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Nedarim, 76

1) REFUTING THE VIEW OF REBBI ELIEZER

QUESTION: Rebbi Eliezer states that a husband may annul the Nedarim of his wife even before she makes them. The Gemara questions how such a Hafarah works: does it prevent the Neder from taking effect in the first place, or does it immediately annul the Neder after the Neder takes effect for one moment?

The Gemara cites a Beraisa that seems to provide conflicting evidence. In the Reisha of the Beraisa, the Chachamim attempt to disprove Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Mikvah": even though a Mikvah can be Metaher something that is Tamei, it cannot prevent something from becoming Tamei in the future. So, too, assert the Chachamim, even though a husband can annul his wife's Nedarim when they exist, he cannot annul them before they are made to prevent them from taking effect. We can infer from the Chachamim's argument against Rebbi Eliezer that Rebbi Eliezer himself holds that when the husband annuls his wife's Nedarim before they are made, his Hafarah prevents the Nedarim from taking effect at all.

In the Seifa of the Beraisa, however, the Chachamim present a different argument against Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Kli": even though one can be Tovel a Kli that is Tamei in order to make it Tahor, one cannot be Tovel a Kli while it is Tahor so that when it becomes Tamei it will immediately become Tahor. So, too, assert the Chachamim, even though a husband can annul his wife's Nedarim with Hafarah once they exist, he cannot do Hafarah before they exist in order to annul them immediately once they take effect. This implies that according to Rebbi Eliezer, when they husband annuls his wife's Nedarim before they are made, the Nedarim do take effect for one moment, but the Hafarah revokes them immediately.

The Gemara resolves the contradiction by saying that the Chachamim themselves are not sure what Rebbi Eliezer holds, and that is why they brought two different arguments against his logic. If he holds that the Neder does not take effect in the first place, then they refute his view from the case of "Mikvah." If he means that the Neder takes effect but is immediately revoked, then they refute his view from the case of "Kli."

Why, though, do the Chachamim phrase each argument differently? They should prove both of their points from the case of "Mikvah" no matter what Rebbi Eliezer holds! They should ask that even though a Mikvah is Metaher something that is Tamei, nevertheless it cannot prevent something from becoming Tamei (refuting Rebbi Eliezer's opinion regarding preemptive Hafarah if he holds that the Hafarah prevents the wife's Neder from taking effect at all), nor can a Mikvah make something that is presently Tahor become Tahor as soon as it becomes Tamei (refuting Rebbi Eliezer's opinion if he holds that the Hafarah annuls the wife's Neder only the moment after it takes effect)! Alternatively, they should prove both points from the case of "Kli": one cannot be Tovel a Kli that is Tahor so that it never becomes Tamei, nor can one be Tovel a Kli that is Tahor so that when it becomes Tamei, it will become Tahor right away! The Chachamim do not have to present two different cases in order to prove their points against Rebbi Eliezer, even though they are in doubt about his opinion; they could just present a single case that would suffice to reject Rebbi Eliezer's opinion no matter what he holds!

ANSWERS:

(a) The ROSH and TOSFOS ask this question, why do the Chachamim bring two different cases for proofs against Rebbi Eliezer. They answer that according to the Girsa of the Gemara (see RAN) that says that the Chachamim support their first proof (from "Mikvah") by mentioning a Kal v'Chomer from the Halachah that something that a person swallows does not become Tamei (the case of "Belu'ah"), their argument can only refute Rebbi Eliezer if he holds that the wife's Neder does not take effect at all. It is clear that the Chachamim could not bring that same proof if Rebbi Eliezer holds that the wife's Neder takes effect and becomes annulled immediately thereafter. According to this Girsa, the Chachamim say that we find that if a person swallows an object, the object cannot become Tamei, but if he swallows an object that is Tamei, it does *not* become Tahor, and yet a Mikvah -- which *does* make an object that is Tamei become Tahor -- does *not* prevent objects from becoming Tamei. (The Chachamim present their argument from the perspective of the Mikvah, rather than from the perspective of the Kli, in order to have a case that parallels the way that a person's body prevents an object from becoming Tamei when it is inside of him. There is no particular act that puts it inside of him which keeps it from becoming Tamei. Rather, it is just the person's body that surrounds it that keeps the item from becoming Tamei. This is similar to the way that a Mikvah works by surrounding the item with water, but which does not prevent a Kli from becoming Tamei if the Kli touches a Neveilah while it is in the Mikvah.) If Rebbi Eliezer holds that the Neder takes effect and then becomes annulled, then this argument does *not* refute Rebbi Eliezer. That is why the Chachamim must bring another proof from the case of being Tovel a Kli in a Mikvah (without the Kal v'Chomer from swallowed food).

According to this answer, why does the Beraisa not bring the proof from "Kli" to disprove Rebbi Eliezer's logic even if he holds that the Neder does *not* take effect? The answer is that it seems that the Chachamim want to strengthen their proof by bringing the added Kal v'Chomer from "Belu'ah" (the case of swallowing food) to refute Rebbi Eliezer if he holds that the Neder does not take effect. If he holds that the Neder does take effect, this added proof is meaningless, and therefore they instead bring their proof just from "Kli."

However, the ROSH and TOSFOS do not explain why the proof against Rebbi Eliezer, if he holds that the Neder takes effect, must be from "Kli" -- the Chachamim still could have disproved Rebbi Eliezer by mentioned that a Mikvah which is Metaher what is now Tamei cannot be Metaher what will become Tamei, making *Mikvah* the focus Mikvah and not *Kli*. The advantage of bringing this proof from a case of "Mikvah" and not from "Kli" is that it would then not be limited to the Tevilah of a Kli, but it would apply to a person as well.

It seems that according to these Rishonim, its more appropriate to focus on an *action* being done to cause Taharah (the act of being Tovel the Kli) than to focus on the *object* that is bringing about the Taharah (the Mikvah), because, in the Mishnah, there is no *object* that is annulling the Neder, but it is merely the husband's *act* of Hafarah. Another reason why it is preferable to ask from the act of Tevilah, as TOSFOS (DH Shema Minah Lo Chayali) and the SHITAH MEKUBETZES point out, is that there is a Pircha, a weakness, from the proof of Mikvah: a Mikvah has the weakness in that if it does not have enough water it cannot be Metaher, and there is no parallel weakness with Hafarah. That might be why the proof from the act of Tevilah is stronger, since, when bringing the proof from the act of being Tovel a Kli, we do not have to address the element of the Mikvah (and its weakness) as part of the proof.

(Nevertheless, the Beraisa still could have left out the word "Kli" so that the proof would have been from the act of Tevilah of either a Kli or a person. This question is left unanswered. The Rishonim also leave unanswered the first Girsa of the Ran that does not mention the Kal v'Chomer from "Belu'ah," and thus the question remains, why do the Chachamim need to bring two different cases to refute Rebbi Eliezer?)

(b) The PARASHAS NEDARIM suggests that the proof from "Mikvah" is from the fact that a Kli or a person inside the Mikvah becomes Tamei if the Kli or person touches a Neveilah. The Mikvah cannot prevent the Kli or person from becoming Tamei. This cannot be used to disprove Rebbi Eliezer if he holds that the Neder *does* take effect and then becomes annulled, becomes if a person touches a Neveilah while he is inside the Mikvah, the Mikvah is indeed Metaher him immediately after he becomes Tamei. That is why the Chachamim need to bring another proof from the case of "Kli" -- if a person is Tovel the Kli, it will not become Tahor immediately after touching Tum'ah once it is removed from the Mikvah. This approach is similar to the answer of the Rosh and Tosfos. This approach, too, does not answer why the Seifa (the refutation of Rebbi Eliezer if he holds that the Neder takes effect) needs to mention "Kli."

(c) The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Mikva'os 1:8) says that the proof from the Seifa that the Neder should not become annulled as soon as it takes effect is a weak proof. Perhaps the Hafarah works for a Neder after the Neder takes effect because the husband has intention for the Hafarah to take effect on the Neder that his wife makes only after she makes it. In contrast, when someone is Tovel a Kli in a Mikvah, there is no reason to connect that Tevilah to a Tum'ah that affects the Kli at a later time. That is why the Chachamim were careful to bring their proof in the Seifa from the case of a person who is Tovel a Kli with intention to make it Tahor when it later becomes Tamei. The Kli that they are discussing is one that is a Sheni l'Tum'ah (i.e. it became Tamei through Mashkin), which is only Tamei with regard to Terumah, and the Mishnah in Chagigah (18b) says that when being Tovel something that is Tamei for Terumah, one must have intention, Kavanah, for the Tevilah to make it Tahor for Terumah. In the Reisha, though, they are discussing Tevilah for the sake of using the Kli for Chulin, which works even without Kavanah. (Even though it is possible for a person to be a Sheni l'Tum'ah, such as by having Mayim She'uvim poured over him or be eating something that is a Sheni l'Tum'ah (Shabbos 15a), nevertheless it is more common for a Kli to be a Sheni l'Tum'ah. It is not clear, though, why the Beraisa would have to mention a case of a Kli that is a Sheni l'Tum'ah. It could mention a case of a Kli that is a *Rishon* l'Tum'ah which a person simply wants to use for Terumah, in which case he also needs to have Kavanah when is Tovel it. The Beraisa could have disproved Rebbi Eliezer from the case of any Kli that one is being Tovel for Terumah, since it still needs Kavanah.)

QUESTION: Rebbi Eliezer states that a husband may annul the Nedarim of his wife even before she makes them. The Gemara questions how such a Hafarah works: does it prevent the Neder from taking effect in the first place, or does it immediately annul the Neder after the Neder takes effect for one moment? The Gemara here attempts to prove that he holds that Hafarah prevents the Neder from taking effect in the first place, from the way that Rebbi Eliezer supports his logic from the case of seeds ("Zera'im") that are sown in the ground. Rebbi Eliezer says that we know that the Torah says that seeds become Tahor from Tum'ah only when they are planted, and yet everyone agrees that once they have been planted, if Tum'ah then touches them they certainly are Tahor. It must be, says that the Gemara, that just like the planting prevents the seeds from becoming Tamei, the Hafarah prevents the Neder from taking effect.

How does this show that Rebbi Eliezer holds that the Neder does not take effect? Perhaps the Neder *does* take effect, and Hafarah removes it only after it takes effect. In the case of planting seeds, when the seeds are planted in the ground, perhaps they *can* become Tamei when a source of Tum'ah touches them, but they become Tahor immediately afterwards! How do we know that what is planted in the ground does not become Tamei in the first place?

ANSWERS:

(a) The ROSH seems to learn that the proof is from the well-known Halachah that a plant that is attached to the ground cannot become Tamei at all even while a source of Tum'ah is touching it.

(b) The RAN, though, says that seeds in the ground certainly do not become Tamei, because if they do become Tamei, there is nothing happening to them to remove their Tum'ah.

What does the Ran mean? The Gemara is assuming that according to Rebbi Eliezer, the husband's Hafarah that precedes the wife's Neder will cause the Neder to be removed after it takes effect (because of the Kal v'Chomer). So, too, when seeds are planted in the ground, they can become Tamei, but the planting that was done earlier will make them become Tahor as soon as they become Tamei!

1. The OR SAME'ACH (see previous Insight) explains that Hafarah can remove a Neder that is made later because the husband *intends* for his Hafarah to take effect on that Neder. The act of Hafarah is done with Kavanah. It is the Kavanah which effects the annulment, and his intention can be applied to any future Nedarim. In contrast, when a person plants seeds, the Taharah does not come about through any Kavanah that the person has, but merely through the fact that the seeds became attached to the ground. It is the act itself which is Metaher, and not the Kavanah. Therefore, that act of attaching it to the ground has no bearing on a Tum'ah that affects the seeds at a later time and cannot remove it. (We could argue with this logic, saying that since the planting accomplishes the attachment of the plant to the ground, anything that happens while the plant is attached to the ground should still be affected by that act of planting.)

2. The Ran might be proving his point from the *second time* that the plant becomes Tamei, or from the case of a plant that was Tamei *at the time* it was planted. If the act of planting makes a plant Tahor only *after* it becomes Tamei, it should only be able to work *once* to be Metaher the plant (either when it was planted while it was Tamei, or to be Metaher it the first time that Tum'ah touches it). The Taharah effect of the act of planting should be used up on the first Taharah, and yet we see that the plant becomes Tahor no matter how many times Tum'ah touches it. It must be that the planting prevents it from becoming Tamei in the first place. If so, it is not acting against any particular Tum'ah, but rather it is changing the nature of the plant and making it the type of object that cannot become Tamei (and that is why it does not make a difference how many times it is touched by a source of Tum'ah). (M. Kornfeld)

3. Perhaps the Ran means what the Rosh says. When the Ran says that there is nothing to remove the Tum'ah, he means that there is nothing to remove the Tum'ah from *another object* that is touching the plant while a Neveilah touches the plant. (This explanation, though, requires emendation in the text of the Ran.)

76b

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that the Chachamim agree, in principle, with Rebbi Eliezer's Kal v'Chomer. The reason why they argue with his ruling and say that the husband cannot annul his wife's Nedarim before she makes them is because of the Derashah from the verse, "Ishah Yekimenu v'Ishah Yefeirenu" (Bamidbar 30:14).

If the Chachamim agree with the Kal v'Chomer (wherever there is no conflicting Derashah), then why do they not apply the Kal v'Chomer in the case of a Mikvah and say that if a Mikvah can be Metaher something that is Tamei, then certainly it can make something that is already Tahor become Tahor when Tum'ah touches it?

The RAN answers that in that case, too, the Chachamim learn from a verse not to make the Kal v'Chomer. The verse teaches that even a person who is inside of a Mikvah can become Tamei if he touches a source of Tum'ah.

How can the Chachamim agree to the Kal v'Chomer of Rebbi Eliezer wherever there is no conflicting verse? Moreover, how can Rebbi Eliezer himself defend the Kal v'Chomer? In all cases where the Kal v'Chomer might apply, we should simply learn from the verse regarding Mikvah not to apply the Kal v'Chomer! The verse regarding Mikvah should be used as a Pircha for all cases where we might want to apply the Kal v'Chomer! Since the verse teaches not to make such a Kal v'Chomer in the case of Mikvah, when Rebbi Eliezer asserts that we do make such a Kal v'Chomer in the case of Hafaras Nedarim, we should refute his assertion by pointing out that the Torah teaches *not* to make such a Kal v'Chomer in a similar case regarding Mikvah, where the Torah teaches that it can make something Tahor but it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei. (See MITZPEH EISAN and PORAS YOSEF who ask a similar question, but their answers do not answer our question.)

ANSWERS:

(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the case of Mikvah is not a Pircha, because in the case of Mikvah, the verse teaching not to apply the Kal v'Chomer is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv.

What does this mean? Why should the verse regarding Mikvah not be a Pircha simply because it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv? On the contrary, it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv telling us not to apply the Kal v'Chomer! Every Pircha on a Kal v'Chomer is from a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv!

The Shitah Mekubetzes might mean that there are two types of Kal v'Chomer. The first type is a Kal v'Chomer that is based purely on logic. The second type is a Kal v'Chomer that is based on certain Kulos and Chumros (leniencies and stringencies) that the Torah gives to a certain matter. This second type of Kal v'Chomer is immediately rejected if we find another case where the Torah applies the Kulos and Chumros differently without applying the Kal v'Chomer. In contrast, a Kal v'Chomer based purely on logic (and especially one based on logic as sound as that in our Gemara), cannot be rejected simply because of a single exception that the Torah makes. Rather, we will say that the Kal v'Chomer is the rule while the single, unique case in the Torah is the exception.

(b) TOSFOS (76a, DH Shema Mina Lo Chayali) and the RITVA (cited by the SHITAH MEKUBETZES) explain that the Kal v'Chomer of Rebbi Eliezer cannot be disproved from the case of the Mikvah. The Mikvah has a weakness that does not exist in the case of Hafaras Nedarim (or in the case of seeds that were planted): the Mikvah is Metaher only when it contains the required minimum amount of water. If it contains even one drop less than forty Se'ah, it cannot be Metaher. This weakness of a Mikvah might be the reason why it cannot prevent an object from becoming Tamei. In contrast, Hafaras Nedarim (or planting seeds in the ground) does not have this weakness and therefore it *can* prevent a Neder from ever taking effect (or planting the seeds can prevent them from ever becoming Tamei while they are planted).

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avos ha'Tum'ah 6:16) writes that if a person touches an Av ha'Tumah while in the Mikvah, he becomes Tamei, "and when he leaves the Mikvah he becomes Tahor." The KESEF MISHNAH infers from the Rambam's words that a Mikvah is Metaher a person who is Tamei at the moment that the person *leaves* the Mikvah (and *being in* the Mikvah is not what is Metaher the person). He explains that the Rambam seems to have understood this from the Sifri that says a person can become Tamei while in a Mikvah by touching a Neveilah.

This ruling of the Rambam answers our question on the Chachamim and on Rebbi Eliezer. The Halachah that a person can become Tamei in a Mikvah does *not* contradict the Kal v'Chomer (that if something is Metaher an item which is Tamei, then certainly it should be Metaher an item which is presently Tahor for when it later becomes Tamei), because going into (or being in) a Mikvah does *not* make a person Tahor (only going out of it does), and thus there is no Kal v'Chomer to say that going into a Mikvah should prevent him from becoming Tamei.

However, why do we not apply the Kal v'Chomer with regard to *going out* of the Mikvah? Since, according to the Rambam, going out of the Mikvah is Metaher a person who is Tamei, then certainly it should prevent him from becoming Tamei later!

The PARASHAS NEDARIM makes an important point about our Sugya that answers this question. He explains that the Kal v'Chomer from the case of "Kli" (i.e. if being Tovel a Kli that is Tamei makes it Tahor, then certainly one should be able to be Tovel a Kli that is Tahor so that when it touches Tum'ah, it will be Tahor) is *not* a valid Kal v'Chomer, because in the case of "Kli" the act of Tevilah is already finished and nothing is left of the Tevilah after the object is removed from the Mikvah. Hence, at that point, it can become Tamei again.

In contrast, when Rebbi Eliezer makes his Kal v'Chomer from the case of seeds, he does not say that even after the seeds are removed from the ground they cannot become Tamei; they certainly can become Tamei at that point. It is only while the act of planting still affects the seeds -- in that they are still attached to the ground -- that the planting can prevent them from becoming Tamei. The same is true for Nedarim. When the husband does Hafarah, his Hafarah remains present throughout the rest of the day, like we learned earlier (73a and Ran there) regarding a person who says, "I want this Hafarah to take effect only after a certain amount of time," in which case the Hafarah is able to take effect (see Insights there). The same applies to the case of "Amah Ivriyah."

Hence, when the Kli is removed from the Mikvah, there is no reason why Tevilah should prevent it from becoming Tamei in the future.

However, according to the Kesef Mishnah's interpretation of the Rambam, it now becomes difficult to understand why the Chachamim ask a question on Rebbi Eliezer from the case of "Mikvah" in the first place! The Kal v'Chomer should not apply in the case of "Mikvah" at all, since it is not the immersing in the Mikvah that is Metaher, but the exiting from the Mikvah that is Metaher!

It would seem, therefore, more probable that the Rambam does not mean, like the Kesef Mishnah says, that only coming out of the Mikvah is Metaher. Rather, the Rambam means that either going in *or* coming out can be Metaher, excluding simply being in the Mikvah, which is not Metaher. This is because one needs to perform an *act* to be Metaher (such as going in or coming out of the Mikvah), and merely being in the Mikvah is not an act. Consequently, if this is what the Rambam means, then the Chachamim *should* apply the Kal v'Chomer to say that if the Tevilah is Metaher a person who is Tamei, then the Mikvah should certainly prevent one from becoming Tamei while in the Mikvah, and our question remains!

Therefore, we must rely on one of the previous approaches to answer our question.

What, though, is the Rambam's source for his ruling (according to our alternative explanation of the Rambam)? The source might be from our Sugya.

The PARASHAS NEDARIM's point leaves an important question unanswered. In the Seifa of the Beraisa, the Chachamim ask that if Rebbi Eliezer holds that the Neder takes effect first and then the Hafarah annuls it, then we can disprove him from the case of "Kli," because when a Kli that is Tahor is immersed in a Mikvah, the Mikvah, according to Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning, should be able to be Metaher the Kli for when it becomes Tamei at a later time. The Chachamim's question cannot be that the Kli should be Tahor if it becomes Tamei while *in* the Mikvah and then it stops touching the source of the Tum'ah, because certainly the Halachah is that it *does* become Tahor. The Chachamim must be asking that if it becomes Tamei *after* leaving the Mikvah then it should become Tahor again, but the Parashas Nedarim points out that this is not a valid Kal v'Chomer because the Tevilah is no longer present after the Kli leaves the Mikvah!

This question might have been the source for the Rambam's ruling. The Rambam is answering this question by saying that when a Kli touches a Neveilah in the Mikvah, it does *not* becomes Tahor as soon as it is no longer touching the Neveilah, but rather when it rises out from the Mikvah! With that, the Chachamim have an excellent question on Rebbi Eliezer -- if Tevilah is Metaher the Kli when it comes in or goes out of the Mikvah, then while it is in the Mikvah certainly it should become Tahor if it becomes Tamei and then stops touching the Tum'ah! This, then, is the source for the Rambam that a Kli, while it is in a Mikvah, will become Tamei and remain so until it leaves.

However, none of the other Rishonim seem to accept this ruling of the Rambam. They all assume that *being in* a Mikvah can make an object Tahor the moment it stops touching the Neveilah. How, then, do they answer our question on the Chachamim's argument against Rebbi Eliezer? Why, according to Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning (the Kal v'Chomer), should a Kli become Tahor *after* leaving the Mikvah because of the Tevilah, if the act of Tevilah is no longer present?

The answer might be that there is a difference between how the Kal v'Chomer operates if Rebbi Eliezer holds that the Neder never takes effect, and how it operates if Rebbi Eliezer holds that it does take effect but becomes annulled immediately thereafter. If the Neder does not take effect at all, then the Kal v'Chomer teaches that the same state that can remove Tum'ah or a Neder can also *prevent* Tum'ah or a Neder from taking effect. The Kal v'Chomer teaches us something about the *state* of the item. Hence, it is only applicable when the item is still in that state (such as a Kli in the Mikvah, or seeds planted in the ground).

However, if Rebbi Eliezer holds that the Neder does take effect and then becomes annulled, then the Kal v'Chomer teaches us that an *act*, not a *state*, which can cause a Taharah or Hafarah for something that is presently Tamei can certainly cause Taharah or Hafarah for Tum'ah or a Neder that has not yet come into existence! If it is the *act* which causes Taharah, then it should be a one-time act, teaching that the Tevilah can cause Taharah once, either for the object at present if it is Tamei now, or for the first time in the future that it becomes Tamei. It should not make a difference whether the Tevilah is still present and apparent on the object or not, since it is the *act* of Tevilah serving as the Metaher, rather than the change in the state of the object, and the act of Tevilah will be able to effect a Taharah at any time, present or future.

QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that Hafaras Nedarim may be performed during the entire day on which the husband hears the Neder, "both to be lenient and to be stringent." The Mishnah explains that the Kula is that if the wife makes a Neder (and her husband hears it) on Friday night, then the husband may be Mefer it during that night and during the day of Shabbos. The Chumra is that if she makes the Neder at the end of the day on Shabbos, he is only able to be Mefer it until nightfall.

The Mishnah means to say that this is a Kula relative to the other opinion of when a husband may be Mefer the Neder of his wife. That other opinion holds that the husband has twenty-four hours from the time that he hears of the Neder to be Mefer it, regardless of what time of day he heard it.

Why, though, is this considered a Kula compared to the other possibility, that the husband has twenty-four hours to be Mefer? The Halachah that limits Hafaras Nedarim to the end of the day will *always* be a *Chumra* when compared to the opinion that says he has a full twenty-four hours!

Second, why does the Mishnah specifically mention a woman who makes a Neder on *Friday night*? How is making the Neder on Shabbos relevant to the Halachah that the Mishnah is teaching (the duration of time that the husband has to be Mefer the Neder)?

ANSWERS:

(a) The RAN says that the word "l'Hakel" ("to be lenient") in the Mishnah is Lav Davka, and it merely means that sometimes the husband has more time than others to be Mefer the Neder. Similarly, the mention of Shabbos in the Mishnah is not related to the Halachah of being Mefer until the end of the day. It is mentioned only parenthetically to teach an unrelated Chidush, that it is permitted to be Mefer a Neder on Shabbos even when it is not necessary for the sake of Shabbos, as the Gemara concludes.

(b) The ROSH says that "l'Hakel" is Lav Davka, but the mention of Shabbos in the Mishnah is intended to teach us that Hafaras Nedarim is practiced "like the night of Shabbos precedes the day" (an expression found in Nidah 36b) -- it teaches that the day is considered to begin with the onset of night with regard to Hafarah.

(c) The ROGATCHAVER GA'ON (Mahadura Tinyana p. 45a, see Ishim v'Shitos on the Rogatchover, ch. 2:9) suggests that "l'Hakel" is written with specific intent, but it does not refer to the case listed in the Mishnah. Rather, the Yerushalmi (cited by the ROSH on 72a, DH v'Shama Ba'al) explains that time during which the husband or father is not *able* to be Mefer is not counted towards "Yom Sham'o" (see Insights to Nedarim 69:1:b). The Yerushalmi adds that this Halachah is dependent on the argument between the Tana'im whether a husband must be Mefer before sunset, i.e. "Yom Sham'o" or whether he has 24 hours to be Mefer, "me'Yom El Yom." If he must be Mefer on "Yom Sham'o" -- "his" day of hearing -- we only count time during which he actually was *able* to be Mefer, i.e. he was not mute. If he is given 24 hours, he always loses the ability to be Mefer after that amount of time passes, regardless of whether he was able to use the time for Hafarah or not. This, then is the "l'Hakel" of the opinion that limits the ability to be Mefer to "Yom Sham'o," as opposed to giving 24 hours to be Mefer.

(d) According to the conclusion of the Gemara (77a), It might be suggested and the mention of "l'Hakel" and of Shabbos in the Mishnah are written specifically, to teach a very important points. The Gemara says that it is permitted to do Hafaras Nedarim on Shabbos for any Neder that the wife makes (even a Neder that is not preventing enjoyment of Shabbos). The Ran explains that the reason for this is because if one is not Mefer before the end of the day, one will lose the chance to be Mefer. The Gemara adds that according to the opinion that says that the husband has twenty-four hours to be Mefer the Neder, he cannot be Mefer on Shabbos, but he must wait until after Shabbos to be Mefer, since time is not pressing.

Hence, it is proper to call the Halachah that limits Hafarah to the day of the Neder a "Kula," if he heard about the wife's Neder at the beginning of Shabbos, since it permits the husband to be Mefer on Shabbos. He does not need to wait until after Shabbos and be Mefer during the few remaining minutes until the end of the 24 hour period. The "Chumra of the end of the Mishnah is that when the wife is Noder towards the end of Shabbos, he must be Mefer in the few remaining minutes until the end of the day. According to the opinion that gives 24 hours, although he may not be Mefer during those few minutes, he has plenty of time after Shabbos in which to be Mefer! (M. Kornfeld -- it is not entirely clear why the Ran and others did not explain in this manner. Perhaps they were trying to offer an explanation of the Mishnah that would make it readable even according to the Gemara's original assumption, that a husband may *not* be Mefer Nedarim that have nothing to do with Shabbos [and that the word "she'Im" in the end of the Mishnah should be interpreted, "v'Im" -- see Beitzah 7b.])