin and not by Kidushei Yi'ud (which may well make Nisu'in).

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Eliezer permits a father to sell his daughter to relatives. The Tana Kama ...

1. ... forbids it - because in his opinion, every sale of an Amah Ivriyah must carry with it the possibility of Yi'ud for the sale to be valid.
2. ... concedes to Rebbi Eliezer that he is permitted to sell her if she is an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, or a Gerushah or a Chalutzah, to a Kohen Hedyot - because there, seeing as the Kidushin takes effect anyway, she is considered fit for Yi'ud.

(b) The Almanah just referred to cannot speak when she arranged her own Kidushin - because, based on the principle 'Ein be'Ma'aseh Ketanah K'lum', the Tana would not refer to her as an Almanah.

(c) The problem with saying that her father arranged the Kidushin is - that how could he possibly then sell her 'seeing as, in the opinion of Rebbi Akiva, 'Eino Mochrah le'Shifchus Achar Ishus'?

(d) Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak therefore establishes the case when she became an Almanah following Yi'ud, according to Rebbi Yossi be'Rebbi Yehudah - who says that it is not the original money that makes the Yi'ud, but the last few minutes of work (which are effected by her and not by her father).

(a) We prove from Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak's explanation - that Yi'ud makes Eirusin, because if it made Nisu'in, then once she was married, her father could no longer sell her.

(b) The problem with 've'Shavin she'Mochrah ... ' even if we say that Yi'ud makes Eirusin is - that according to Rebbi Akiva 'Eino Mochrah le'Shifchus Achar Ishus'.

(c) Despite the fact that, at the end of the day, we differentiate between Eirusin which the father arranges (where we say 'Ein Adam Mocher es Bito ... ') and Eirusin which she herself arranges (where it does not apply), we cannot make the same distinction between Nisu'in which the father makes and Nisu'in which she herself makes (refuting the proof that 'Yi'ud Eirusin Oseh') - because logically, Nisu'in takes her out of her father's domain irrespective of who arranged it.

(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak disagrees with Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak. In his opinion, Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah concedes 'Ma'os ha'Rishonos le'Kidushin Nitnu' (as will be explained later). He explains the Beraisa's concession for the father to sell his daughter who is an Almanah le'Kohen Gadol ... (despite the fact that it is a case of 'Shifchus Achar Ishus' (which Rebbi Akiva forbids) - by establishing the author as Rebbi Eliezer (who permits it).