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1)

(a) We just queried Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua's explanation (that our Mishnah speaks when the woman declared her hands forbidden after her husband divorced her), he reason for this Halachah on the grounds that, seeing as she was unable to do so immediately, why is it not still considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam? Rav Ila now attempts to compare the case to someone who declares the field that he is about to sell to his friend Hekdesh for when he has bought it back (which he takes for granted, takes effect).
Why does he consider our case comparable to his, seeing as in our case, the woman cannot forbid her work immediately?

(b) On what grounds does Rebbi Yirmiyah refute Rav Ila's explanation?

(c) So he compares our case to the very case that Rav Ila declined to compare it to (where the 'owner' declares a field that he has already sold, Hekdesh). Rav Papa however, rejects this on the same grounds as Rav Ila did. He in turn, compares it to someone who declares the field that he gave as collateral against a loan for after he has redeemed it.
Why does the field only become Hekdesh after the borrower has redeemed it? Why does Hekdesh not override the Shibud?

(d) In that case, how can we ask in Erchin how it is possible for the renter to live in his rented house once the owner has declared it Hekdesh.
Why do we not say there too, that Hekdesh Damim cannot override the Shibud of the renter?

(a) How does Rav Shisha B'rei de'Rav Idi reject the proof from the previous case that the woman too, should be able to declare her hands Hekdesh after her divorce?

(b) Why is that? Why is it not nevertheless possible for the woman to make her Neder effective immediately, by saying 'Eini Nizones ve'Eini Osah', like Rav Huna?

(c) So to which similar case of Mashkon does Rav Shisha now compare our case, to prove that she can declare her hands Hekdesh for after she becomes divorced?

(d) And on what grounds does Rav Ashi reject his explanation?

3)

(a) Rav Ashi finally offers a new line of approach, to explain the difference between Hekdesh and Konamos.
What makes Konamos different? Why does Shmuel rule like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri (who says 'Yafer, Shema Yigreshenah'), despite the fact that he holds 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'?

(b) How does Rav Ashi know this? Which aspect of Konamos renders them similar to Kedushas Mizbei'ach, rather than to Kedushas Damim?

(c) Rava holds that Hekdesh, Chametz and Shichrur remove the Shibud.
What does he mean by ...

1. ... Hekdesh?
2. ... Chametz?
3. ... Shichrur?

(a) According to Rav Ashi's explanation, why does the Tana of our Mishnah say 'Shema Yigreshenah'? Why does the Neder not take effect immediately?

(b) In that case, how do we resolve our original problem of 'Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (where Shmuel appears to contradict himself)?

(a) What will be the Din if a man annuls a Neder thinking it was his wife who declared it, and it turned out to be his daughter or vice-versa?

(b) The same applies if he annuls her Neder of Nezirus thinking she declared an ordinary Neder, or vice-versa, or if he annulled her Neder thinking that she forbade figs, when really it was grapes, or vice-versa.
Will the same apply if he upholds her Neder under the same circumstances?

(c) What is the reason for this Halachah?

(a) How do we learn this principle from the Pasuk "Yani Osah"?

(b) But this Pasuk is written by Hafarah.
What is the source of the same principle by Hakamah?

(c) In view of the Hekesh "Iyshah Yekimenu, ve'Iyshah Yeferenu", what can we learn from the Beraisa in Na'arah ha'Me'urasah 'Chomer be'Hekem mi'be'Hafer, Kiyem be'Libo, Kiyam ... '?

(d) What other Halachah can we learn from the word "Ki Hecherish *Lah*"?

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