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1)

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that, if the woman ate the dates as she received them, they do not combine to make up a Perutah. Rava qualifies this, by differentiating between 'be'Zu, be'Zu, be'Zu' and 'be'Eilu'.
What makes 'be'Eilu' different?

(b) What does the Tana of the Beraisa rule in a case where a man said 'Hiskadshi Li ba'Alon, be'Rimon u've'Egoz', or 'Hiskadshi be'Eilu'?

(c) What is an 'Alon'? Why is it listed together with edible fruit?

(a) What is the difference between the Reisha of the Beraisa, where the man said 'ba'Alon, be'Rimon *u've'Egoz'* (rather than 'O be'Egoz') and the Seifa 'be'Zu, be'Zu, be'Zu'?

(b) How can we establish the Reisha when he said 'be'Eilu', seeing as the Tana then lists 'Hiskadshi Li be'Eilu' as an independent case?

(c) What does the Tana add in the Seifa that he did not include in the Reisha?

(d) What does this prove?

(a) What is the problem from the previous Beraisa on Rav and Shmuel, who established the case in our Mishnah 'Haysah Ocheles Rishonah Rishonah' on the Reisha ('Hiskadshi Li bi'Temarah Zu, Hiskadshi Li be'Zu')? Why can we not establish the Beraisa likewise?

(b) We answer by establishing the Tana of the Beraisa like Rebbi.
What does Rebbi say?

(c) To which section of the Beraisa are we now referring?

(d) How will this explain the Beraisa according to Rav and Shmuel? Why does the Tana present the case of Natlaso ve'Ochlaso'?

(a) Rav corroborates what we learned earlier 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Einah Mekudeshes'.
What is the reason for this ruling?

(b) We suggest that this is the Machlokes Tana'im in the Beraisa 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Mekudeshes; ve'Yesh Omrim Einah Mekudeshes'.
What is the Tana Kama's reason? If a loan is not for spending, then what is it for?

(c) We refute this suggestion however, on the basis of the Seifa which refers to a sale.
What does the Seifa say?

(d) Why does the Seifa force us to retract from the previous proposal?

(a) What does Rav Nachman quoting Huna our Chaver mean when he establishes the Beraisa in a different case? By which kind of Milveh does he establish it?

(b) What is then the basis of the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Yesh Omrim?

(c) What does Rebbi Elazar rule in a case where a man agrees to give a woman a Manah, but only hands her a Dinar? How much is the discrepancy?

(d) Does this mean that Rebbi Elazar holds like Yesh Omrim?

(a) In the case where a man betrothed a woman with the Pikadon that she is safekeeping for him, and she then discovered that it was either stolen or lost, the Tana Kama of the Beraisa rules that she is betrothed, provided that goods to the value of at least a Perutah remain.
What does he say in the case of a Milveh? Why the difference?

(b) What does Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar in the name of Rebbi Meir say?

(c) What can we extrapolate from their words with re. to betrothing with a loan?

(d) Why is this a Kashya on Rav?

7)

(a) We reject the suggestion that the Rabbanan and Rebbi Meir argue over whether 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah' or not, because that would leave us with a problem with the Reisha ('Hiskadshi Li be'Pikadon') where the Tana requires at least one Perutah to remain.
What is the problem assuming that ...

1. ... the woman accepted liability?
2. ... she did not?

(b) So we first amend the Beraisa and then establish it in a different case (as we did the previous Beraisa).
How does the case ...

1. ... of Pikadon now speak? Did the woman accept responsibility or not?
2. ... of Milveh now read?

(c) Rabah learned the interpretation of the Machlokes Tana'im from the Rabbanan in Bei Rav.
What does 'Bei Rav' mean?

(a) The Rabbanan de'Bei Rav established the Machlokes by whether 'Milveh bi'Reshus Ba'alim la'Chazarah' or not.
What does this mean? Why does Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar in the name of Rebbi Meir ascribe to Milveh the same Din as Pikadon?

(b) What will they hold re. 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah'? What would be its practical application?

(c) And what did they mean when they said 've'Hu ha'Din le'Onsin?

(d) On what grounds does Rabah disagree with the latter statement? Why did he consider it obvious that the borrower is Chayav Onsin even before he has spent any of the money?

(a) Rav Huna rules that if someone borrows an ax for ten days, he only acquires it from the moment he chops with it.
What are the ramifications of Rav Huna's statement?

(b) On what grounds will even the Rabbanan of Rebbi Meir (who hold that someone who borrows money acquires it immediately) concede this?

(a) 'ha'Omer le'Ishah Hiskadshi Li bi'Sh'tar Chov O she'Hayah Lo Milveh be'Yad Acheirim ve'Hirshah Aleihem, Rebbi Meir Omer Mekudeshes'.
What do the Chachamim say?

(b) On what grounds do we initially reject the suggestion that Sh'tar Chov means Sh'tar Chov da'Acheirim?

(c) In that case, what *does* it mean? What do we try and prove from here?

(d) How do we finally justify establishing the case of Sh'tar Chov by Sh'tar Chov da'Acheirim?

(a) We establish the Machlokes by Sh'tar Chov as being the same Machlokes as Rebbi and the Rabbanan. Rebbi holds 'Osiyos Niknos bi'Mesirah (one can acquire an outstanding debt with nothing more than the receipt of the original Sh'tar).
What do the Rabbanan say?

(b) Alternatively, neither Rebbi Meir nor the Rabbanan hold like Rebbi (see Tosfos DH 'de'Kuli Alma'), and they argue over Rav Papa.
What does Rav Papa say about someone who sells a Sh'tar Chov? What is he obligated to write?

(c) Which Tana holds like Rav Papa?

(a) Alternatively, both Tana'im hold like Rav Papa, and they argue over Shmuel.
On what grounds does Shmuel say that if someone sells a Sh'tar Chov and then waives the debt, the debt is canceled?

(b) And what does he say about the heirs, in the event of the creditor's death?

(c) How will this now tie up with the Machlokes Tana'im, where Rebbi Meir holds 'Hiskadshi Li bi'Sh'tar Chov, Mekudeshes', and the Chachamim, Einah Mekudeshes'?

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