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1) PLANNING FOR ONE "AVODAH" WHILE PERFORMING ANOTHER

(a) Question (Rava bar Rav Chanan): Why don't we say that Hishtachava'ah teaches the general rule (that one is liable for showing honor to idolatry, even if it is not Avodas Penim)?

1. "Zove'ach...." would teach that intent is projected from one Avodah to another (if a person did an Avodah in order to (later) pour the blood or burn the Chelev to idolatry, we consider the first Avodah itself to be for the sake of idolatry).

i. (R. Yochanan): If a person slaughtered an animal in order to pour the blood or burn the Chelev to idolatry, the animal is forbidden;
ii. (Reish Lakish): It is permitted.

(b) We understand according to R. Yochanan - we learn projection of intent from Pigul, "Zove'ach..." is needed to teach projection of intent, it must teach the general rule, not Hishtachava'ah;
(c) Question: But according to Reish Lakish, we need "Zove'ach..." to teach projection of intent!

1. Question (Rav Papa): R. Yochanan also needs a verse to teach projection of intent!

i. He only forbade the animal, he did not say that the person (who slaughtered) is liable;
ii. Perhaps the verse comes to obligate the person!

(d) Answer (Rav Acha brei d'Rav Ika): Reish Lakish only permitted the animal, he holds that the person is liable (even without "Zove'ach");

1. This is like one who bows to a mountain - the mountain is permitted, he is killed.

(a) Question (Rav Acha mi'Difti): Rava bar Rav Chanan suggested that Hishtachava'ah should teach that one is liable even for Avodah that is not Avodas Penim - if so, what would "Eichah Ya'avdu...Es Eloheihem" come to exclude? (In truth, "Eichah Ya'avdu" is our source to exempt Avodah that is not Avodas Penim (unless it is the normal Avodah of the idolatry).)

1. Suggestion: Perhaps it excludes excreting in front of an idolatry whose normal Avodah is Zevichah.
2. Rejection: Hishtachava'ah is honorable, we would only learn such Avodah (there is no need to exclude Avodah of disgrace)!

(b) Answer (Abaye): It would exclude excreting in front of Markulis;

1. One might have thought, since the normal Avodah of Markulis is disgraceful, one is liable for any disgraceful Avodah - the verse would teach, this is not so.

(c) Question: R. Elazar taught, if one slaughters an animal to Markulis, he is liable (even though its normal Avodah is disgraceful) - "V'Lo Yizbechu Od...la'Se'irim".

1. We do not need it to teach about its normal Avodah, which we learn from "Eichah Ya'avdu...", therefore, it teaches about something other than its normal Avodah.
2. Summation of question: Hishtachava'ah already teaches about honorable Avodah that is not its normal Avodah!

(d) Answer: Hishtachava'ah teaches about when he seeks to please the idolatry, "V'Lo Yizbechu Od" forbids Avodah even to anger the idolatry.
(e) Contradiction (Rav Hamnuna): Our Mishnah teaches 'One who *serves* idolatry (is Chayav Misah)' - he is not liable for just *saying* that he will serve;

1. A later Mishnah teaches 'One who *says* 'I will serve idolatry', or 'Let us go serve idolatry' is liable.

(f) Answer #1 (Rabah): Our Mishnah is when he does not accept it to be his god until he serves it.
(g) Answer #2 (Rav Yosef): The Tana'im of these Mishnayos argue with each other.

1. (Beraisa - R. Meir): If one says 'Come and worship me', he is liable;
2. R. Yehudah exempts.
3. (One opinion in Tosfos explains that the enticer is always liable, the discussion is when the enticee is liable. The other opinion explains that the enticer is liable only when the enticee is liable.)

i. All agree that he is liable if he served him - "Lo Sa'aseh Lecha Pesel";
ii. They argue about whether or not he is liable just for speaking - R. Meir obligates, he says that speech is significant; R. Yehudah exempts, he says that it is insignificant.

(h) Retraction (Rav Yosef): I erred - R. Yehudah admits that he is liable for speaking.

1. (Beraisa - R. Yehudah): He is not liable (for enticing) until he says 'I will serve', or 'I will go and serve idolatry', or 'Let us go and serve'.
2. Question: What do R. Meir and R. Yehudah argue about?
3. Answer: They argue whether or not enticing to serve oneself is enticement, when others agree to serve him

i. R. Meir says that others agree to serve him, they sincerely agree.
ii. R. Yehudah says that they do not intend to serve him - they reason, 'He is just a person, like us!'

iii. They mock him by 'agreeing' to serve him.

(i) Answer #3 (Rav Yosef): The later Mishnah is when an individual is enticed - he will not reconsider, therefore the enticer is liable immediately;

1. Our Mishnah is when more than one person is enticed - they are likely to reconsider, the enticer is not liable until they serve.

(j) Support (Rav Yosef for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma Elav" - if he wants and listens, he is liable.
(k) Support (Rav Yosef for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma Elav" - if he (an individual) wants and listens, he is liable.
(l) Objection (Abaye): We do not make this distinction between an individual and a group that is enticed!

1. (Beraisa): "Ki Yesisecha Achicha Ven Imecha" - this applies to an individual or a multitude that is enticed;
2. The Torah distinguished their punishments - it is stringent on the body of an individual (he is stoned), it is lenient on his money (it passes to his heirs);

i. The Torah is lenient is on the bodies of a multitude (Ir ha'Nidachas - they are choked), it is stringent on their money (it is destroyed).

3. Inference: These are the only differences!

(m) Answer #4 (Abaye): Our Mishnah is when a person entices himself - he is likely to reconsider, he is not liable until he serves;

1. The later Mishnah is when others entice him - he will not reconsider, therefore the enticer is liable immediately;
2. Our Mishnah is when more than one person is enticed - they are likely to reconsider, the enticer is not liable until they serve.

(n) Support (Abaye, for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma *Elav*" - if he consents to someone else enticing him, he is liable.
(o) Answer #5 (Rava): Both Mishnayos are when others entice him;

1. If the enticer detailed what the idolatry eats, drinks, rewards and punishes, the enticee is liable once he agrees;
2. If the enticer did not give these details, the enticee is not liable until he serves.

(p) Support (Rava, for himself): "Me'Elokei...ha'Kerovim Elecha O ha'Rechokim";

1. Question: What difference is there between idolatry nearby or far away?
2. Answer: From the nearby idolatries you can infer about the ones far away, i.e. an enticer normally describes what a far away idolatry eats, drinks, rewards and punishes,- the Torah tells you that it is no different than the nearby idolatries, which you recognize (that they do nothing).

(q) Answer #6 (Rav Ashi): The latter Mishnah discusses a Yisrael Mumar (he will not reconsider, he is liable once he agrees).
(r) Answer #7 (Ravina): The latter Mishnah teaches a bigger Chidush, not only is one liable for serving, he is liable once he agrees to serve. (Indeed, from the latter Mishnah we can infer the law of our Mishnah.)

(a) (Abaye): If one served idolatry on account of love or fear of a person, he is liable, for in any event he served.
(b) (Rava): He is exempt, for he did not accept it to be his god.
(c) Support (Abaye, for himself - Mishnah): The same applies to one who serves...

1. Suggestion: This means, whether he serves on account of love or fear!

(d) Rejection (Rava): No, R. Yirmeyah explained, it means whether he did its normal Avodah, or served it through Avodas Penim, even if this is not its normal Avodah.
(e) Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa): "Lo Sishtachaveh Lahem"(to idols), but you may bow to a person;

1. Suggestion: Perhaps you may bow to a person people serve (like idolatry), such as Haman!
2. Rejection: "V'Lo So'ovdem".
3. (Abaye): People served Haman because they feared Achashverosh, the Torah considers this idolatry!

(f) Rejection (Rava): No - the Torah forbids bowing to someone who resembles Haman in one respect, not in all respects:

1. One may not bow to a person who is served, such as Haman - but this is only if people truly intend to serve him, unlike Haman, who was served only out of fear.

(g) Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa - Rebbi): A Kohen Gadol anointed with the Shemen ha'Mishchah brings a Korban if he served idolatry b'Shogeg
(h) Chachamim say, he is liable only for He'elam Davar (if he erred in Halachah);

1. Both agree that when he is liable, he brings a female goat, like a commoner.
2. They also agree that he does not bring an Asham Taluy (when in doubt whether or not he transgressed).
3. Question: What is the case of idolatry b'Shogeg?

i. If he thought he was bowing to a synagogue, and it really was idolatry - he intended to serve Hash-m (surely, he is exempt)!

4. Answer #1: Rather, he bowed to a statue in the king's image.
5. Rejection: If he accepted it to be his god, he was Mezid (he does not bring a Korban); if he did not accept it to be his god, he did not serve idolatry!
6. Answer #2: Rather, he served idolatry on account of love or fear. (The Tana'im only argue about whether or not an anointed Kohen must err in Halachah, all agree that serving on account of love or fear is considered idolatry!)
7. Answer #3 (and rejection of Abaye's support - Rava): No, he thought that idolatry is permitted.
8. Question: But that is He'elam Davar (which Chachamim agree about - the argument is about b'Shogeg, this must be a different case)!
9. Answer: He thought that idolatry is totally permitted - He'elam Davar is only when he remembers part of the law and forgets part.