ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nazir 31
NAZIR 31 - Dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Chaim Mordechai ben Harav Yisrael Azriel
(Feldman) of Milwaukee (Yahrzeit: 19 Cheshvan) by the members of his family.
(a) Beis Shamai derive that 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh' 'Techilas Hekdesh from
Sof Hekdesh. Sof Hekdesh - is Temurah (swapping another animal for a
(b) They learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Vehayah Hu u'Semuraso *Yih'yeh*
Kodesh" - 'Lerabos Shogeg ke'Meizid' (that if someone meant to say that the
black animal standing in front of him should be a Temurah for his Olah, and
by mistake, he said it about the white one that was standing next to it, the
black one becomes a Temurah).
(c) Beis Hillel disagree with this - on the grounds that one cannot learn
Techilas Hekdesh (the taking inception of Hekdesh) from Sof Hekdesh (from
(d) The problem that we have with this is a case of someone who declares an
animal a Temurah from midday on - where it is obvious, even according to
Beis Shamai, that the Temurah will take effect as from midday (because that
is what he said, and we have a principle which requires 'Piv ve'Libo
Shavin'). In that case, in our Mishnah how can Beis Shamai maintain that
even if someone declares a black animal Hekdesh, it is a white one that will
(a) On the basis of the previous Kashya, Rav Papa changes our understanding
of Beis Shamai. He now explains the case in our Mishnah 'Amar Shor Shachor
she'Yeitzei mi'Beisi Rishon, Harei Hu Hekdesh, ve'Yatza Lavan' to mean -
that if the owner of a number of black animals declared the first black
animal to come out of the gate Hekdesh, then his words will take effect,
even if a white one preceded it.
(b) This explanation also extends to the other two cases in our Mishnah.
In the case of Dinar Zahav she'Ya'aleh be'Yadi Rishon, Harei Hu Hekdesh,
ve'Alah shel Kesef' - he declared the first of his gold coins that he picked
up, Hekdesh, but the first coin that he actually held in his hand was a
(c) Beis Hillel disagree on the basis of the Lashon used by the Noder.
According to Beis Shamai, they maintain - he should have said 'Shor Shachor
she'Yeitzei mi'Beisi ba'Rishon' (rather than 'Rishon').
(d) The Tana nevertheless refers to this as Hekdesh Ta'us, despite the fact
that the Hekdesh takes effect exactly as he intended it to - because the
Lashon is misleading (as Beis Hillel point out).
(a) Beis Shamai in the following Mishnah say that the designated Korban of a
Nazir who then has his Nezirus annulled - must graze in the field until it
obtains a blemish, when it goes out to Chulin.
(b) Beis Hillel attempt to prove from Beis Shamai's very own words - that
'Hekdesh Ta'us, Lo Havi Hekdesh' (otherwise, why should the animal not
(c) This Mishnah presents Rav Papa with a Kashya - from Beis Hillel's words
it is clear that Beis Shamai holds 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh' (so how can Rav
Papa say that he doesn't)?
(d) Rav Papa resolves this problem. According to him - it is Beis Hillel who
misunderstood Beis Shamai, thinking that his opinion was based on 'Hekdesh
Ta'us Hekdesh' when really it wasn't.
(a) The following Mishnah speaks about six people traveling together when
they see a man coming towards them. The first traveler declares that he is a
Nazir if that person is Reuven - the second one, if he is not.
(b) The third traveler declares that he is a Nazir if one of the first two
is a Nazir - the fourth one, if one of them is not. In fact, both mean the
same thing, since the one is referring to the one who is right, the other,
to the one who is wrong.
(c) The fifth traveler declares himself a Nazir if both of the first two are
Nezirim - seeing as each one accepted Nezirus on the understanding that he
(d) The sixth traveler declares that he is a Nazir if all the others are
(a) Beis Shamai hold that they are all Nezirim - because 'Nezirus be'Ta'us
(b) In that case, they will also hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh'. This case
differ from that of someone who declares a Temurah to take effect from
midday - inasmuch as there, the Noder certainly did not have in mind for the
Hekdesh to take effect immediately, whereas here, each of the travelers
intended to accept Nezirus, according to their mistake.
(c) Rav Papa reconciles his opinion (that Beis Shamai do not hold 'Hekdesh
Ta'us Hekdesh') with that Mishnah - by conceding that from there it is
indeed clear that Beis Shamai hold Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh, but not from our
Mishnah (seeing as it is open to an alternative interpretation).
(a) Abaye establishes our Mishnah as we thought at first (that it is the
white animal which is Hekdesh, even though the Noder specifically said 'the
first black one'. He reconciles that with the case of someone who declares a
Temurah to take effect from midday (where Beis Shamai agrees that we do not
deviate from his words) - by changing the case in our Mishnah from the
future to the past. What the Noder said was Shor Shachor she'Yatza mi'Beisi
... '. And when they tell him that it was not a black one but a white one,
he retorts that, had he known that, he would have said so.
Abaye explains the Mishnah, which says 'Dinar Zahav she'Ya'aleh Rishon ...
', and 'Chavis shel Yayin she'Ta'aleh Risho nah ... ' (in the future) - by
amending it to 'Dinar Zahav she'Alah Rishon ... ', and 'Chavis shel Yayin
she'Alsah Rishonah ... '.
(b) In the equivalent case if the Noder made his declaration with reference
to the future, and then, when they told him that it was a white animal that
emerged first, he said that, had he known that, he would have specifically
said 'a white one' - Abaye would say that his Neder is not effective. The
reason for this is because then (bearing in mind that he is not a prophet)
there is no justification for saying 'a black one'; whereas in the past, he
said 'a black one', because he genuinely thought (mistakenly) that it was a
black one that emerged first.
(c) This latter case differs from the case of Temurah, and from the Mishnah
of the six travelers (where Beis Shamai hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh') -
inasmuch as there, his mistake is based on a justifiable mistake, whereas
here, there is no basis to think that it will a black animal that will
emerge first (in which case he must have had some reason to mention the
black one specifically).
(d) Beis Hillel say 'Eino Nazir'.
(a) When Rav Chisda says ...
1. ... 'Uchma be'Chivra Lakya' - he means that a black ox in a herd of white
ones devalues the herd.
(b) The problem with that from our Mishnah, where Beis Shamai declare the
white ox Hekdesh is - that on the assumption that a person tends to be
Makdish begrudgingly, we take for granted that the Noder had in mind a black
one. In that case, why is the white one Hekdesh (bearing in mind that we are
explaining our Mishnah like Abaye).
2. ... 'Chivra be'Uchma Lakya' - he means that white spots on a black ox
devalues the ox.
(c) To conform with his opinion - Rav Chisda explains that a person is
(d) we reject his answer however, from the middle case of 'Dinar shel Zahav'
from which it is clear (from the fact that the silver coin is Hekdesh) that
a person tends to be Makdish begrudgingly.
(a) Having concluded that a person tends to be Makdish begrudgingly way ...
1. ... we establish the Seifa of 'Chavis' (seeing as oil is generally more
expensive than wine) - in the Galil, where wine is more expensive than oil.
(b) Based on these facts, the Tana of our Mishnah needs to state all three
cases (Tosfos). He mentions the case of ...
2. ... Rav Chisda establishes the Reisha, where Beis Shamai considers the
white ox Hekdesh even though in his opinion, it is more valuable - by the
majority of oxen (where black oxen are more valuable than white ones),
whereas his statement is confined specifically to oxen from Karmuna.
1. ... the coins (the middle case) - to establish that a person is Makdish
2. ... the oxen (the Reisha) - to teach us the Din by all oxen other than
those of Karmuna (according to Rav Chisda).
3. ... the barrels (the Seifa) - to teach us that although the Din is
confined to the Galil, we do not go after the majority of the world. Note:
see also the commentaries on the Mishnah.
(a) Rav Chisda also said that a black ox is good for its skin, and a red one
for its meat - A white one is good for plowing.
(b) This appears to clash with his previous statement (that a black ox among
white ones lessens their value) - because if it more valuable as far as its
skin is concerned, it does not seem logical that the white ones are so
superior as regards plowing that it completely negates the black ones
(c) We resolve these two statements by qualifying the first one, like we did
earlier - by confining Rav Chisda's earlier statement to oxen from Karmuna,
where the white ones are better than the black ones in all regards; whereas
his second statement pertains to all other oxen.
(d) Rav Chisda will expalin our Mishnah, which considers black oxen
superior - by ordinary oxen, as we explained earlier, because the advantage
of better skin outweighs that of better plowing.
(a) If the Chacham declined to annul the Nezirus, the Noder continues to
count his Nezirus from the time of the declaration. As we learned earlier,
Beis Shamai holds that the designated Korban of a Nazir who then has his
Nezirus annulled - must graze in the field until it obtains a blemish, when
it goes out to Chulin. When Beis Hillel attempted to prove from Beis
Shamai's own words that he holds 'Hekdesh Ta'us Eino Hekdesh' - Beis Shamai
retorted whether Beis Hillel did not agree that if someone mistakenly
declared the ninth animal that entered the pen, the tenth, the tenth, the
ninth and the eleventh, the tenth, that all of them are Ma'aser Beheimah
(proving that 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh').
(b) Beis Shamai agree with Beis Hillel in the earlier case that 'Hekdesh
Ta'us Eino Hekdesh' - because seeing as the Neder has been annulled, it
turns out that the ox was not Hekdesh at all, in which case, this cannot
even be called 'Hekdesh Ta'us'.
(c) We learned in Perek 'Mi she'Amar' that, assuming that the Chatas of a
Nezirah was hers, it must die (whereas here we say that it grazes). This may
be because a husband only negates his wife's Nedarim from now on (but not
from their inception, or it may be because the Tana there is Rebbi Elazar
ha'Kapar, who requires that she brings a Chatas anyway (as we discussed
there). In fact, even Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar might agree that even the Chatas
grazes - because, even if we say that a husband annuls his wife's Nedarim
retroactively, they are nevertheless effective for one moment (since he
annuls them even without Charatah), whereas in our case, where it was a
Chacham who annulled the Nezirus, it is uprooted from its inception.
(a) Beis Shamai attempt to prove from Ma'aser Beheimah that Hekdesh Ta'us,
Hekdesh, as we just explained. Even if the reason by Ma'aser Beheimah is
because of Hekdesh Ta'us, only the three animals in question are Ma'aser,
and not the eighth or the twelfth - because it is either the tenth animal
that can be Hekdesh or one that one called the tenth (Tosfos).
(b) Rav Papa, who learns that, at this stage, Beis Shamai hold 'Ta'us
Hekdesh Eino Ta'us', explain Beis Shamai's answer (where he clearly holds
'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh') - as nothing more than a response to Beis Hillel,
who think that they hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh'.
(c) Beis Hillel counter Beis Shamai's proof from Ma'aser Beheimah - by
pointing out that, based on the fact that the eighth or the twelfth animals
are not Ma'aser, it is evident that the reason there is not because of
'Hekdesh Ta'us', but is a 'Gezeiras ha'Kasuv' (from which we cannot learn
any other cases).