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1)

(a) Having taught us that whichever Kidushin took place first, negates the second one ...

1. ... by a man, the Tana nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in the case of a woman - because, seeing as women were not generally expert in Yichus like men, we might have thought that the woman accepted her Kidushin (not in order to negate that of the Sheli'ach, but) to take effect in the event that the latter did not succeed in his mission (not if he did).
2. ... by a woman, the Tana nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in the case of the father - because we would otherwise have thought that it is specifically the woman who meant to negate the Sheli'ach's Kidushin with her own, because she is more particular about the Yichus of the man that she is marrying than a man is re. the man his daughter marries.

(b) If a man is Mekadesh his daughter who is a Na'arah outside town, whilst on the same day, she accepted Kidushin from another man in town, and we then discover that she is a Bogeres, Rav rules that her Kidushin is valid - because we assume that since she a Bogeres now, we assume that that is what she was in the morning too.

(c) According to Shmuel, it is a Safek to which of the two men she is betrothed.

(d) We cannot establish their Machlokes ...

1. ... within the first six months after she became a Na'arah - (in which case, her Bagrus would manifest itself in her breasts,as we learn in Nidah), because throughout the six-month period, a girl has a Chezkas Na'arah, and Rav would not declare her a Bogeres retroactively from day-break.
2. ... after the six months had terminated - because then, a girl has a Chezkas Bagrus, and Shmuel would not declare her a Safek.

(a) So we establish the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel on the actual day when the six-month period terminates. We have discussed Rav's reasoning. Shmuel holds - that perhaps the girl retained her Chezkas Na'arus until the last moment.

(b) The Mishnah in Mikva'os says that if a Mikveh which was known to contain forty Sa'ah, but which is measured and found to be ;lacking - all Taharos that were performed relying on that Mikveh, are Tamei, irrespective of whether they were handled in the Reshus ha'Yachid or the Reshus ha'Rabim.

(c) The difference between a Reshus ha'Yachid and a Reshus ha'Rabim with re. to Safek Tum'ah is - Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, Tamei, bi'Reshus ha'Rabim, Tahor.

(d) And the reason that the Tana in Mikva'os does not declare all Taharos that were dealt with in the Reshus ha'Rabim, Tahor, is - because the Mikveh (which now has a Chezkas P'sul) is not Safek Pasul, but Vaday.

(a) Despite the fact that in the case of Safek Bogeres, just like in the case of Mikveh, the Chazakah is now broken in front of us, Shmuel does not take his cue from the case of Mikveh (to consider the girl a Bogeres retroactively) like Rav does - because in the case of Mikveh, in addition to the Chazakah of the Mikveh, there is also the Chazakah of the one who Toveled in it (and maybe that is why we declare all the Taharos that were subsequently performed relying on that Tevilah, Tamei (but not when there is only one Chazakah).

(b) The Beraisa discusses a barrel of wine which one examined regularly to make sure that it had not turned sour, and from which one separated Terumos on other barrels of wine (two Lugin for each barrel of a hundred Lugin. The Tana rules there that if one discovered the wine to have turned sour - then for three days, it is Vaday, but from then on, it is a Safek, which means that whatever one gave during that period is Terumah, but one remains obligated to separate Terumah again.

(c) When the Tana says 'three days', he means - either that all the wine from the three days immediately following the previous Bedikah was definitely wine, or that all the wine from the three days prior to the discovery, was definitely vinegar (though this Machlokes does not affect our Sugya).

(d) This Beraisa clashes with the Mishnah in Mikva'os - because according to that Tana - the wine ought to have been considered vinegar retroactively, just as it was found (like he rules in the case of Mikveh).

(a) Rebbi Chanina from Syria establishes the Beraisa like Rebbi Shimon, who says in a Beraisa 'bi'Reshus ha'Rabim, Tehoros; bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, Tolin'.

(b) According to Shmuel, we do not place the wine on a Safek Chazakah that it only turned sour now, like we do by the Safek Bogeres - because here too (like by Mikveh), there are two detrimental factors with which to contend, the Chazakah of the wine (which is now vinegar) and that of the Tevel, which the wine is coming to rectify.

5)

(a) If someone writes all his property to a friend and then recovers, assuming that, at the time of writing, he was ...

1. ... a Shechiv-Mera (on his death-bed) - his gift is invalid and he is permitted to retain the money.
2. ... in good health - his gift is valid.

(b) Rebbi Ya'akov in the Mishnah in Bava Basra rules that in the case of a Safek, the donor retains the money. Rebbi Nasan says - that we go after whatever he is when he comes to retract (like in the case of the Mikveh). If he is healthy, then the onus is on him to prove that he was a Sh'chiv-Mera when he donated it; whereas if he is a Shechiv-Mera, then the onus lies on the recipient to prove that he was healthy.

(c) We attempt to connect the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel with this Machlokes Tana'im. We establish ...

1. ... Rav - like Rebbi Nasan (who considers the donor to have been retroactively, whatever he is now).
2. ... Shmuel - like Rebbi Ya'akov (who does not go after what he is now, but contends with the possibility of his having been a Shechiv-Mera, even if now he is healthy).

(d) We refute this proposal however. We conclude that ...

1. ... Rav might even hold like Rebbi Ya'akov - whose reasoning is based on the Chezkas Mamon which stands against any other Safek; whereas the Chezkas ha'Guf (that she was and still is a Na'arah), cannot override the Safek, seeing as it stands to change (every Na'arah becomes a Bogeres).
2. ... Shmuel might even hold like Rebbi Nasan - who contends with the possibility that he was healthy, like most people are; whereas in the case of the Safek Bogeres, many a girl remains a Na'arah on the day that she is due to become a Bogeres.

(a) If a man is Mekadesh his daughter who is a Na'arah outside town, whilst on the same day, she accepted Kidushin from another man in town, and we then discover that she is a Bogeres, one Beraisa rules that her Kidushin is valid ('Harei Hi Bogeres Lefaneinu'). A second Beraisa says - that we must contend with the Kidushin of both men ('Chayshinan le'Kidushei Sheneihem').

(b) We refute the proposal that Rav and Shmuel follow the respective opinions of these two Beraisos - by establishing both Beraisos like Shmuel.

(c) It is possible to establish the first Beraisa like Shmuel - by establishing it when the girl contradicts her father, claiming that she turned a Bogeres the day before.

(d) This causes us to cause us to query the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel - on the grounds that, if the Beraisos don't argue, perhaps Rav and Shmuel don't argue either (and Rav is speaking when the girl contradicts her father).

(a) When Rav Yosef Brei de'Rav Menashyah from Davil ruled in practice like Rav - Shmuel was angry with him, because he said, everyone else measures in small quantities (they are hesitant to permit a Safek Eishes Ish), whereas *he* measures in large measurements (by ruling outright that she is betrothed to the second man).

(b) We prove from this incident that Rav and Shmuel argue - because if they don't, Rav would be speaking in a case where the girl contradicted her father (of which Shmuel does not speak), and that is the case in which Rav Yosef Brei de'Rav Menashyah issued his ruling, so why was Shmuel angry?

(c) Mar Zutra told Rav Ashi that Ameimar ruled like Rav. Rav Ashi himself holds like Shmuel.

(d) The final ruling is - like Rav.

(a) The Tana says that if a man who goes overseas with his wife, and returns ...

1. ... with her, claiming that she and the children that returned with them are his wife and her children - needs to prove neither that the woman is Meyuchas (because he already proved it when he married her), nor that the children are hers (as we shall see shortly).
2. ... without her, claiming that she died and that the children are hers - he is believed with re. to the woman, but not with re. to the children.

(b) In the event that he returns from overseas ...

1. ... with a woman and children in tow, claiming that he married the woman overseas and that these are her children - he will need to prove that the woman is Meyuchas, but is believed with re. to the children.
2. ... with a woman but no children, claiming that he married a woman overseas, who died and these are her children - he will need to prove both that his wife was Meyuchas and that the children are hers.

(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna explains that the Tana speaks when the children cling to the woman like only small children cling to their mother - which explains why (in both cases, where he returns with his wife) he does not need to prove that the children are hers.

(b) When the Tana of the Beraisa says 'u'Meivi Re'ayah al ha'Gedolim, ve'Ein Tzarich Lehavi Re'ayah al ha'Ketanim' he means simply - that it is only big children who need to be proved to be his wife's, but not small ones who cling to her (as we explained).

(c) And in a case where he returns with one woman, and claims that he married two, one of whom died, and that the children belong to the wife who returned with him, the Tana says that he is not believed on the children, even if they cling to the woman, because of the possibility that they are really the children of the deceased woman, and that the woman who returned with him is their step-mother, who brought them up, and whom they consider to be their mother.