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Shabbos 3

1) WHICH D'RABANAN ACTS OF "HOTZA'AH" WERE COUNTED BY THE MISHNAH?
The Gemara says that the Mishnah includes in its count of four additional Hotza'os only those that are forbidden mid'Rabanan that could lead to a d'Oraisa transgression (a Chiyuv Chatas). What are those acts of Hotza'ah?

OPINIONS

(a) The Mishnah counts those acts of Hotza'ah in which a person performed an *Akirah*, for then he could have completed his action and performed a Hanachah, making himself liable. (RASHI and RABEINU CHANANEL)

(b) The RIVA as cited in Tosfos (DH Peturi), the Ba'al ha'Ma'or, and the teachers of Rashi as cited in Rashi explain that the Mishnah is counting the actions in which a person *extends his hand* from one Reshus to another Reshus, for this is more similar to the Melachah d'Oraisa, which involves transporting an object from one Reshus to another. Rashi explains the logical justification for this opinion slightly differently -- the one who passes his hand from one Reshus to another *initiates* the Melachah by doing the first motion involved. (See Sefas Emes for a novel understanding of the Riva's explanation.)

(c) The RAMBAN and RASHBA mention that according to others, the Mishnah is counting only the acts of *Hanachah*. The Hanachah completes the Melachah, and it is at the point of Hanachah that a person would be liable had he done an entire Melachah. That is why it is more similar to Hotza'ah d'Oraisa, and is counted in the Mishnah.

3b

QUESTION: One Beraisa says that when a person extends his hand which is full of fruit from Reshus ha'Yachid to Reshus ha'Rabim, within ten Tefachim of the ground, it is forbidden to bring his hand back to Reshus ha'Yachid. Why can he not simply lift up his hand to above ten Tefachim (which is a Makom Petur), and then bring it back into Reshus ha'Yachid (since transferring from a Makom Petur to a Reshus ha'Yachid is permitted)?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH Kan l'Ma'alah) says that it would indeed be permissible.

(b) According to one opinion in Eruvin (85b), it is forbidden to transfer from a Karmelis to a Makom Petur.

(c) The RASHBA explains that it was prohibited mid'Rabanan, since if it had been permitted to lift a hand above ten Tefachim and then bring it back to Reshus ha'Yachid, we fear that we may bring his hand directly back to his Reshus without lifting it up.

(d) Perhaps lifting his hand above ten Tefachim would not be considered as bringing it from a Makom Petur into Reshus ha'Yachid, because he never rested his hand or its contents in the Makom Petur. Since his hand only *passes through* a Makom Petur, it is not considered as being brought from a Makom Petur to a Reshus ha'Yachid, but rather it is considered as having been brought directly from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Yachid, which is prohibited. (M. Kornfeld)

SUMMARY: Rav Bivi asked whether or not it is permitted for one who affixed dough to the sides of a lit oven on Shabbos to remove it ("Rediyas ha'Pas") before it is baked. The Gemara asks why we do not infer the answer to his question from the explanation given to reconcile the two Beraisos in which we see that the Rabanan prohibited a person to bring his hand back into his Reshus when he put his hand out on Shabbos, even though such a decree may cause him to transgress the Melachah d'Oraisa (he may get too tired and cast down the contents of his hand into Reshus ha'Rabim). The Gemara answers that we cannot infer an answer to Rav Bivi's question from what was stated earlier in the Gemara because "in this case it is Shogeg, and in this case it is Mezid."

RASHI explains that the words, "in this case it is Shogeg, and in this case it is Mezid," refer back to the two Beraisos. The Gemara is saying that Rav Bivi's question cannot be resolved from either the case of Shogeg or the case Mezid, because on one hand the case of the outstretched hand is more strict than the case of removing the bread, while on the other hand, it is more lenient:

(1) If one put out his laden hand, inadvertently, into Reshus ha'Rabim, perhaps there the Rabanan permit him to bring his hand back in, because there was no pre-existing rabbinical prohibition against bringing his hand back into the Reshus in which he is standing. In the case of Rav Bivi, though, there is a pre-existing rabbinical prohibition against removing dough from the sides of an oven, and therefore even though it will lead to a transgression of an Isur d'Oraisa, the Rabanan did not relax their prohibition.

(2) On the other hand, if one put out his laden hand, on purpose, into Reshus ha'Rabim, perhaps only there did the Rabanan prohibit him from bringing his hand back in, because they knew that he would not jeopardize his life by throwing the object down and being liable to the death penalty. In Rav Bivi's case, though, if they uphold their decree, he will *definitely* transgress an Isur d'Oraisa when the bread is baked (it is not in his ability to avoid the transgression), and therefore perhaps they do not forbid him from removing the dough.

QUESTIONS:

(a) Why did Rashi not give a much simpler explanation for the words of the Gemara? When the Beraisa says that it is forbidden to bring back his hand, it is talking about when he *deliberately* extended his laden hand, while Rav Bivi's case is when he put the dough on the oven *unintentionally*, and therefore the Rabanan do not forbid him to remove it!

(b) If the Gemara is saying that Rav Bivi's case is, in one sense, more strict than the case of the outstretched hand, but in another sense it is more lenient, then why does the Gemara have to differentiate at all between "Shogeg" and "Mezid?" Let it just stay with the original answer, that one Beraisa is when he extended his hand before it was Shabbos ("mib'Od Yom") and the other Beraisa is when he extended his hand on Shabbos ("mishe'Chashecha")! The differences between Rav Bivi's case and the case of the outstretched arm will still exist, so why does the Gemara have to give a new resolution for the Beraisos?

ANSWERS:

(a) The Gemara on 4a concludes that the case of Rav Bivi was when dough was put into the oven on purpose. Rashi therefore had to explain that the words, "in this case it is Shogeg" do not refer to the case of removing bread from an oven, but rather to one of the two Beraisos that discuss the outstretched hand.

(b) From the wording of the Gemara it is clear that the question on Rav Bivi (why he did not resolve his question from the Beraisa) only applies if there is a difference between extending one's hand before Shabbos and extending it on Shabbos, and the latter is treated *as more severe*. Since that would be the *opposite* of Rav Bivi's proposed logic (which was that if the decree of the Rabanan will lead to a transgression of an Isur d'Oraisa, perhaps the Rabanan did not uphold their decree), the Gemara sees it as a resolution for Rav Bivi's question. Otherwise why did the one who gave the resolution for the two Beraisos not give the opposite answer (that extending one's hand *before* Shabbos is treated more severely, because doing so will not lead to a transgression of an Isur d'Oraisa).

The Gemara explains that we misunderstood what was meant in the previous line of the Gemara. When we said that one Beraisa is talking about when he put out his hand "before Shabbos," we meant that he put his hand out b'Shogeg (because normally one is not thinking about Shabbos when he stretches out his hand before Shabbos starts.) When the Gemara says that the other Beraisa is talking about when he put out his hand on Shabbos, it means that he put out his hand b'Mezid. Hence, the Gemara's real differentiation between the Beraisos was not between "before Shabbos" and "on Shabbos," but rather between Shogeg and Mezid. Since the Gemara is no longer proposing a logic *opposite* to Rav Bivi's, we cannot resolve Rav Bivi's question based on the Gemara's statements (since there is reason to be either more or less stringent in the case of the outstretched hand, as Rashi explains). (M. Kornfeld)