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1)

(a) We just cited Rava, who extrapolates from the case brought in the Beraisa that silence after having accepted the money is construed as indifference, but not as consent, that the same applies to Kidushin. On what grounds did ...

1. ... the people of Pum Nahara in the name of Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua query Rava's comparison? Why might this Din not pertain to the latter, even though it pertains to the former?
2. ... Rav Acha'i query this distinction?

(b) When Rav Acha bar Rav (presumably, this should read 'Rav Acha bar Rava') asked Ravina what the Din would be in such a case, what did the latter reply?

(a) How did that woman selling bandages (or bundles of silk) react when, instead of returning them to her unconditionally, the man who had grabbed some from her asked her whether she would agree to become betrothed to him in exchange for their return?

(b) What did Rav Nachman rule in that case? Was she Mekudeshes or not?

(c) Rava queried Rav Nachman from a Beraisa.
What does the Tana of the Beraisa rule in a similar case?

(d) The Tana also speaks about betrothing her with Gezel, Chamas or Geneivah.
What is the difference between Gezel and Chamas?

(a) How did Rav Nachman establish the Beraisa in order to conform with the Tana?

(b) The Tana of another Beraisa says that when a man said 'Kinsi Sela Zeh she'Ani Chayav Lach', and later added 'Hiskadshi Li Bo', be'Sha'as Matan Ma'os Ratz'sah Mekudeshes, Lo Ratz'sah, Einah Mekudeshes'.
What does he rule by 'le'Achar Matan Ma'os'?

(c) Why can we not interpret 'Lo Ratz'sah' to mean that she declined to accept his offer? What would it then insinuate?

(d) What then, does it mean? What does Rav Nachman subsequently prove from here?

(a) Why did the Rabbanan gather to collect the sayings of Rav Asi after his death?

(b) What did a certain Rav Ya'akov quote Rav Asi Amar Rav as saying regarding the Kinyan of Karka?

(c) How did Rav Ya'akov then establish the Beraisa which rules that Karka can be acquired for less than a P'rutah?

(a) What does the Navi Hoshei'a mean when he writes "Alah ve'Chachesh ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov ve'Na'of *Paratzu, ve'Damim be'Damim Naga'u*"? How does Targum Yonasan translate it?

(b) What is the significance of the fact that it is Rav Yosef who cited the Targum?

(c) How does Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan extrapolate from the continuation of that Pasuk that dealing with Gitin and Kidushin when one is not conversant with the Halachos is a worse sin than those perpetrated by the generation of the flood? What tragedy occurred there that did not occur by the Dor ha'Mabul?

(d) What do we learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... in Yirmiyah "Ki Mipnei Alah Avlah ha'Aretz"?
2. ... there " ... ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov ve'Na'of Paratzu" (and not "*u*'Partzu')?

6)

(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Kinin that if a Yoledes brought her Chatas and died, her heirs must bring her Olah. Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel establishes the Mishnah when the woman had already designated the Olah during her lifeti me.
What does Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan say?

(b) What is the basis of their Machlokes?

(c) What does 'Shibuda d'Oraysa' mean?

(d) According to Rav and Shmuel, why can the creditor then claim from Meshubadim in the case of a written loan? What is the difference between an oral loan and a written one?

(a) What do Rav and Shmuel say about claiming an oral loan from the orphans or from purchasers?

(b) Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree, and permit claiming from either.
What is the basis of their Machlokes?

(c) Shmuel and Rebbi Yochanan seem to repeat their Machlokes twice.
Why do they find it necessary to present their dispute in the case of ...

1. ... the Korban of a Yoledes?
2. ... a loan?

(d) Seeing as ...

1. ... in principle, we rule like Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, why can one not in fact, claim an oral loan from purchasers?
2. ... min ha'Torah, we hold 'Shibuda d'Oraysa', why should the creditor lose his right to claim from the purchasers?

(a) We know that a woman acquires herself by means of a Get, from the Pasuk "ve'Kasav Lah Sefer K'riysus".
On what grounds do we repudiate the suggestion that she acquires herself with the death of her husband ...

1. ... because of the S'vara 'Hu Asrah, ve'Hu Sharsah'?
2. ... because the Torah writes by a Yevamah that when she has no children she is prohibited to remarry? On what grounds do we reject the inference, that if she has children, she is permitted to do so?
3. ... from the fact that the Torah forbids an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, insinuating that she is permitted to others? Which Asei are we talking about?

(b) How do we attempt (unsuccessfully) to reinstate the proof from the latter Halachah?

(c) We substantiate the disproof, from Pesulei ha'Mukdashin which the owner redeemed.
Which ...

1. ... La'av becomes permitted there?
2. ... Asei then comes into effect?

(d) How do we finally learn that the death of her husband permits her to marry, from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei concerning those who are sent home from the battlefront?

(a) Rav Ashi ...

1. ... explained to Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi that "Ish Acher" referred to in the previous Pasuk cannot refer to the Yavam.
From where does he know this?
2. ... brings another disproof (apparently to the previous contention that although there is no La'av forbidding an Almanah to remarry, there is an Asei) from the Pasuk there "u'Senei'ah ha'Ish ha'Acharon ve'Kasav Lah Sefer K'riysus ... O Ki Yamus ha'Ish ha'Acharon".
What does he prove from there?

(b) Why did he not cite the following Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Ba'alah ha'Rishon Lashuv Lekachtah" (implying that somebody else may marry her)?

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