Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Nazir, 34

1) ONE PERSON ACCEPTING CONTRADICTORY CONDITIONAL OATHS OF NEZIRUS

QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses a case of nine people who made their Nezirus contingent upon the status of a "Koy." The Gemara cites a Beraisa which says that a single person can also become a Nazir nine times by making the same types of conditions in his oaths of acceptance of Nezirus. The Gemara points out that it is understandable how the first six conditional oaths can apply to one person. However, the last three conditional oaths of acceptance of Nezirus must, by definition, apply to more than one person, so how can one person make such an oath? This is the Gemara's question.

Why is the Gemara not bothered by the first six conditional oaths of Nezirus? Why should even the first six conditional oaths of Nezirus apply to a single person? Some of the conditions contradict each other, such as, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is a Chayah," and, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is not a Chayah!" How could these contradictory oaths of Nezirus both take effect? Whether the Koy is a Chayah or not, only one of the two oaths can take effect! (ARZEI HA'LEVANON)

ANSWERS:

(a) The ARZEI HA'LEVANON (fn. 58) answers that the Gemara indeed knows that all six sets of Nezirus cannot take effect at the same time on the same person. The Gemara just means to say that six of the oaths can make a single person into a Nazir (when stated at different times), while the other three are meaningless when stated by a single person.

However, TOSFOS implies that the six oaths of Nezirus actually take effect on the person at the same time.

(b) When the person says that he will be a Nazir if the Koy is a Chayah, he does not mean to make his Nezirus dependent on the Koy being a full-fledged Chayah. Rather, he means to say that if the Koy is a Vadai Chayah, he will be a Vadai Nazir, and if the Koy is a Safek Chayah, he will be a Safek Nazir. Whether or not he becomes a Nazir will not be determined, though, by whether the Koy is actually a Chayah or not, because he did not make his Nezirus dependent on the actual (unknown) status of the Koy, but on the status with which the Koy is treated, which is the status of a Safek. Therefore, whether or not the Koy actually is a Chayah in reality, since the Safek is indeterminable his conditional oath makes him a Nazir Safek (a Nazir whose true status is known only to Hashem, just like the true status of a Koy is known only to Hashem). Therefore, each of the six conditions make him a Nazir Safek (unless he states two of the oaths in a single sentence, such as, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is or is not a Chayah," which obviously will make him a Nazir Vadai).

This interpretation is supported by the Gemara's conclusion that if nine people express the nine conditional oaths mentioned in the Mishnah, and then a single person comes and accepts all of the oaths of Nezirus that these people accepted, he becomes a Safek Nazir with nine sets of Safek Nezirus. Since the Koy either is a Chayah or is not a Chayah, only one of the two people who made those two conditional oaths becomes a Nazir. Why, then, should the single person who accepted to be a Nazir like all nine people become a Nazir Safek for both of the people who accepted contradictory conditions? It must be that the Safek Nezirus of each person is not dependent on whether the Koy actually is or is not a Chayah; rather, the Safek Nezirus is an indeterminable Safek (the way the Koy is viewed by us as an indeterminable Safek). This might be the Chidush of the Beraisa that teaches that a person can accept nine sets of Safek Nezirus in this manner. Even though the person accepted all nine sets of Safek Nezirus in one sentence, we do not view it as one who said, "I am a Nazir whether a Koy is a Chayah or is not a Chayah," but rather as a person who made nine separate oaths of acceptance of Nezirus, conditional on the status of the Koy.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nezirus 2:10, and Perush ha'Mishnayos) rules that in the case of our Mishnah, all of the people who accepted conditional oaths of Nezirus become normal, Vadai Nezirim, and not Safek Nezirim. The person who made his Nezirus dependent on the Koy being a Chayah meant that even if it only has *some* of the laws of a Chayah, he will be a Nazir. Similarly, the person who made his Nezirus dependent on the Koy not being a Chayah meant that he will be a Nazir even if it is only unlike a Chayah in *some* of its laws. According to his view, the answer to our original question is obvious; if a single person accepted Nezirus with the six conditions of the Mishnah, each of the conditions has been fulfilled, and thus he will be a Nazir with six sets of Nezirus.

34b

QUESTIONS: The Gemara cites a Beraisa in which Rebbi Elazar teaches that a Nazir is prohibited from eating even Alin v'Lulavin (leaves and young sprouts) of the grape vine. The Gemara points out that the Tana of our Mishnah argues and permits a Nazir to eat Alin v'Lulavin. The Gemara explains that the source of the argument revolves around a more general argument concerning a certain point of exegetical methodology.

The verse (Bamidbar 6:3) first mentions a specific category ("mi'Yayin v'Shechar") of grape products prohibited to a Nazir, and then (Bamidbar 6:4) it mentions the general category ("mi'Kol Asher Ye'a'seh mi'Gefen") of all grape products prohibited to a Nazir, and then (ibid.) it mentions another specific category ("me'Chartzanim v'Ad Zag").

The Gemara says that Rebbi Elazar approaches this type of verse by classifying the phrase of the specific category as a "Mi'ut" (a term that excludes) and the phrase of the general category as a "Ribuy" (a term that includes). He only takes into account the first two of the three phrases in the verse, classifying the verse as a Limud of "Mi'ut v'Ribuy," a Mi'ut followed by a Ribuy. Such a Limud teaches that everything that can possibly be included in the general category is included in the verse except for one specific thing (in this case, Shevishta, branches (or hard leaves; see Tosfos 35b, DH Ika)). Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase, as we will discuss shortly.

The Tana of our Mishnah, on the other hand, takes into account all three phrases, classifying the verse as a Limud of "Prat u'Klal u'Prat." Such a Limud teaches that the verse is including in the general category only those objects that are similar to the Prat (see Chart). Hence, the verse is excluding not only branches and hard leaves, but also Alin v'Lulavin (soft leaves and young sprouts).

TOSFOS (DH mi'Yayin) asks why Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase (which is a Mi'ut) of the verse. Tosfos answers that Rebbi Elazar uses that phrase to teach the Halachah of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, who rules that a Nazir is only punished if he eats two grape-seeds ("Chartzanim") and one peal ("Zag"). The Gemara (35a) indeed suggests that Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah himself learns like Rebbi Elazar (that the Limud of the verse is a Mi'ut v'Ribuy).

How does the Gemara know that Rebbi Elazar must hold like Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah? Perhaps Rebbi Elazar learns like the Rabanan and takes into account the last phrase and learns the Limud of the verse as a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut!" Presumably, a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut" (MRM) is equivalent to a "Ribuy Mi'ut v'Ribuy" (RMR), which also includes everything except for one item, just like a "Miut v'Ribuy" (we can make this presumption based on the fact that according to the Rabanan, a "Klal Prat u'Klal" (KPK) and a "Prat Klal u'Prat" (PKP) are almost identical forms of Limud in that both types of Limud include items that are "k'Ein ha'Prat"). In addition, if Rebbi Elazar does not learn the last phrase as a Mi'ut, why does he prefer to use that phrase to learn Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's Halachah over using it as a Mi'ut?

(b) Why does the Gemara assume that Rebbi Elazar, who includes Alin v'Lulavin in the Nazir's prohibition of grape products, learns verses as "Mi'ut v'Ribuy?" Perhaps he holds like the Rabanan who use the approach of "Prat u'Klal," and he merely explains that the first two verses are a "Prat u'Klal" which teaches that everything is included in the Halachah of the verse (since the Klal adds to the Prat), and that is why Alin v'Lulavin are included, while he does not take into account the last phrase (the second Prat) of the verse because he uses it for Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's teaching! In the same vein, we can ask why does the Gemara (35a) assume that Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah must hold of the approach of "Mi'ut vRibuy?" Why can he not hold of the approach of "Prat u'Klal" and still disregard the last phrase of the verse (since it is already being used to teach his Halachah of "two Chartzanim and one Zag")?

ANSWERS:

(a) The way the Gemara knows that Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase and make the verse into a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut" is because all Tana'im agree that there is no such Limud as a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut," as the Gemara makes clear later (35a). Even those who normally learn a verse as "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" agree that if there is a limiting clause and then a broader close and then another limiting clause, we learn it as a "Prat Klal u'Prat" (and not a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy") and we take into account the second limiting clause, thus including in the verse only things that are similar to the Prat (in our case, Alin v'Lulavin would therefore be excluded from the Isur). Why, though, would Rebbi Elazar prefer to use the last clause of the verse for Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's teaching rather than to view it as the second limiting clause and make the verse a Limud of "Prat Klal u'Prat?"

TOSFOS (35a, DH Rebbi Elazar) suggests two different approaches. In his second approach (that of the RI), Tosfos suggests that there is an accepted tradition (Kabalah) that it is always preferable to learn a verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" and to use the more common exegetical method than to learn a verse as a "Prat Klal u'Prat" and use a rare and unusual exegetical method. That is why Rebbi Elazar prefers to learn the verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" and use the third clause for the teaching of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah. However, if there is a choice between viewing the clauses of a verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" or using each clause independently to teach a specific Halachah, then it is preferable to view the verse as part of a series of a Limud (such as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy").

In his first approach, it appears that Tosfos learns that it is always preferable to use the verse to teach a specific Halachah than to view it as part of a series of a Limud (Klalim u'Pratim, or Ribuyim u'Mi'utim). It is possible that these two approaches in Tosfos are arguing about the issue that Rashi and Tosfos argue in Sukah (31a; Tosfos DH v'Rebbi Yehudah). Rashi writes that we cannot apply any of the Thirteen Midos to learn a Halachah on our own (except for Kal v'Chomer); there must be a Kabalah to apply those principles. Tosfos argues and says that we may apply all of the Midos on our own, except for Gezeirah Shavah. The argument seems to revolve around how to define a "Klal u'Prat." Tosfos learns like the Ri, who says that it is always preferable to view a verse as part of a series of Klalim and Pratim rather to use it for a specific Halachah. Rashi, though, learns that a verse is only considered a Klal or Prat if we cannot learn from it a specific Halachah. Since we can never know if there is some specific Limud to learn from a verse instead of using it as a "Klal u'Prat" (or similar Limud), we must have a Kabalah in order to apply the rule of "Klal u'Prat" (or similar Limud), just like we may use a verse to teach a Gezeirah Shavah only when the verse is not being used to teach any specific Limud instead (a Kal v'Chomer, though, may be made by oneself, since this limitation does not apply to the Midah of a Kal v'Chomer).

(b) The reason the Gemara does not suggest that Rebbi Elazar includes Alin v'Lulavin through a "Prat u'Klal" is because a "Prat u'Klal" includes every object in the Klal with no exception, and thus a Nazir would be prohibited from eating even branches. It is clear from Rebbi Elazar's words that he holds that a Nazir is Chayav only for eating something edible, like Alin v'Lulavin. Therefore, the only way to include everything in the Klal except for one object is by learning the verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy."