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Pesachim 63

1) PUTTING THE "MULIM" BEFORE THE "ARELIM"

QUESTION: The Beraisa quotes the opinion of Acherim who say that if one slaughters the Korban Pesach for Mulim (circumcised people) and Arelim (uncircumcised people), it makes a difference which one he says first. If he says "for Mulim" first, then it is Kosher. If he says "for Arelim" first, then it is Pasul.

The Gemara gives three different ways to explain this Beraisa. Why does the Gemara not suggest a simpler explanation: Acherim of the Beraisa is Rebbi Meir (as the Gemara eventually concludes), and Rebbi Meir is the one who always holds that we follow the first part of a person's statement ("Tefos Lashon Rishon")?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Leima) explains that "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply here, because the two statements of "for Mulim" and "for Arelim" are not mutually exclusive. It is possible for one to slaughter the Korban for a number of people, some of whom are Mulim and some of whom are Arelim. Therefore, even according to Rebbi Meir, the principle of "Tefos Lashon Rishon" cannot be applied in this case.

This differs from a case where one make a Korban into a Temurah by stating that half of it would be a Temuras Olah and half of it would be a Temuras Shelamim, in which case Rebbi Meir does apply the principle of "Tefos Lashon Rishon." In that case, the two statements do contradict each other, since as a result of his first statement, the first half of the animal becomes an Olah, and consequently the Kedushas Olah *spreads throughout* the entire animal, leaving no room for any of it to become a Shelamim. It is as if one's first statement was that the *whole* animal should be an Olah. In our case, though, just because he thought that some Arelim will eat from the Korban does not mean that the Korban becomes exclusively designated only for the consumption of Arelim! Certainly, Mulim are still able to eat from it if he had them in mind. Therefore, "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply.

However, this answer does not seem to suffice to explain RASHI. Rashi says that if a person slaughters a Korban having in mind to eat one k'Zayis after of its allotted time (Chutz li'Zemano), and another k'Zayis outside of its proper place (Chutz li'Mekomo), then "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies and the Korban is a Pigul. We see that according to Rashi, even when the two Machshavos do not contradict each other, "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies!

Apparently Rashi holds that even in a case where the Avodah was done with Machshavah to eat one k'Zayis outside of its proper time, we say that the first Machshavah "spreads throughout" the entire Avodah, and it is as if the entire Avodah was done with Machshavah of Chutz li'Zemano. This is not the case when one has Machshavah for Mulim and for Arelim, since many people can eat from a single Korban, as mentioned above. In the case of the Beraisa of our Gemara, there is no contradiction at all between the two Machshavos, so "Tefos Lashon Rishon" cannot be applied.

QUESTION: Rabah, in explaining the Beraisa of Acherim (see previous Insight), says that if a person has in mind to slaughter the Korban Pesach for Mulim and for Arelim but he only manages to say "for Arelim" before the Shechitah is completed, the Korban is Pasul, because Rebbi Meir holds that one's speech does not have to be consistent with one's thoughts ("Lo Ba'inan Piv v'Libo Shavin"). We follow one's words ("for Arelim"), even though he was thinking something else ("for Arelim *and* for Mulim").

The Gemara quotes a Mishnah from Terumos (3:8) to disprove Rabah's assertion that Rebbi Meir does not require "Piv v'Livo Shavin." The Mishnah states that if a person wants to separate fruit as Terumah and he inadvertently says that the fruit is Ma'aser, it is not going to be Terumah ("Lo Amar Klum"), because his speech and his thoughts are not consistent. We see from there that Rebbi Meir requires one's speech and thoughts to be consistent.

This Gemara poses a number of problems. When a person slaughters a Korban for Arelim, the Gemara says that it is Pasul due to the Machshavah, the thoughts, of the Shochet (see 60a, *Mechashvin* m'Avodah l'Avodah, and 61b, *Machsheves* Ochlin and *Machsheves* Arelim b'Zerikah; even the Pasuk says of Pigul "Lo Yechashev," Vayikra 7:18). If so, what difference does it make if one said "for Arelim?" The status of the Korban depends only on one's thoughts, regardless of what he expressed verbally! How does his speech affect the Korban, if his thoughts were proper?

Similarly, with regard to Terumah we know that Terumah can be separated by Machshavah alone (Gitin 31a, Shavuos 26b). If so, when a person intends in his mind to say "these fruits are Terumah" and he accidentally says that they are Ma'aser, we should disregard his speech and the fruits should be Terumah! Why does the Mishnah in Terumos say that he has not said anything?

ANSWERS:

(a) The RASH (Terumos 3:8) and TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his second answer) explain that Machshavah only works to make something Terumah when it is not contradicted by a person's speech. If one's speech contradicts what he has in his mind, then it overrides the Machshavah and the Machshavah is ignored.

This explains the case of Arelim, where his speech at the time of the Shechitah was only for Arelim. Even though his Machshavah was different (for Arelim and for Mulim), his speech during the Shechitah, which contradicted his thoughts, overrides it.

This also explains the case when he thought to separate Terumah but instead said Ma'aser. His speech contradicts and overrides his thoughts. (The KEREN ORAH, Nedarim 2a, also gives this answer.)

(b) The Gemara in Shavuos (26b) explains that even things that can be done through Machshavah will only work if a person intends for them to take effect through Machshavah. But if he decides that he is going to speak them out, then they do not take effect through Machshavah. The SHACH (YD 258) understands this to mean that when a person decides that he is going to verbally express what he intends, he does not want his thoughts to take effect until the time at which he says it aloud. If so, in our Sugya, since he wants to speak out "for Arelim and for Mulim," or "these fruits are Terumah," his intention is that his thoughts *not* take effect until he speaks it out. (TUREI EVEN, in Avnei Shoham to Chagigah 10a). Again, this answers both of our questions at once.

(c) TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his first answer) explains that his Machshavah *does* take effect here and the fruits do become Terumah. When the Mishnah in Terumos says "Lo Amar Klum" ("he did not say anything"), it means that his *speech* (that the fruits should be Ma'aser) was worthless, but his Machshavah (that the fruits should be Terumah) still works!

However, that only answers the case of Terumah. What about the case of "for Arelim and for Mulim?" If one's Machshavah works even when he has a conflicting speech, then the Korban was slaughtered for both Arelim and Mulim and therefore it should be Kosher! Why, then, is it Pasul?

Tosfos in our Sugya answers this question by positing that whenever the Mishnah or Gemara says that one invalidates a Korban through Machshavah, it means through Dibur. That is, there is no such thing as pure thought being able to invalidate a Korban. Therefore, one's Machshavah here is worthless, because Machshavah never works alone to make a Korban Pasul. Since all he *said* was "for Arelim," the Korban is Pasul.

(d) RASHI (Gitin 31a and many other places in the Gemara) is consistent in explaining that when the Gemara says that Terumah can be separated through Machshavah, it means that Terumah can be separated without a *physical action*, and that speech alone is sufficient. It does not mean that *thought* alone can make fruits into Terumah (see also Rashi, Shavuos 26b, DH Terumah; Tosfos Gitin 31a, DH v'Nechshav).

If so, since one must speak out that he is making fruit Terumah, and he accidentally said Ma'aser, the Terumah is certainly not valid.

However the other question from our Gemara remains. Why do we not follow his Machshavah that he intends the Korban to be for Mulim as well as for Arelim? Rashi here (DH v'Hacha) explains, like Tosfos, that with regard to Kodshim a Machshavah alone cannot invalidate a Korban.

Another question remains, though. The Mishnah in Terumos also says that if a person intends to say l'Olah and he says l'Shelamim, he has not said anything. That seems to be discussing Kodshim, which even Rashi (Shavuos 26b) agrees can be made Kodesh through Machshavah alone! Perhaps Rashi understood that the Mishnah there is talking about making a *Temurah* of an Olah or Shelamim, which can only be done through speech. (M. Kornfeld)

63b

QUESTION: The Gemara suggests that the argument between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan, concerning whether one is Chayav for slaughtering the Korban Pesach when he has Chametz in his home and not nearby in the Azarah, is based on whether Hasra'as Safek is considered a valid Hasra'ah or not.

RASHI (DH b'Hasra'as Safek) explains that if witnesses do not know whether the person slaughtering the Korban Pesach has Chametz in his home or not, then their Hasra'ah is only a Hasra'as Safek, and even if he does have Chametz in his home, he does not get Malkus since we do not know about it.

What difference does it make that the witnesses do not know about the Chametz? As long as the *person being warned* knows that he has Chametz and he still transgresses even after receiving the warning, he cannot be called "Shogeg." He has willfully committed a sin and he should get Malkus!

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Hasra'as Safek) explains that Rashi does not mean to say that if the witnesses do not know, then it is a Hasra'as Safek and his transgression is considered inadvertent. Rather, Rashi means that since the person slaughtering the Pesach can say that he does not know whether he has Chametz in his home, if the witnesses also do not know, then he cannot be held accountable since he can always claim that he did not know at the time of the Isur that he actually had Chametz in his home. But if the witnesses know for sure that he has Chametz, when they tell him that he has Chametz in his home and he slaughters the Korban anyhow, his act is a deliberate, intentional sin, for which he will get Malkus. (Rav Mordechai Rabin points out that the RITVA in Shavous (37a) gives a similar explanation for Rashi there.)