ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 79
KIDUSHIN 77-80 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) Having taught us that whichever Kidushin took place first, negates the
second one ...
1. ... by a man, the Tana nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in
the case of a woman - because, seeing as women were not generally expert in
Yichus like men, we might have thought that the woman accepted her Kidushin
(not in order to negate that of the Sheli'ach, but) to take effect in the
event that the latter did not succeed in his mission (not if he did).
(b) If a man is Mekadesh his daughter who is a Na'arah outside town, whilst
on the same day, she accepted Kidushin from another man in town, and we then
discover that she is a Bogeres, Rav rules that her Kidushin is valid -
because we assume that since she a Bogeres now, we assume that that is what
she was in the morning too.
2. ... by a woman, the Tana nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in
the case of the father - because we would otherwise have thought that it is
specifically the woman who meant to negate the Sheli'ach's Kidushin with her
own, because she is more particular about the Yichus of the man that she is
marrying than a man is re. the man his daughter marries.
(c) According to Shmuel, it is a Safek to which of the two men she is
(d) We cannot establish their Machlokes ...
1. ... within the first six months after she became a Na'arah - (in which
case, her Bagrus would manifest itself in her breasts,as we learn in Nidah),
because throughout the six-month period, a girl has a Chezkas Na'arah, and
Rav would not declare her a Bogeres retroactively from day-break.
2. ... after the six months had terminated - because then, a girl has a
Chezkas Bagrus, and Shmuel would not declare her a Safek.
(a) So we establish the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel on the actual day
when the six-month period terminates. We have discussed Rav's reasoning.
Shmuel holds - that perhaps the girl retained her Chezkas Na'arus until the
(b) The Mishnah in Mikva'os says that if a Mikveh which was known to contain
forty Sa'ah, but which is measured and found to be ;lacking - all Taharos
that were performed relying on that Mikveh, are Tamei, irrespective of
whether they were handled in the Reshus ha'Yachid or the Reshus ha'Rabim.
(c) The difference between a Reshus ha'Yachid and a Reshus ha'Rabim with re.
to Safek Tum'ah is - Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, Tamei, bi'Reshus
(d) And the reason that the Tana in Mikva'os does not declare all Taharos
that were dealt with in the Reshus ha'Rabim, Tahor, is - because the Mikveh
(which now has a Chezkas P'sul) is not Safek Pasul, but Vaday.
(a) Despite the fact that in the case of Safek Bogeres, just like in the
case of Mikveh, the Chazakah is now broken in front of us, Shmuel does not
take his cue from the case of Mikveh (to consider the girl a Bogeres
retroactively) like Rav does - because in the case of Mikveh, in addition to
the Chazakah of the Mikveh, there is also the Chazakah of the one who
Toveled in it (and maybe that is why we declare all the Taharos that were
subsequently performed relying on that Tevilah, Tamei (but not when there is
only one Chazakah).
(b) The Beraisa discusses a barrel of wine which one examined regularly to
make sure that it had not turned sour, and from which one separated Terumos
on other barrels of wine (two Lugin for each barrel of a hundred Lugin. The
Tana rules there that if one discovered the wine to have turned sour - then
for three days, it is Vaday, but from then on, it is a Safek, which means
that whatever one gave during that period is Terumah, but one remains
obligated to separate Terumah again.
(c) When the Tana says 'three days', he means - either that all the wine
from the three days immediately following the previous Bedikah was
definitely wine, or that all the wine from the three days prior to the
discovery, was definitely vinegar (though this Machlokes does not affect our
(d) This Beraisa clashes with the Mishnah in Mikva'os - because according to
that Tana - the wine ought to have been considered vinegar retroactively,
just as it was found (like he rules in the case of Mikveh).
(a) Rebbi Chanina from Syria establishes the Beraisa like Rebbi Shimon, who
says in a Beraisa 'bi'Reshus ha'Rabim, Tehoros; bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, Tolin'.
(b) According to Shmuel, we do not place the wine on a Safek Chazakah that
it only turned sour now, like we do by the Safek Bogeres - because here too
(like by Mikveh), there are two detrimental factors with which to contend,
the Chazakah of the wine (which is now vinegar) and that of the Tevel, which
the wine is coming to rectify.
(a) If someone writes all his property to a friend and then recovers,
assuming that, at the time of writing, he was ...
1. ... a Shechiv-Mera (on his death-bed) - his gift is invalid and he is
permitted to retain the money.
(b) Rebbi Ya'akov in the Mishnah in Bava Basra rules that in the case of a
Safek, the donor retains the money. Rebbi Nasan says - that we go after
whatever he is when he comes to retract (like in the case of the Mikveh). If
he is healthy, then the onus is on him to prove that he was a Sh'chiv-Mera
when he donated it; whereas if he is a Shechiv-Mera, then the onus lies on
the recipient to prove that he was healthy.
2. ... in good health - his gift is valid.
(c) We attempt to connect the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel with this
Machlokes Tana'im. We establish ...
1. ... Rav - like Rebbi Nasan (who considers the donor to have been
retroactively, whatever he is now).
(d) We refute this proposal however. We conclude that ...
2. ... Shmuel - like Rebbi Ya'akov (who does not go after what he is now,
but contends with the possibility of his having been a Shechiv-Mera, even if
now he is healthy).
1. ... Rav might even hold like Rebbi Ya'akov - whose reasoning is based on
the Chezkas Mamon which stands against any other Safek; whereas the Chezkas
ha'Guf (that she was and still is a Na'arah), cannot override the Safek,
seeing as it stands to change (every Na'arah becomes a Bogeres).
2. ... Shmuel might even hold like Rebbi Nasan - who contends with the
possibility that he was healthy, like most people are; whereas in the case
of the Safek Bogeres, many a girl remains a Na'arah on the day that she is
due to become a Bogeres.
(a) If a man is Mekadesh his daughter who is a Na'arah outside town, whilst
on the same day, she accepted Kidushin from another man in town, and we then
discover that she is a Bogeres, one Beraisa rules that her Kidushin is valid
('Harei Hi Bogeres Lefaneinu'). A second Beraisa says - that we must contend
with the Kidushin of both men ('Chayshinan le'Kidushei Sheneihem').
(b) We refute the proposal that Rav and Shmuel follow the respective
opinions of these two Beraisos - by establishing both Beraisos like Shmuel.
(c) It is possible to establish the first Beraisa like Shmuel - by
establishing it when the girl contradicts her father, claiming that she
turned a Bogeres the day before.
(d) This causes us to cause us to query the Machlokes between Rav and
Shmuel - on the grounds that, if the Beraisos don't argue, perhaps Rav and
Shmuel don't argue either (and Rav is speaking when the girl contradicts her
(a) When Rav Yosef Brei de'Rav Menashyah from Davil ruled in practice like
Rav - Shmuel was angry with him, because he said, everyone else measures in
small quantities (they are hesitant to permit a Safek Eishes Ish), whereas
*he* measures in large measurements (by ruling outright that she is
betrothed to the second man).
(b) We prove from this incident that Rav and Shmuel argue - because if they
don't, Rav would be speaking in a case where the girl contradicted her
father (of which Shmuel does not speak), and that is the case in which Rav
Yosef Brei de'Rav Menashyah issued his ruling, so why was Shmuel angry?
(c) Mar Zutra told Rav Ashi that Ameimar ruled like Rav. Rav Ashi himself
holds like Shmuel.
(d) The final ruling is - like Rav.
(a) The Tana says that if a man who goes overseas with his wife, and returns
1. ... with her, claiming that she and the children that returned with them
are his wife and her children - needs to prove neither that the woman is
Meyuchas (because he already proved it when he married her), nor that the
children are hers (as we shall see shortly).
(b) In the event that he returns from overseas ...
2. ... without her, claiming that she died and that the children are hers -
he is believed with re. to the woman, but not with re. to the children.
1. ... with a woman and children in tow, claiming that he married the woman
overseas and that these are her children - he will need to prove that the
woman is Meyuchas, but is believed with re. to the children.
2. ... with a woman but no children, claiming that he married a woman
overseas, who died and these are her children - he will need to prove both
that his wife was Meyuchas and that the children are hers.
(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna explains that the Tana speaks when the children cling
to the woman like only small children cling to their mother - which explains
why (in both cases, where he returns with his wife) he does not need to
prove that the children are hers.
(b) When the Tana of the Beraisa says 'u'Meivi Re'ayah al ha'Gedolim, ve'Ein
Tzarich Lehavi Re'ayah al ha'Ketanim' he means simply - that it is only big
children who need to be proved to be his wife's, but not small ones who
cling to her (as we explained).
(c) And in a case where he returns with one woman, and claims that he
married two, one of whom died, and that the children belong to the wife who
returned with him, the Tana says that he is not believed on the children,
even if they cling to the woman, because of the possibility that they are
really the children of the deceased woman, and that the woman who returned
with him is their step-mother, who brought them up, and whom they consider
to be their mother.