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Shabbos 156

1) FOLLOWING ASTROLOGICAL PREDICTIONS

QUESTION: The Tana'im and Amora'im discuss the effects of the Mazalos (constellations) on human behavior and destiny. The Gemara describes how certain Tana'im and Amora'im were concerned about the effects of the Mazalos.

This Gemara seems difficult in light of the Gemara in Pesachim (113b). The Gemara there says that it is forbidden to ask a "Kalda'ei" for advice, because the verse says "Tamim Tiheyeh Im Hashem Elokecha" -- "You shall be completely faithful to Hashem your G-d" (Devarim 18:13). Our Gemara describes a "Kalda'ei" as a gentile astrologer who gazes at the constellations and predicts future events based on them. Why, then, does our Gemara describe this discipline as something which is trustworthy, when the Gemara in Pesachim says that we are not allowed to have any trust or faith in it at all?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI in Pesachim (ibid.) translates "Kalda'ei" as Ba'alei Ovos, those who divine with bones and commune with dead people. Everywhere else in Shas, though, Rashi defines "Kalda'ei" as astrologers. Apparently Rashi maintained that the Sugya in Pesachim cannot be referring to astrologers, because -- as our Sugya makes clear -- there is nothing wrong with consulting with astrologers. (TOSFOS and the RASHBAM there take issue with Rashi's definition of "Kalda'ei" as Ba'alei Ovos.)

(b) The RAMBAN (in Teshuvos ha'Meyuchasos #243) and the NIMUKEI YOSEF (Sanhedrin 65b) write that the Gemara in Pesachim is not teaching that there is an Isur d'Oraisa to consult astrologers. If there was such an Isur d'Oraisa, the Gemara would have cited as the source the negative commandment (Devarim 18:10) commanding us not to be involved in any type of divination. It must be that consulting astrologers is not included in that prohibition. Rather, there is indeed some veracity to the science of astrological prediction. Consequently, says the Ramban, if a person is told his astrological forecast, he must not attempt to defy it because he might thereby be placing himself in danger. Rather, he should heed the warning and avoid the situation which his forecast says is dangerous for him.

When the Gemara in Pesachim says that one may not consult with astrologers, it means that the *Rabanan advise* that one should not look into astrology in the first place. Instead one should place his trust in Hashem and acknowledge that his prayers to Hashem can be effective in altering his fate. The reason why the Tana'im and Amora'im of our Sugya were concerned over their astrological forecasts was not because they went to *consult* with astrologers, but because they *happened* to find out about their forecasts. To defy what they heard in such a manner would require relying on a miracle to save them, and one may not rely on a miracle.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:8) rules that it is an Isur d'Oraisa to look into one's astrological horoscope. What, then, does the Rambam do with our Gemara?

When the Gemara lists each Mazal and its effects on one who was born in it, that does not tell the person anything about how he should act in the future, i.e. what day will be a good one and what day will be a bad one. It is just telling us the facts about what that person's tendency will be. Apparently, that does not fall into the prohibition against divining. Similarly, when Rebbi Akiva was concerned for the astrological prediction that was said about the fate of his daughter, he was merely worried, but he did not *act* on the prediction of the astrologer.

However, the Rambam writes later (11:16) that anyone who believes that there is any truth in these predictions is foolish and childish. How, then, could Rebbi Akiva and the Amora'im be concerned for the predictions of astrologers?

The Rambam, in his Introduction to Perush ha'Mishnayos, intimates that the predictions of astrologers contain truth, but they are not *exact* in their predictions. He may mean that a person's fate, as seen by astrological prediction, is liable to change based on the performance of good deeds, exactly as our Sugya concludes. In Hilchos Avodah Zarah, when he writes that anyone who believes in astrological predictions is foolish, he means that one must put his faith only in Hashem and acknowledge that Tefilah and Yir'as Shamayim can entirely change one's fate and therefore it is futile to put one's trust in the Mazalos, as our Gemara concludes.

When Rebbi Akiva was worried about the prediction of the astrologer, he was worried for someone else (his daughter), since *she* might not be G-d- fearing enough to merit having a good future. Similarly, the mother of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak was worried for the prediction said about Rav Nachman, because she was worried that *her son* might not have enough merit to save him from the fate that the astrologer predicted. About one's self, though, a person need not fear; let him simply place his trust in Hashem and perform Mitzvos and the dreaded outcome will not come to pass. (M. Kornfeld)

156b

QUESTION: The Mishnah says that it is permitted to cut gourds on Shabbos in order to give them to one's animal to eat. Why is it necessary for the Mishnah to permit cutting gourds? Why should it *not* have been permitted?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI here says that a person cannot eat a gourd with first *cooking* it. As a result, gourds are fit for man to eat, but they are not fit for him on Shabbos. Therefore, they are considered "Muchan l'Adam" (fit for man) which makes them unfit for animals.

According to this explanation, Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah dispute this point, and it is Rebbi Shimon who permits cutting gourds. Rebbi Yehudah prohibits it because he maintains that something which is fit for man is considered unfit for animals.

(b) The RITVA also explains that cutting gourds for one's animal is the subject of a dispute between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon whether something which is fit for man is fit for animals or not. The Ritva explains, though, that before Shabbos, the gourds were *soft* and thus suitable to be eaten by man, but on Shabbos they *became hard* and unfit for man. Since they are not fit for man now, we do not permit them even for animals (see next Insight).

(c) RABEINU TAM in Chulin (14a) explains that the Mishnah is referring to gourds that were cut from the ground on Shabbos. Once again, Rebbi Yehudah prohibits them and Rebbi Shimon permits them. Even Rebbi Shimon normally prohibits items that were cut from the ground on Shabbos (because a person had no intention whatsoever to use those items on Shabbos, Beitzah 24b and Rashi there), nevertheless Rebbi Shimon permits gourds that were cut from the ground on Shabbos, when the person had in mind to use the gourds whenever they would become detached.

(Although the Rabanan prohibited using fruits that were detached from their source on Shabbos -- "Peros ha'Noshrin," Beitzah 3a -- this prohibition applies only to fruits which can be picked and eaten right away. It does not apply to gourds, which must be cooked before they can be eaten.)

(d) TOSFOS and RASHI in Beitzah (2a) explain that the Mishnah is merely teaching that cutting gourds for animals is not considered creating a new food item (according to Rav Huna on 155a) or making a food item easier for an animal to eat (according to Rav Yehudah on 155a). (Even though cutting gourds is *not related* to the case of cutting a Neveilah for one's animal on Shabbos, nevertheless it was placed in this Mishnah since this Mishnah discusses cutting things.)

According to this explanation, both Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah agree that one may cut gourds for one's animal on Shabbos.

OPINIONS: The Mishnah explains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon argue about feeding an animal which died on Shabbos to a dog. According to the Gemara, they argue whether or not something that was fit for man at the beginning of Shabbos is considered fit for dogs as well.

Rebbi Yehudah says that something which was fit for man is considered Muktzah for animals. When do we apply this prohibition? It is obvious that bread, for example, which is fit for man, may be handled in order to give it to animals, and it is not considered Muktzah with regard to giving it to animals.

(a) RASHI explains that any item that will be fit for man to eat *after* Shabbos but is not fit for man to eat on Shabbos is considered Muktzah with regard to giving it to animals, since it cannot be used for man at the present. However, if it can be eaten on Shabbos by man and is not Muktzah for him, it may be moved for either man or animal. For this reason, a live chicken or cow or similar animal which will not be eaten on Shabbos (because it cannot be slaughtered on Shabbos) but will be slaughtered the next day, is Muktzah. It may not even be given to dogs, alive or dead, according to Rebbi Yehudah (see previous Insight).

(b) The BA'AL HA'ME'OR (142b) and the RITVA explain that something which is or will be fit to be eaten by man -- even if it cannot be eaten on Shabbos (for example, it needs to be cooked) -- is *not* considered Muktzah with regard to giving it to animals. Only if it became *unfit* for man at some point during Shabbos does it become Muktzah with regard to giving it to animals, because it is considered Nolad, since before Shabbos it was fit even for man and on Shabbos it became unfit for him. Even though it is still fit for dogs, it is considered to be a new entity which came into existence on Shabbos, and is Muktzah for both man and animals. (According to Rashi, this may not be considered "Muchan l'Adam...," but rather simply "Nolad," see Rashi 29a DH Achlan.)