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1)

(a) The Tana Kama disqualifies a Shushbin (best man) from testifying on behalf of the Chasan. According to Rebbi Aba Amar Rebbi Yirmiyah Amar Rav, this ruling applies throughout the seven days of festivity.
What do the Rabbanan quoting Rava say?

(b) According to the Tana Kama, to whom is the Torah referring when it writes in Masei (in connection with a manslaughterer) ...

1. ... "ve'Hu Lo Oyev Lo"?
2. ... "ve'Lo Mevakesh Ra'aso"?

(c) We reject the suggestion that he learns 'Ohev' from the same Pasuk, as if it had written "ve'Hu Lo Oyev Lo, ve'Lo Ohev Lo", because the Torah does not write that.
Then what is his source for Ohev?

(d) What do the Rabbanan, who validate witnesses who hate or who love the defendant, then learn from ...

1. ... "ve'Hu Lo Oyev Lo"?
2. ... "ve'Lo Mevakesh Ra'aso"?

(a) To cross-examine the witnesses, Beis-Din would take them into a room and scare them (as will be explained later).
How many people besides the judges, were in the room during the cross-examination?

(b) Which witness was the first to be questioned?

(c) What will Beis-Din do if the witness testifies that they heard from ...

1. ... a third party that Shimon owes Reuven two hundred Zuz"
2. ... Shimon himself that he owes Reuven the money? Why is that?

(d) What would the witness have to add for his testimony to be acceptable?

(a) Beis-Din would then examine the second witness.
What happens if the testimony of the two witnesses tallies?

(b) After they finish debating, they take a count. As long as it is a matter of two judges against one, we follow the majority.
What happens if one judge doesn't know ...

1. ... and the other two disagree?
2. ... and the other two agree that the defendant is either Chayav or Patur?

(c) What is the procedure once they arrive at a decision? Who makes the announcement?

(d) Based on the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Lo Seilech Rachil be'Amecha", what is a Dayan forbidden to do upon leaving the court-room?

(a) Regarding scaring the witnesses, on what grounds does ...

1. ... Rava object to Rav Yehudah's explanation, that the scare consists of a warning by Beis-Din that false testimony results in a stoppage of wind and rain?
2. ... Rav Ashi object to Rava's explanation, that the scare consists of a warning by Beis-Din that false testimony results in a plague of pestilence?

(b) Rav Ashi finally cites Nasan bar Mar Zutra.
What does the latter prove from the Pasuk in Melachim "ve'Hoshivu Shenayim Anashim B'nei Beliya'al Negdo"?

(c) What did the false witnesses in Melachim testify? On whom were they testifying?

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that in order to validate an admission, the witnesses must state that the debtor made it in the presence of the creditor. This supports a statement of Rav Yehudah Amar Rav.
What does Rav Yehudah Amar Rav require the debtor to do when making an admission in front of witnesses?

(b) What does Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan say about this?

(c) And we even prove it from a Beraisa.
What does the Tana say about Reuven who admits one day that he owes Shimon money, and the next, claims that he was only pulling his leg?

(d) And what does the Tana add to this?

(a) If Reuven does not retract from his first claim, we do not claim on his behalf that his initial claim was only a joke.
In which case, would we do so, even though it did not occur to the defendant to make the claim himself?

(b) Which is the sole exception to this latter ruling?

(c) What did Rebbi Chama b'Rebbi Chanina learn from Rebbi Chiya bar Aba, based on the Pasuk in Re'ei "Lo Sachmol ve'Lo Sechaseh Alav"?

(a) How does Rebbi Shmuel bar Nachmeni Amar Rebbi Yonasan citing Rebbi Simla'i learn the previous ruling from the first snake?

(b) How could the snake have exonerated himself?

(c) What does Chizkiyah learn from the snake's words to Chavah "Amar Elokim Lo Sochlu Mimenu ve'Lo Sig'u Bo"?

(d) How does ...

1. ... Rav Mesharshaya learns the same thing from the Pasuk in Terumah (in connection with the length of the Aron) "Amasayim va'Chetzi Orko"?
2. ... Rav Ashi learn it from the Pasuk there "Ashtei-Esrei Yeri'os"?

8)

(a) According to Abaye, if instead of claiming that he was only pulling the creditor's leg, the debtor denies having admitted to owing him, he is Huchzak Kafran.
What does 'Huchzak Kafran' mean?

(b) What does Rav Papa B'rei de'Rav Acha bar Ada quote Rava as having said in this regard?

(c) In a case where a creditor hid witnesses behind the curtain of a four-poster bed, he then asked the debtor whether he would agree that Iri and Shichvi would be witnesses to the admission that he had just made to the creditor.
What is the significance of 'Iri ve'Shichvi'? Why did he say that?

(d) Why did Rav Kahana discount the debtor's admission? What had the latter answered to the creditor's question regarding 'Iri ve'Shichvi'?

(a) Resh Lakish too, issued the same ruling in a similar case to the previous one.
What can we infer from there? What would the Din have been if the debtor had remained silent?

(b) What does Ravina (or Rav Papa) extrapolate from the above with regard to Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, who requires 'Atem Eidai' on the part of the debtor (as we learned earlier)?

(c) What did Rav Nachman rule in a case where someone known as Kav Reshu declared that he owed Reuven and Shimon money, when Reuven and Shimon took him at his word and claimed from him? Why was he called by that name?

(a) What did Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi rule in an almost identical case, where Achb'ra de'Shachiv a'Dinri declared on his death-bed that he owed Reuven and Shimon money, when Reuven and Shimon claimed then claimed from his sons?

(b) Why was Achb'ra de'Shachiv a'Dinri called by that name?

(c) What did Rebbi Chiya rule when after having paid half, they took the sons to court for the other half?

(d) And what did he rule when the sons demanded to be reimbursed for half the money that they had already paid?

(a) If Reuven admits that he owes Shimon money and they make a Kinyan, the witnesses automatically write a Sh'tar Hoda'ah.
Do they also write a Sh'tar if he admitted in front of them having said 'Atem Eidai'?

(b) Why the difference?

(c) Then why not write a Sh'tar anyway, even in the latter case?

(d) If Reuven admitted that he owed Shimon money in front of three people, Rav holds that one writes a Sh'tar even though no Kinyan was made.
Why is that?

(a) What does Rav Asi say in the previous case?

(b) What happened when such a case came before Rav?

(c) What sort of compromise does Rav Ada bar Ahavah make in this regard? Why is that?

(d) Rava disagrees with Rav Ada bar Ahavah.
What does he say?

(a) Mar bar Rav Ashi goes even further that Rava. What does *he* say?

(b) Establishing the previous distinction between Kanu mi'Yado and Lo Kanu mi'Yado, by Metaltelin, we ask what the Din will be in a case where Reuven admitted that a piece of Karka belonged to Shimon.
Why might Karka be any different than Metaltelin in this regard? Why might we write a Sh'tar even if no Kinyan was made?

(c) Ameimar rules 'Ein Kosvin' (like by Metaltelin).
What does Mar Zutra rule? What is the Halachah?

(d) Ravina told Rav Dimi from Damhari'ah that if the debtor admits to Metaltelin that are available to pay back immediately, they have a Din of Karka, and the witnesses write a Sh'tar even without a Kinyan.
What does Rav Ashi say?

(a) When a Sh'tar Odisa (without a Kinyan) on which two witnesses had signed, but which did not contain the customary 'Amar Lana Kisvu ve'Chismu ve'Havu Leih', Abaye and Rava compared it to a ruling of Resh Lakish. What did Resh Lakish say about a Sh'tar on which two witnesses signed, but where it is not known for sure that the seller was a Gadol? What constitutes a Gadol in the case of a Yasom?

(b) How does Resh Lakish's ruling reflect on our case?

(c) What objection did Rav Papi (or Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua) raise to Abaye and Rava's ruling?

(d) How did they refute Rav Papi's Kashya?

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