Please note that unless where otherwise indicated, we follow the explanation of Ran, instead of that of Rashi, since the latter is purported to have written by someone other than Rashi. As a result, our notes and comments do not necessarily have a bearing on the practical Halachah.

1)

(a) There are two categories of Neder, Nidrei Hekdesh and Nidrei Isur. The definition of ...

1. ... Nidrei Hekdesh is - Nedarim that one makes when designating something to Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis, or an animal to go on the Mizbei'ach.
2. ... Nidrei Isur is - Nedarim that one makes forbidding any sort of object on oneself.

(b) The difference between them is - that whereas the former is confined to one's own object or animal, the latter extends even to things that belong to someone else.

(c) This Masechta deals - with the latter (Nidrei Isur).

(d) The proof for this is from Charamim, which the Tana inserts here, and which is a Lashon of Isur - because if he was referring to Chermei Bedek ha'Bayis, they would not belong here, but in Kodshim.

(a) Hatfasah - means connecting the object that one comes to forbid on oneself to someone which is already forbidden (e.g. 'This should be Asur ... like a Korban').

(b) We learn from the Pasuk "Ish ki Yidor *Neder* la'Hashem" - that it is only possible to make Hatfasah on an object that itself became forbidden through a Neder (such as a Korban), but not on an object that the Torah forbade initially (such as Neveilah or T'reifah).

(c) A Neder that one makes without Hatfasah - is valid (if one does make Hatfasah however, then it must conform with the requirements currently under discussion).

(a) The Ikar Neder (with Hatfasah) comprises forbidding an object on oneself like a Korban. A Kinuy - comprises using one of the other nicknames of Korban, such as Konem (the most commonly used throughout the Masechta), Konei'ach or Koneis, either expressions that Nochrim commonly use, or that were instituted by the Chachamim, as we shall see later.

(b) Kinuyin are d'Oraysa - even according to those who say that Kinuyin are expressions that the Chachamim initiated.

(c) Yados Nedarim (handles of Nedarim) - are Nedarim that one did not complete. Like handles (through which one carries the vessel without actually touching it), one carries the unspoken part of the Neder via the part that was said.

(a) We prove from our Mishnah 'u'Shevu'os ki'Shevu'os', that it is not necessary to mention Hashem's Name when making a Shevu'ah - because if it was, then neither the Shevu'ah nor the Kinuy would be necessary, seeing as the Name oh Hashem on its own represents a Shevu'ah.

(b) To reconcile the Sugya in Shevu'os, where Rav Chanina bar Idi requires the Name of Hashem by Shevu'as ha'Eidus, with our Sugya, Rabeinu Tam restricts the Din there to a Shevu'ah that is instigated by others, whereas our Sugya speaks about a Shevu'ah that one makes of one's own volition.

(c) Based on the fact that we learn the Din by Shevu'as ha'Eidus from the Din of Sotah (from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Alah" "Alah"), who also mentions the Name of Hashem, the Ran objects to Rabeinu Tam's explanation - because we have learned in Shevu'os that whoever says 'Amein after a Shevu'ah, is as if he had uttered the Shevu'ah himself, and we learn this from Sotah (so how can Rabeinu Tam refer to Sotah as a Shevu'ah that is instigated by others)?

(d) The Ran resolves the apparent discrepancy between the two Sugyos - by confining the Sugya in Shevu'os to the opinion of Rav Chanina bar Idi, whereas the author of our Sugya is the Chachamim, who disagree with him.

6)

(a) Besides Nedarim, Charamim and Shevu'os, the fourth area of vow where Kinuyim are effective is - Nezirus ('Kol Kinuyei Nezirus ki'Nezirus').

(b) The significance of the continuation of the Mishnah 'Mudrani Mimcha, Mufreshani Mimcha, Meruchkani Mimcha she'Ani Ochel Lach, she'Ani To'em Lach, Asur' (which some read as 'she'Eini Ochel Lach, she'Ani To'em Lach') - is in connection with Yados Nedarim.

(c) This is a Yad, either because although he is Matfis, he omits the word 'ke'Hekdesh', or because he does not explicitly mention the Isur.

(d) In a case of 'Menudeh Ani Lach' - Rebbi Akiva tended to be strict, to treat it like a Neder (though he was uncertain).

7)

(a) In Nazir, the Tana only deals with Kinuyei Nezirus. The reason that the Tana here sees fit to insert all the Kinuyim (Charamim, Shevu'os and Nezirus, as well as Nedarim) is - because it mentions Kinuyei Shevu'os (seeing as Shevu'os are mentioned in the Torah together with Nedarim), and once he mentions Kinuyei Shevu'os, he thinks that he may as well throw in the other two as well.

(b) Nevertheless, he puts Charamim next to Nedarim (and not Shevu'os), because these two are both Isurei Cheftza (the Isur is placed on the object, which becomes forbidden to the person), as opposed to Shevu'os, which are an Isur Gavra (the Isur is on the person not to benefit from the object).

(c) Most Rishonim say that, if someone attempts to make a Shevu'ah by forbidding the object on himself, or a Neder by forbidding himself on the object - the Shevu'ah or the Neder is ineffective?

(d) They explain the various Sugyos, which seem to validate them - as being La'av Dafka (the Tana'im or the Amora'im were simply not careful with their wording).

(a) The Ramban says that a Shevu'ah that one makes by forbidding the object on himself, or a Neder by forbidding himself on the object - is valid (and one cannot just accuse Tana'im and Amora'im of carelessness), only not because of a Neder or a Shevu'ah, but because of a Yad le'Neder or li'Shevu'ah.

(b) Our Sugya, which appears to insist that the two run along different lines and cannot be confused - is talking about a pure Neder and Shevu'ah, and not a Yad. A pure Neder is an Isur Cheftza, and a pure Shevu'ah, an Isur Gavra.

(a) One problem with our Mishnah is that it opens with Kinuyin and goes on to explain Yados. The second problem with the Tana's opening statement of Yados - is that he has not yet mentioned Yados and he is already explaining them?

(b) We answer the second Kashya by amending the opening phrase of the Mishnah to read - 'Kol Kinuyei Nedarim ki'Nedarim ... ve'Yados Nedarim, ki'Nedarim'.

(c) We then answer the first Kashya by citing a series of other Mishnahs. The following Mishnahs all have in common - that the Tana begins explaining the second case first. 'ba'Meh Madlikin, u'va'Mah Ein Madlikin'?; 'ba'Meh Tomnin, uva'Mah Ein Tomnin'; 'ba'Meh Ishah Yotz'ah, u'va'Mah Einah Yotz'ah'.

(d) If that is the procedure that the Tana always follows - then why in the following Mishnahs, does it specifically not do so: 'Yesh Nochlin u'Manchilin, Nochlin ve'Ein Manchilin ... '; 'Yesh Mutaros le'Ba'aleihen, va'Asuros le'Yibmeihen, Mutaros le'Yibmeihen, va'Asuros le'Ba'aleihen ... '?

(a) The basic distinction that one can one draw between the two groups of Mishnahs that provides us with the initial answer to the above Kashya is - that the first group is confined to two cases (and that is where the Tana always begins to discuss the second case first); whereas each case in the second list comprises many cases - usually four (when the Tana always begins with the first case).

(b) The problem from the Mishnah 'ba'Meh Beheimah Yotz'ah, u'va'Mah Einah Yotz'ah' is - that, according to the above-mentioned principle, that Mishnah, which only contains two cases, belongs in the *first* list, whereas in actual fact, the Tana deals with the first case first (like all the cases in the *second* list).

(c) To resolve the Kashya therefore, we conclude that the Tana has no fixed procedure regarding which of the cases to discuss first. In spite of this however, it is possible that our Tana makes a point of mentioning Kinuyim first but of discussing Yados first - because Kinuyim are more obvious than Yados, which are learned from a Derashah (as we shall soon see), and it is the way of the Tana to open the proceedings with the one that is more obvious, but when it comes to discussing them, he first discusses the one that is less obvious.