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Menachos, 5

1) OFFERING A DIFFERENT "KORBAN MINCHAH" BEFORE THE "MINCHAS HA'OMER"

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Reish Lakish who says that when the Kemitzah of a Minchas ha'Omer is performed she'Lo Lishmah (not with intent that it is a Minchas ha'Omer), the Korban Minchah nevertheless is valid and may be offered, but it does not accomplish the permitting of the Isur Chadash on all newly harvested grain, and thus another Minchas ha'Omer must be offered.

The Gemara asks how can Reish Lakish permit eating the Shirayim of the Minchas ha'Omer that was offered she'Lo Lishmah, if, when it was offered, it did not serve to permit Chadash? At the time that it was offered, its flour was Asur, and thus it should not be a valid Korban altogether! We know that the Minchas ha'Omer must be brought from grain that a person is permitted to eat, as is derived from the verse in Yechezkel (45:15). How, then, can it be offered as a valid Minchah?

The KEREN ORAH asks why the Gemara does not ask a more obvious question on the ruling of Reish Lakish. The Mishnah later (68b, and cited on 5b) states that any Korban Minchah that is brought before the Minchas ha'Omer is brought is invalid. The Gemara should have asked how can Reish Lakish rule that the first Minchah (for which the Kemitzah was done she'Lo Lishmah) is valid, if it is being offered before the actual Minchas ha'Omer. Why does the Gemara not question Reish Lakish's statement from an explicit Mishnah, instead of asking a question from a statement of another Amora?

ANSWER: The BRISKER RAV (cited by the MINCHAS AVRAHAM) answers that the reason for the Halachah of the Mishnah later is *not* because of the verse in Yechezkel that requires the Minchah to be brought from grain that is permitted to a Yisrael to eat, but rather it is based on an entirely different source which is not relevant to Reish Lakish's ruling.

We know that the Matir (the permitting factor) that permits new grain for ordinary consumption is the Minchas ha'Omer, and the Matir that permits new grain for being offered as Menachos is the Shtei ha'Lechem. The Brisker Rav proves that the Omer is also necessary as a Matir for grain to be offered as Menachos. The Torah calls the Omer the "first" Minchah (Vayikra 23:10), which necessarily implies that any other Minchah that is brought before the Omer is Pasul, because any other Minchah is not permitted to be the "first." This is the reason why the Mishnah later says that any Minchah that is brought before the Omer is Pasul; it is not because that Minchah is not permitted to a Yisrael to eat, but rather it is because that Minchah is being brought first, before the Omer.

This novel understanding of the Mishnah answers the question of the Keren Orah. The Gemara could not have questioned Reish Lakish's ruling from the Mishnah later that says any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul, because that Mishnah is not relevant to Reish Lakish's case. The Gemara here is discussing an Omer which was offered she'Lo Lishmah, but which nevertheless retains its title as a Korban Minchas ha'Omer (as is evident from the fact that it is forbidden for the Kohen to continue performing the Avodos of this offering she'Lo Lishmah -- "Asur l'Shenuyei" (2a)). As long as this offering retains its title of a Minchas ha'Omer, the law that it must be the *first* Minchah to be offered does not change. Therefore, it cannot be Pasul because of the Halachah of the Mishnah later which says that any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul; this offering *is* the Omer with regard to having to be offered first.

The Gemara therefore questions Reish Lakish only from the Halachah that the verse in Yechezkel requires that the Minchas ha'Omer be fit for ordinary consumption. Since, in the case of Reish Lakish, the Isur Chadash has not yet been permitted, the Minchah is prohibited to be eaten and thus it should be Pasul. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

5b

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah later (68b) that states that if a Korban Minchah is brought from the new harvest before the Minchas ha'Omer is brought, then it is Pasul. Rebbi Yitzchak says in the name of Reish Lakish that the Korban Minchah is Pasul only when it is brought on the fourteenth or fifteenth of Nisan. If it is brought before the Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan, then it is valid b'Di'eved. The Gemara proves from this statement that Reish Lakish maintains that the "He'ir ha'Mizrach" -- the coming of dawn of the sixteenth of Nisan -- is the Matir which permits the new grain, and it is not the actual Omer offering that permits it. Therefore, a Korban Minchah that is offered on the sixteenth of Nisan before the Omer is valid, since it is no longer subject to the Isur of Chadash.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES questions the Gemara's proof that Reish Lakish maintains that "He'ir ha'Mizrach" permits Chadash. Perhaps the new grain remains Asur until the Minchas ha'Omer is offered, and the reason why a Korban Minchah brought before the Minchas ha'Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan is valid is because Reish Lakish holds that "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo va'Yom." The Gemara earlier (5a) uses this logic to explain why a Korban Omer that is offered she'Lo Lishmah is valid, even though the Isur of Chadash is not removed. This logic dictates that since on this day Chadash will become Mutar, it is considered to be Mutar already from the beginning of the day. Perhaps here, too, Reish Lakish maintains that the reason the Minchah brought before the Omer is valid is because the Omer will eventually be brought on this day and permit Chadash!

ANSWER: It is clear that the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is based on the understanding that the purpose of the Omer offering is to remove the Isur of Chadash. Accordingly, since the day is not considered "Mechusar Zeman," on the day that the Omer is brought, the Isur Chadash is considered to have been removed from the beginning of the day.

However, the BRISKER RAV proposes that the purpose of the Omer is not merely to remove the Isur of Chadash to permit the new grain for ordinary consumption. As we discussed in the previous Insight, the Brisker Rav proposes that the Omer is also necessary in order to permit Menachos brought from the new grain to be offered. Accordingly, the Omer must be the first Minchah offering that is brought.

According to this logic, the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is no longer applicable. If there is an order of precedence to which we must adhere when bringing Minchah offerings, then the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo va'Yom" does not help. The Omer *must* be brought first, and only afterwards may other Menachos be brought. The Menachos must be brought according to this order. When the Omer is offered after another Minchah, the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" cannot change the actual order and make it as if the Omer was offered before the Minchah that was actually offered first. Only in the previous Sugya (5a), where the question was whether or not the Minchah is considered permitted for ordinary consumption, does the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" apply and tell us that sine later on in the day it will become Mutar, it is considered Mutar now with regard to being a valid Korban Minchah. The Gemara here, though, is discussing a specific order, and thus the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" does not apply. Consequently, the fact that Reish Lakish validates a Minchah brought before the Omer proves that he maintains that Chadash becomes Mutar at "He'ir ha'Mizrach." (See MINCHAS AVRAHAM, p. 48.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)