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Yevamos, 5

1) EXPOUNDING "SEMUCHIN" TO TEACH "ASEH DOCHEH LO TA'ASEH"

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" at length. It proposes that the source that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh is derived from the proximity of the prohibition of wearing Kil'ayim with the command to make Tzitzis for one's garment. The proximity (Semuchin) of those two verses teaches that one may place threads of wool in a garment of linen in order to make Tzitzis, the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis thereby being Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.

The Gemara concludes that this is a valid source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" according to d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael. According to d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael, there is an extra phrase in the verse of Kil'ayim which gives us license to apply Semuchin and to learn that the Aseh of Tzitzis is Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim. According to the Rabanan, however, there is no extra phrase (because they require the phrase "Tzemer u'Pishtim" to teach that the Isur of Kil'ayim applies only to a mixture of wool and linen and not to any other mixture). Hence the Gemara asks that according to the Rabanan, what is the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," since we can only apply Semuchin if there is an extra phrase.

What is the Gemara's question? Only Rebbi Yehudah requires that there be an extra phrase ("Mufneh") in order to expound Semuchin -- the Rabanan who argue with d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael can simply hold like the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Yehudah and do not require an extra phrase in order to expound Semuchin!

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH l'Rabanan) says that the Gemara is just asking this question to cover all possibilities, just in case the Rabanan hold like Rebbi Yehudah.

(b) The RITVA (and ME'IRI) answers that the Rabanan -- who argue with Rebbi Yehudah and apply Semuchin even when there is no extra phrase -- do not go so far as to extend the law derived from Semuchin to other cases through a Binyan Av, unless there is an extra phrase. When there is no extra phrase, the law derived through Semuchin applies only to the specific case mentioned in the verse, and cannot be applied to other cases.

(c) TOSFOS HA'ROSH in the name of RABEINU MEIR explains that even if the Rabanan hold that we do expound Semuchin, perhaps in this case the Semuchin does not teach us that one is able to put Tzitzis of wool on a garment on linen. Perhaps according to the Rabanan (who do not rule that any time the verse says "Beged" it refers to Tzemer and Pishtim only) the Semuchin teaches a different Halachah altogether -- the Halachah of Rava, that Tzitzis of wool or linen may be used for a garment of any material (while Tzitzis made of any other material may only be used for a garment made of the same material), but Tzitzis of linen may not be used for a garment of wool, but only for a garment of linen (or another non-wool material).

QUESTION: The Gemara cites the verse, "Rosho" ("On the seventh day he shall shave off all of his hair, [and the hair of] *his head*") (Vayikra 14:9), and says that it teaches that the Mitzvas Aseh for a Metzora to shave his hair is Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of cutting off the hair of the corners of one's head ("Hakafas ha'Rosh"). The Gemara suggests that this is the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." The Gemara (5b) concludes that there is another source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" -- the verses that teach that the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis is Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.

If we have a source, without the verse of "Rosho," that teaches that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh, then why do we need the verse of "Rosho" at all? We already know that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh, and thus we should simply apply that principle to the situation of a Metzora who has a Mitzvas Aseh to shave his entire head, even though there is a Lo Ta'aseh that prohibits shaving one's entire head. If an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh in the case of Tzitzis and Kil'ayim (where the Lo Ta'aseh applies to everyone), then certainly in the case of a Metzora -- where the Lo Ta'aseh against shaving the entire head does not apply to everyone (women are not included in the prohibition) -- the Aseh should be Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh! (The Gemara in Nazir 58a actually implies that according to the Tana of "Rosho," the source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" is *not* derived from the verses regarding Tzitzis, but from the word "Rosho" in this verse. Our Sugya, however, clearly rejects this approach.)

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH Mah l'Lav) answers that the verse of "Rosho" is needed to teach another Halachah, and not the Halachah of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." It teaches that shaving the entire head is considered "Hakafah" ("Hakafas ha'Rosh Shmei Hakafah") and it would have been prohibited had it not been for the Mitzvas Aseh.

(b) Alternatively, without the verse of "Rosho," we might have thought that the second verse quoted by the Gemara, the verse of "Zekano," is not referring to the Mitzvah of a Kohen who was a Metzora to shave his hair, but rather it is referring to a regular person who was a Metzora, and it is not teaching a new Halachah of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh va'Aseh" in the case of a Kohen. We might have thought that the verse of "Zekano" is talking about a case where there is only a Lo Ta'aseh, and thus the Aseh is certainly Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh, and it is not talking about a case where there is both an Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh not to shave. However, now that we have the verse of "Rosho," we know that "Zekano" is referring to the case of a Kohen Metzora, and it is teaching that an Aseh is Docheh both an Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh.

5b

QUESTION: The Gemara searches for a source for the principle that "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kares." Since we find that the Torah went out of its way, in the case of Tzitzis made from Kil'ayim, to specifically teach that an Aseh is Docheh a normal Lo Ta'aseh (one that does not have Kares), we should be able to infer that an Aseh is *not* Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares! Why does the Gemara attempt to prove that an Aseh *is* Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares, when we apparently have evidence that it is *not* Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (6a, middle of DH Ta'ama) explains that we might have thought that perhaps the verse of Tzitzis does not teach that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh. The verse might be teaching the Halachah of Rava, that it is permitted to use Tzitzis of wool or linen for a garment of any type of material (according to the Rabanan, and for both woolen and linen garments according to Rebbi Yishmael, who holds that only those garments are obligated in Tzitzis.) Without the verse, one would have thought that Tzitzis must be made of the same material from which the garment is made. That is why the Gemara thought that perhaps we do not expound the verse of Tzitzis with regard to Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh. Thus, we are free to find another source that says that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares.

(b) TOSFOS suggests further that perhaps the Aseh of Tzitzis is a weaker Aseh, because it does not apply to everyone (women are exempt from the Mitzvah of Tzitzis). Therefore, we need a verse to teach that nonetheless it is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh (of Kil'ayim). (This answer does not explain why the Gemara thought that it could learn from Milah that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares; Milah is also a Mitzvah that does not apply to everyone, and yet it is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares, and if so, certainly the Mitzvah of Tzitzis should be able to be Docheh a normal Lo Ta'aseh.)