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Menachos, 14

1) A THOUGHT OF "PIGUL" CAUSING A SECOND "ISUR" TO TAKE EFFECT

QUESTION: Rebbi Yosi maintains that when a Kohen has intention to eat one of the two loaves of the Shtei ha'Lechem in the incorrect time (Chutz l'Zemano), only that loaf becomes Pigul, but not the second loaf. Rav Huna explains that Rebbi Yosi considers the two loaves to be entirely independent entities. He adds that Rebbi Yosi's ruling will apply equally with regard to the meat of a Korban; only the meat that the Kohen plans to eat Chutz l'Zemano becomes Pigul; the rest of the meat does not become Pigul.

Rav Ashi questions Rav Huna's interpretation of Rebbi Yosi's ruling from a Beraisa. The Beraisa teaches that a Korban can become Pigul when the Kohen has intention to pour the blood of the Korban on the following day, Chutz l'Zemano. Which part of the Korban becomes Pigul in such a case? Obviously, it cannot be the blood itself, since blood is not subject to the laws of Pigul. Rather, it must be the meat of the Korban that becomes Pigul as a result of the Machshavah about the blood. This shows that a Machshavah of Pigul about one part of the Korban *can* cause the rest of the Korban to become Pigul.

RASHI (DH l'Ifgulei) asks that the Gemara implies that had blood been subject to the laws of Pigul, we would have accepted the suggestion that the thought of Pigul to pour the Shiyarei ha'Dam on the next day would make the blood Pigul. Rashi asks how would becoming Pigul affect the blood? The blood is already forbidden to be eaten with an Isur Kares!

Rashi answers that Pigul would add a second Isur to the blood so that one who eats the blood unintentionally, b'Shogeg, will be obligated to bring an additional Korban Chatas.

How can Rashi write that a person will be obligated to bring two Chata'os for eating blood that became Pigul? This implies that the Isur of Pigul takes effect on the blood even though the blood is already prohibited. How can this be? We know that there is a principle that "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" -- once an object is prohibited with one Isur, it cannot become prohibited again with another Isur. Why, then, should the Isur of Pigul take effect on the blood? (EIZEHU MEKOMAN)

ANSWERS: The Gemara in Kerisus (23a) asks a similar question. The Mishnah there teaches that according to Rebbi Shimon the Isur of Nosar takes effect and adds a Chiyuv Korban on an item of Chelev that was left over from a Korban. If a person eats Chelev which is Nosar, he will be Chayav to bring two Chata'os. The Gemara asks that "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" and, therefore, the Isur of Nosar should not take effect on an item that is already prohibited because of the Isur of Chelev. The way the Gemara and Rishonim there answer that question will help us understand the words of Rashi here.

(a) The Gemara in Kerisus answers that there is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that the rule of "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" does *not* apply to Isurim involving Kodshim (such as the Isur of Nosar), and thus a second Isur *does* take effect on a pre-existing Isur.

Similarly, the Isur of Pigul is an Isur that applies to Kodshim, and thus it adds another Isur to the blood, even though the blood is already prohibited because of the Isur of Dam.

(b) TOSFOS there in Kerisus (DH u'Mi) points out that the reason why the Gemara finds it necessary to quote the Beraisa that maintains that an Isur does take effect on another Isur with regard to Kodshim is because it is explaining the opinion of Rebbi Shimon. Rebbi Shimon maintains that the principle of "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" applies even when the second Isur is an Isur Kolel or Isur Mosif. (In general, an Isur is referred to as an "Isur Mosif" when an additional prohibition is added to the *object* that was previously Asur, such as when the prohibited object becomes Asur with a new prohibition that applies to additional people, or when it obtains a more stringent Isur. An "Isur Kolel" refers to a situation in which the change is not in the object that was previously Asur, but rather that the *subject* to whom the object was prohibited becomes prohibited to other objects as well.) However, according to the other Tana'im, it is not necessary to differentiate between Isurim that apply to Kodshim and other types of Isurim, because the Isur of Nosar is an Isur Mosif. Nosar adds a new facet of Isur to the item of Chelev, since the Chelev was hitherto permitted to be offered on the Mizbe'ach, and once it becomes Nosar it becomes prohibited from being offered on the Mizbe'ach. This makes it an Isur Mosif which can take effect on another Isur, according to most Tana'im.

Similarly, the Isur of Pigul adds a new facet of Isur to the blood by prohibiting it from being poured on the Mizbe'ach.

(c) TOSFOS in Zevachim (45b, DH Aval) proposes a novel way in which a second Isur can take effect on an object that is already prohibited by another Isur. Tosfos says that when a minor reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah *after* the cause for the second Isur has occurred, he will be Chayav for both Isurim if he eats the object, even though other people will be Chayav only for the first Isur. The reason for this is because the Isurim take effect (with regard to the minor) only at the moment that he becomes an adult. At that moment, both Isurim take effect simultaneously, and thus it is not considered to be a case of "Isur Chal Al Isur," since neither Isur preceded the other. Similarly, in the case of our Gemara, the second Isur -- the Isur of Pigul -- will take effect on the pre-existing Isur of Dam when a minor reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah and eats the Dam after the Kohen had the thought of Pigul. (EIZEHU MEKOMAN)

The principle that two Isurim can take effect when they occur simultaneously is expressed by the Gemara in Yevamos (33a), which teaches that when a minor reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah on Shabbos, the Isur against a Zar performing Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash and the Isur against performing Melachah on Shabbos take effect simultaneously. Consequently, a person would be obligated to bring two Chata'os for performing Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash on the Shabbos on which he reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah.

However, as the KEREN ORAH (in Zevachim) points out, in the cases described by the Gemara in Yevamos, the Isurim are not the type of Isurim that take effect on a specific *object*, but rather they are the type of Isurim that prohibit the *person* from performing a certain act. In such a case, it is clear that both Isurim take effect at the moment that the minor reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah. Tosfos, on the other hand, is applying this principle to a case in which the two Isurim take effect on a specific *object*, similar to the case of our Gemara (the Isurim of Dam and Pigul that take effect on the blood). Tosfos' assertion is a Chidush, because, logically, there does not seem to be any reason why both Isurim should take effect on the specific object at the moment that the minor reaches the age of Bar Mitzvah, rather than at the moment that their cause occurs.

14b

QUESTION: The Mishnah (13b) records the argument between Rebbi Yosi and the Chachamim regarding a case in which the Kohen slaughters the Kivsei Atzeres with intention to eat one of the two loaves of the Shtei ha'Lechem Chutz l'Zemano. Rebbi Yosi maintains that the second loaf is not Pigul. The Chachamim maintain that both loaves are Pigul.

In the Gemara here, Rebbi Yochanan asks whether or not the same Machlokes applies in a case of Lachmei Todah (which are comprised of four different types of loaves), and in case of a Minchas Ma'afeh (which is comprised of either ten Chalos or ten Rekikin). If the Kohen has a thought of Pigul to eat one of the types of loaves Chutz l'Zemano, do the other loaves become Pigul? The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that the argument between Rebbi Yosi and the Chachamim does apply to these cases as well.

The Minchas Ma'afeh may be comprised of either ten Chalos or ten Rekikin, but in either case it consists of a single type of loaf. Why, then, should the ten loaves of the Minchas Ma'afeh differ from any other Minchas Nedavah? There are four types of Menachos of Nedavah -- Minchas Ma'afeh, Minchas Marcheshes, Minchas Machavas, and Minchas Soles -- and all of them are divided into ten loaves. Since the Mishnah and Gemara do not tell us that the argument between Rebbi Yosi and the Chachamim applies to these types of Menachos, it is evident that even Rebbi Yosi agrees that a thought of Pigul for one of the loaves will cause the entire Minchah to become Pigul. (Although the Shtei ha'Lechem are also comprised of a single type of loaf, nevertheless -- since it requires two actions to permit the loaves to be eaten (the Shechitah of the two lambs) -- Rebbi Yosi maintains that the two loaves are considered like separate parts of a Minchah, and a thought of Pigul about one does not affect the other. The same applies to the Lechem ha'Panim; each of the two Bazichin permits its half of the Lechem ha'Panim (see PERUSH HA'MEYUCHAS LA'RASHBA). However, with regard to other types of Menachos, a thought to eat one loaf Chutz l'Zemano will cause all of the other loaves to become Pigul as well.) Why, then, does the Gemara question whether Rebbi Yosi argues with the Chachamim in a case of a Minchas Ma'afeh? Since the Minchas Ma'afeh also consists of a single type of loaf, Rebbi Yosi should agree that the entire Minchah becomes Pasul when the Kohen thinks about eating one of the loaves Chutz l'Zemano!

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (DH b'Minchas Ma'afeh) writes that the Gemara is following the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who permits bringing five Chalos and five Rekikin as the Minchas Ma'afeh. Since two different types of loaves are being brought, it is not comparable to the Shtei ha'Lechem.

However, this does not seem to be the approach of the RAMBAM, as the KEREN ORAH points out. The Rambam rules that a person may bring either Chalos or Rekikin as a Minchas Ma'afeh, and yet he also quotes the Beraisa here and says that a thought of Pigul in one of the loaves of a Minchas Ma'afeh will invalidate all of the loaves. Why is it necessary for the Rambam to mention that the Halachah of the Mishnah applies to a Minchas Ma'afeh, if, according to his own view, the Minchas Ma'afeh is identical to the Shtei ha'Lechem?

(b) The MINCHAS CHINUCH (Mitzvah #144) explains that a third opinion regarding Minchas Ma'afeh is expressed in the Gemara later (63a), which Rashi here does not mention. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah, who says that l'Chatchilah a person should bring either Chalos or Rekikin, but b'Di'eved he Korban is accepted if he brings a combination of both types of loaves. Perhaps the Rambam follows this opinion, and that is why he points out that a thought of Pigul about one of the loaves of the Minchas Ma'afeh causes the others to become Pigul even though they are a different type of loaf.

(c) The MINCHAS AVRAHAM does not accept the answer of the Minchas Chinuch, because the Rambam mentions nowhere that one may mix Chalos and Rekikin when bringing a Minchas Ma'afeh. The Minchas Avraham cites the BRISKER RAV who suggests a different approach to our Gemara. Perhaps the difference the Minchas Ma'afeh and the other Menachos of Nedavah is as follows. With regard to the other Menachos, the Torah does not specify explicitly that more than one loaf must be brought. Although it is true that we learn from a Gezeirah Shavah that ten loaves must be brought, that law is merely a detail in the way the Minchah is to be brought, and it is not a defining feature of that Minchah. In contrast, the Torah specifies that the Minchas Ma'afeh must be comprised of "Chalos" or "Rekikei Matzos," in the plural form. This shows that the multiple loaves are a defining feature of this type of Minchah. The same is true with regard to the Lachmei Todah.

This is the basis for the Gemara's question. Perhaps the Chachamim will argue with Rebbi Yosi in a case in which the Kohen has intention to eat one of the loaves of the Minchas Ma'afeh Chutz l'Zemano. The other loaves will not become Pigul, because the Torah specifies that this Korban is brought with many loaves, implying that each Chalah is distinct from the others. Since the Torah does not make them all a single entity, as we find that it does with regard to the Shtei ha'Lechem and Lechem ha'Panim, perhaps each loaf is an independent, separate entity. The Gemara concludes that the Chachamim indeed consider all of the loaves of the Minchas Ma'afeh to be a single Minchah, and intention to eat one Chutz l'Zemano will make them all Pigul.