ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Sanhedrin 8
(a) When Rav's innkeeper asked Rav to litigate, he declined - because he had
reminded him of the good service he had rendered (and this is akin to
(b) So Rav sent him to - Rav Kahana.
(c) Rav Kahana reprimanded him - because he indicated that, due his
connections with Rav, he would not accept Rav Kahana's ruling.
(d) So the latter warned him that unless he did, he would make it clear that
Rav could not help him, by placing him in Cherem.
(a) Resh Lakish establishes the Pasuk in Devarim "ka'Katon ka'Gadol
Tishma'un" in connection with attaching as much importance to a case
involving a P'rutah as to one of a hundred Manah. This cannot be taken
literally - because it is obvious.
(b) What Resh Lakish means is - that cases must be taken on a strictly
'first-come first-served' basis, and not in accordance with the sums
(c) And Rebbi Chama b'Rebbi Chanina explains the Pasuk "Ki ha'Mishpat
l'Elokim Hu" - by quoting Ha'kadosh Baruch Hu, who says that not only do the
Resha'im transfer money from the rightful owner to his disputant, but they
also place the judgment on His Shoulders (Kevayachol, forcing Him to return
the money to its rightful owner.
(a) Rebbi Chanina (or Rebbi Yashiyah) connects the Pasuk "ve'ha'Davar Asher
Yiksheh Mikem" with the Pasuk "va'Yakreiv Moshe es Mishpatan Lifnei
Hashem" - by explaining that, as a punishment for the former (vain)
statement, Moshe was forced to admit that he was unable to answer the B'nos
Tz'lofchad's She'eilah, and had to take it before Hashem.
(b) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rejects this explanation however, on the basis
of the continuation of the Pasuk "Tikrevun Elai *u'Shema'ativ*", which
implies (not that he would be able to answer all problems, but) - that he
would hear them out, ruling on what he did know, and asking Hashem what he
did not (which has not the least connotations of vanity).
(c) And the reason that the Parshah ...
1. ... of Nachalos was said through the query of the daughters of Tz'lofchad
(and not directly at the hand of Moshe) is - due to their merit.
(d) We learn from these two Pesukim - that Hashem brings about merits
through righteous people and punishments through people who are guilty.
2. ... of Chilul Shabbos was said through the actions of the Mekoshesh (the
man who gathered wood on Shabbos [who some say was Tz'lofchad]) - due to his
(a) According to Rebbi Elazar Amar Rebbi Simla'i, the Pasuk ...
1. ... "va'Atzaveh es Shofteichem ba'Eis ha'Hi" comes to teach us - that the
judges should be patient with the people.
(b) The Pasuk "Ka'asher Yisa ha'Omen es ha'Yonek" (like a nurse carries an
infant) - teaches us the expected extent of the judge's patience towards the
2. ... "va'Atzaveh eschem ba'Eis ha'Hi" - that the people, for their part,
should hold the judges in awe.
(c) Rebbi Yochanan explains the apparent discrepancy between the two
Pesukim, where Yehoshua is first instructed "Ki Atah Tavo es ha'Am", and
then "Ki Atah Tavi es ha'Am" - by establishing the former as being the words
of Moshe (who instructed him to go with the people as an equal [see also
Rashi in Chumash]), and the latter, the words of Hashem, who appointed him
as the sole leader (based on the priniple 'Dabar Echad le'Dor, ve'Lo Sh'nei
Dabarim le'Dor' [There can only be one leader in a generation, and not
(d) Rebbi Yochanan knows that the second Pasuk was said by Hashem, and not
by Moshe, like the first - because the Pasuk speaks in the first person ("to
the land which *I* swore ... "), and not in the third ("to the land which
*Hashem* swore", as it did in the first Pasuk [indeed, as it does for the
major part of Devarim]).
(a) The Beraisa states 'Zimun bi'Sheloshah'. This cannot refer to the
B'rachah of Mezuman - because another Beraisa mentions them both 'Zimun
u'Birchas Zimun bi'Sheloshah'.
(b) And we know that, when the Beraisa states 'Zimun u'Birchas Zimun
bi'Sheloshah', the latter is not merely an explanation of the former -
because we have a third Beraisa which states - 'Zimun bi'Sheloshah,
u'Birchas Zimun bi'Sheloshah', clearly indicating that 'Zimun' in this
context refers to something else.
(c) So we establish the Beraisa like Rava, who ruled that if three Dayanim
send a Sheli'ach to invite someone to a court hearing - he must specifically
issue the invitation in the name of all three Dayanim. Otherwise, Beis-Din
do not have the authority to place him in Cherem for failing to attend.
(d) This will not be necessary however - on the actual day of judgment.
(a) Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov how many
Dayanim are required to judge Diynei K'nasos. We cannot accept the She'eilah
at surface value - because our Mishnah has already taught us that Diynei
K'nasos require three judges.
(b) What he must have therefore meant to ask him was - whether a Yachid
Mumcheh is permitted to judge Diynei K'nasos.
(c) He replied by quoting Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda's grandfather - who
forbade even ten Hedyotos to judge Diynei K'nasos. In that case, when our
Mishnah states 'Tashlumei Kefel ... bi'Sheloshah', it must be referring to
Mumchin, from which we can deduce that one Mumcheh cannot judge Diynei
(a) Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in our Mishnah whether Motzi-Shem-Ra
requires three judges or twenty-three. The case is - where the husband
claims on the day after the marriage that his wife was not a virgin, and
that she therefore loses her Kesuvah (see also Tosfos DH 'Motzi-Shem-Ra').
(b) We know that the husband only intends to make his wife lose her Kesuvah,
and not to have her sentenced to death (with witnesses) - because if he did,
why would Rebbi Meir argue?
(c) Our initial problem with the Rabbanan's opinion (that Motzi-Shem-Ra
requires twenty-three) is - that, seeing as there no witnesses that the
woman committed adultery after the betrothal, and her husband only comes to
make her lose her Kesuvah, why should we take into account what would have
been, had he brought witnesses that she had?
(d) So Ula establishes their Machlokes by whether 'Chosheshin le'La'az' (the
Rabbanan) or not (Rebbi Meir). 'Chosheshin le'La'az' means - that we take
into account the likelihood that, following the husband's initial claim in
Beis-Din, witnesses (of whom the husband was not aware) will come forward
and testify that she commited adultery, and Beis-Din will need to reconvene
(which makes a mockery of Beis-Din).
(a) According to Rava, nobody holds 'Chosheshin le'La'az', and the
Rabbanan's reason is because they hold 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel
Rishonim', meaning - that the husband appeared before a Beis-Din of
twenty-three, claiming that he had witnesses that his wife had committed
adultery. But when no witnesses arrived, the Dayanim went home.
(b) He then asked three other judges to judge his claim (of 'Pesach
Pasu'ach') - so that his wife should at least lose her Kesuvah.
(c) The Rabbanan are now concerned about the Kavod of the Dayanim who had
sat initially and had gone home (since to now judge the case with a Beis-Din
of three, after a Beis-Din of twenty-three already convened to judge it, is
a slight to the honor of the larger Beis-Din).
(a) The Beraisa states 'va'Chachamim Omrim, Tav'o Mamon bi'Sheloshah - Tav'o
Nefashos, be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah' (see Chidushei ha'Ran).
(b) Rava will explain the Beraisa in exactly the same way as he just
explained our Mishnah, based on the fact that he does not hold of 'La'az',
but he does hold of 'Chevodan shel Rishonim'.
(c) The problem this poses on Ula is - from the Reisha. What is the case of
'Tav'o Mamon, bi'Sheloshah', according to him?
(a) To reconcile Ula with the Beraisa, Rava, together with Rav Chiya bar
Avin, establishes the Reisha by Eidim Zomemin. Rava describes Rav Chiya bar
Avin as - 'the lion of the group'.
(b) The case is - where the husband initially brought witnesses before a
Beis-Din of twenty-three, but the girl's father brought witnesses who
rendered them Eidim Zomemin. If the father now wishes to claim payment from
the husband, he only needs a Beis-Din of three (even though the initial
Beis-Din comprised twenty-three).
(c) When the Tana says 'Tav'o Nefashos, be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah', he means -
that a case that can involve Diynei Nefashos (i.e. whenever the husband is
the claimant), requires twenty-three (because of La'az).
(d) And the reason that we are not concerned about La'az in the Reisha - is
due to the fact that we are now concerned with a new claimant (the father),
as if it was a new case.
(a) Some commentaries establish the entire Sugya in connection with the
Manah that the father is claiming from the husband (see Tosfos on the
previous Amud DH 'Motzi-Shem-Ra'). We reject this explanation however -
because if the husband did not bring witnesses, he would be believed
outright to make his wife lose her Kesuvah. So the Mishnah must be speaking
when he brought witnesses, and the father brought Eidei Hazamah. In that
case, La'az would no longer be applicable, as we explained.
(b) According to Abaye, even Rebbi Meir agrees with both Chosheshin le'La'az
and Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Rishonim, and they argue over the Machlokes
between Rebbi Yehudah and the Tana Kama. According to the Tana Kama in a
Beraisa, the two other condition required to sentence someone to death,
besides a Beis-Din of twenty-three, witnesses and warning is - informing him
that his sin renders him subject to the death-penalty.
(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah - he must also inform him which death he is
due to receive.
(d) In similar vein, the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan is
confined to a case - where the witnesses brought by the husband failed to
warn the woman which death she was due to receive, in which case, Rebbi Meir
holds like Rebbi Yehudah. Consequently, it is no longer a case of Diynei
Nefashos, and three judges will suffice.
(a) With regard to the previous case, we know that there is not another pair
of witnesses ready to testify (in which case it would remain within the
realm of Diynei Nefashos), because once one of the parties brings witnesses,
we do not contend with the possibility of their being additional witnesses.
(b) Rav Papa learns basically like Abaye. Only to explain the Rabbanan, he
establishes them like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who says - Chaver (a
Talmid-Chacham) does not require a warning.
(c) The case by Motzi-Shem-Ra is - where the witnesses did not warn the
woman before she committed adultery, because she was a Chaverah.
(d) Consequently ...
1. ... Rebbi Meir requires only three judges - because he holds like the
Rabbanan, who require a warning even with regard to a Chaver, and it is no
longer a case of Chayvei Miysos.
2. ... the Rabbanan require twenty-three - because they hold like Rebbi
Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah.