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1)

(a) According to Munbaz, even if he is aware both of the sin, and of the Chiyuv Chatas, he will be called a Shogeg as long as he does not know about the Chiyuv Korban.

(b) The Rabbanan maintain that lack of knowledge of the Korban alone, does not make one a Shogeg - and he will not be Chayav a Korban - unless he is also unaware of the Chiyuv Kares.

(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, the Rabbanan will obligate a Korban even if the transgressor was unaware of the Chiyuv Kares (even though he was a Meizid on the La'av. Whereas according to Resh Lakish, he must also be a Shogeg on the La'av as well.

(b) Resh Lakish learns this from "Asher Lo Se'asenah ve'Ashem".

(c) Rebbi Yochanan quotes the opinion of Rebbi Shimon in a Beraisa, who learns from , "Asher Lo Se'asenah" - that only someone who would have desisted, had he known that he was sinning, is obligated to bring a Chatas - but not an apostate (who would have proceeded to sin anyway). The Tana Kama learns this from "me'Am ha'Aretz".

(a) The Tana saw fit to write that there are thirty-nine Melachos, to teach us how many Chata'os someone who transgresses all the Melachos in one He'elam, is Chayav to bring.

(b) The Mishnah must be speaking about Zadon Shabbos ve'Shigegas Melachos, in order to be Chayav *thirty-nine* Chata'os; since we have already learnt that for Shigegas Shabbos and Zadon Melachos, one is only Chayav *one* Chatas.

(c) Resh Lakish explains Zadon Shabbos to pertain to the prohibition of Techum Shabbos, which is not one of the thirty-nine Melachos, but is nevertheless an Isur d'Oraysa - according to Rebbi Akiva.

(d) The Tana who is Mechayev a Chatas for the Shigegas Korban alone, is Munbaz.

(a) When Abaye says that *everyone agrees* that by a Shevu'as Bituy, one is only Chayav if one Shogeg on the La'av, he is referring to Rebbi Yochanan, who does not require Shigegas La'av, by cases of Chiyuv Kares.

(b) Abaye cannot be referring to Munbaz - to say that Munbaz will agree that here, it will not suffice to be Shogeg on the Korban alone, unless he is also a Shogeg on the La'av. Because why should that be necessary? Now that, by cases of Kares, where the Korban is *not* a Chidush, Munbaz holds that Shogag be'Korban is called a Shogeg, how much more so by Shevu'as Bituy, where it *is* (since the Korban comes even when there is no Kares)?

(c) The Chidush of Abaye is that here, although the Korban is a Chidush, he will not be called a Shogeg by being a Shagag be'Korban, until he becomes a Shagag be La'av.

(d) The author of the Beraisa which obligates someone who was Shogag be'Korban by Shevu'as Bituy, is Munbaz, who holds that Shigegas Korban is called a Shogeg.

5)

(a) A Shigegas Shevu'as Bituy in the future is straightforward: it speaks when, at the time when he came to break the Shevu'ah, he forgot that he made it. But a Shevu'as Bituy in the past, presents us with problem: what is it that he forgot? If he forgot - at the time when he swore - that he did *not* eat, but believed that he *did*, then he would not be Chayav, because of the Pasuk in Vayikra "ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah", from which we learn that a person is only Chayav if he is aware of the facts when he makes the Shevu'ah.

(b) According to the Rabbanan, one is not Chayav a Korban for a Shevu'as Bituy in the past, only in the future.

(c) The second Lashon contends that if the author of the Beraisa was Munbaz, there would be no inherent Chidush in the Beraisa, since it is obvious that, by Shevu'as Bituy, where the Korban is a Chidush, that, according to Munbaz, Shagag be'Korban is called a Shogeg (as we discussed earlier). But this is not a Kashya, because it is necessary to inform us that Shevu'as Bituy is different than all other cases - even according to Munbaz, inasmuch as, by all other cases, one is a Shogeg whether he was Shagag be'Korban or Shagag be'La'av; whereas here, Shagag be'La'av is not called a Shogeg (because of "ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah"), *only* Shagag be'Korban.

(a) According to Abaye, we might have said that, according to Rebbi Yochanan, the Shagag be'Chiyuv Misah (bi'Yedei Shamayim) will be sufficient to render him a Shogeg (like Shagag be'Kares by those cases where there is a Chiyuv Kares).

(b) Rav indeed says that 'Misah bi'Mekom Kares Omedes, ve'Chomesh bi'Mekom Korban Ka'i', and one will be Chayav the extra fifth for Shagag be'Misah, in the same way as one is Chayav a Korban when one is Shagag be'Kares.

(a) Someone who loses track of the days, could observe Shabbos either by counting six days from the day he realizes his dilemna, and by observing the seventh day as Shabbos; or he could count the day on which he realized, and observe the following day as Shabbos. Either way, he would then continue to observe every seventh day as Shabbos.

(b) The former suggestion (which is the conclusive one) is based on the creation of the world, where Shabbos followed the six days of the creation, the latter, the creation of Adam, who was created on Friday, and observed the following day as Shabbos.

(c) Had the Tana held that Shabbos follows the day that he realized his dilemna, he should have said 'Meshamer Yom Echad, u'Moneh Shishah' rather than 'Meshamer Echad le'Shishah'.

(a) As far as Melachah as concerned, there is absolutely no difference between his Shabbos and the other six days: He is permitted to do whatever is necessary for his survival - even on his Shabbos, whereas what is *not* necessary, is forbidden even on the other days of the week. (Regarding walking beyond the Techum Shabbos - refer to Tosfos DH 'Oseh'.)

(b) The practical difference between the days, is regarding Kidush and Havdalah, which he recites on his Shabbos, but not on the other six days.

(c) The Gemara rejects the contention that he does nothing at all on his Shabbos, and a double quota of work on the previous day, on the grounds that he cannot possibly do more than he needs to, to keep alive on any day, since that day might be Shabbos.

(a) If he was able to recall how many days before he had entered the dessert, he may treat that day as a regular week-day, since he knows with certainty that he would not have entered the desert on a Shabbos. Consequently, every subsequent seventh day is permitted.

(b) The Gemara initially assumed that just as we can take for granted that he would not have entered the desert on Shabbos, likewise, we can take for granted that he would not have entered it on Friday either. In that case, he should be permitted to treat both every seventh and every eighth day as week-days.

(c) The Gemara rejects this contention however, because it may have happened that a caravan left on Friday, and he took the opportunity and booked a seat on it.

(a) "ve'Shamru B'nei Yisrael es ha'Shabbos" suggests one Shemirah for many Shabbasos - implying that sometimes one is obligated to bring only one Korban for the many Shabbasos that he transgressed. "ve'es Shabsosai Tishmoru" suggests one Shemirah for many Shabbasos - implying that one is Chayav one Korban for each and every Shabbos.

(b) Alternatively, the first Pasuk implies one Korban for each Shabbos, and the second, one Korban for many Shabbasos.
Either way, these two Pesukim serve as the basis for the first and second case in our Mishnah ('Kol ha'Shochei'ach Ikar Shabbos' etc. and 'Shigegas Shabbos ve'Zadon Melachos' respectively).