ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 36
YEVAMOS 36 & 37 - sponsored by Hagaon Rav Yosef Pearlman of London, a living
demonstration of love for and adoration of the Torah.
(a) According to the Beraisa that we just learned, the Tzarah is forbidden
to get married, because the baby may live - implying that if we knew that
the baby will die, she would be permitted (proving that the Chalitzah of a
Me'uberes is valid (a Kashya on Resh Lakish)!
(b) Resh Lakish amends the Beraisa to read 'Shema *Lo* Yehei ha'V'lad ben
Kayama, u'Bi'as Me'uberes *Lo* Sh'mah Bi'ah, va'Chalitzas Me'uberes *Lo*
Sh'mah Chalitzah'. The Tana nevertheless need to add the fact that the baby
does not exempt (from Yibum and Chalitzah) until it is born - because
otherwise, we would go after the majority of women, who give birth to a baby
that lives, permitting her to marry anticipating that this will be the case.
(c) Rebbi Elazar was impressed with Resh Lakish's opinion - which explains
why he set out to find a Mishnah in support of it.
(a) The Mishnah in ha'Ishah Basra says that a woman whose husband and Tzarah
went overseas, and they came and told her that her husband had died - may
neither get married nor make Yibum, in case the Yevamah is pregnant?
(b) Rebbi Elazar attempts to vindicate Resh Lakish from there - because
(whereas Yibum is understandable, seeing as the baby may live, in which case
she have transgressed the Isur of Eishes Ach) why should she not make
Chalitzah, unless the Tana holds that the Chalitzah of a pregnant woman or
her Tzarah is not valid (like Resh Lakish)?
(c) Even Rebbi Yochanan will agree that the woman is forbidden to get
married, even after performing Chalitzah - within nine months, in case the
baby lives, and, as we learned above, the baby does not exempt the Yevamah
from Yibum until it is born.
(d) The text 'Tachlotz be'Toch Sheloshah ve'Tinasei le'Achar Sheloshah' is
unacceptable - because how can we permit her to marry after three months,
when the baby may well live, and we just learned that if that is so, it is
only the baby that will permit her to get married, but only from the moment
that he is born?
(a) We reject Rebbi Elazar's proof on the grounds that even Resh Lakish
would be forced to agree that, strictly speaking, it should be possible for
the woman to marry after nine months. In that case, why should she not
perform Chalitzah before nine months and get married after nine months?
(b) The Tana's reason for forbidding her to do so - is because of Abaye and
Chinena, the sons of Avin, who explained that perhaps the baby will live, in
which case, the Chalitzah will be invalidated retroactively, and she will
require a public announcement to permit her to marry a Kohen. The problem
with this is that there may be people who were present at the Chalitzah but
not at the announcement, and, if we subsequently permit her to marry, those
people will think that a Chalutzah may marry a Kohen.
(c) Abaye rejects even this explanation, establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi
Yochanan - by pointing out that the Beraisa says nothing about not
performing Chalitzah, only marriage and Yibum; so who said that the Yevamah
is forbidden to perform Chalitzah (like Rebbi Yochanan)?
(d) We finally quote a Beraisa that vindicates Resh Lakish. The Beraisa says
that a Yavam who performs Chalitzah with a Me'uberes, and who then loses her
baby - still requires Chalitzah from the brothers.
(a) In addition to our case, Rava quotes two other cases where the Halachah
is like Resh Lakish against Rebbi Yochanan.
(b) One of the two cases concerns someone who distributes his property among
his children. The Mishnah in Bava Basra makes a distinction between whether
he uses a Lashon of Yerushah - in which case the distribution is invalid,
or whether he does not - in which case it is.
(c) As long as he mentions Matanah, the Tana adds, the distribution stands
(even though the basic text of the Sh'tar is one of Yerushah) - and it makes
no difference in which part of the Sh'tar he mentions it, at the beginning,
in the middle or at the end.
(d) In the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan (in Bava Basra), as long as the father
mentions Matanah once, the entire distribution stands. Resh Lakish however,
says - that the distribution only stands if the Lashon of Matanah pertains
to each person.
(a) The third case where Rava rules like Resh Lakish concerns a Mishnah in
Bava Kama which states 'ha'Kosev Kol Nechasav li'V'no le'Achar Moso' -
meaning that he writes 'from today and until after my death' bequeathing all
his property to his son immediately, but retaining the 'Peiros' (all current
benefits) for himself until then.
The Tana of our Mishnah considers the son's sale valid from the time of the
father's death, says Rebbi Yochanan, only because the son is still alive,
and the son sold any rights that he would later obtain (which he did when
his father died).
(b) Neither of them is permitted to sell the property as long as the father
is still alive.
(c) If ...
1. ... the father did sell the property - the sale is valid (i.e. the
Peiros) until his death.
(d) If the son sold it during his father's life-time and then died, Rebbi
Yochanan maintains that the sale is not valid (even after the father's
death), whereas according to Resh Lakish, it is. The reason of ...
2. ... the son sold it - the sale will take effect only after his father's
1. ... Rebbi Yochanan is because - he holds (the) 'Kinyan Peiros (of the
father) ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', thereby rendering his son's sale invalid.
2. ... Resh Lakish is because, in his opinion - 'Kinyan Peiros La'av
ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', so it does not interfere with the son's sale.
(a) The Seifa of our Mishnah rules that if, after the Yavam performed Yibum,
the baby turned out to be a still-born, he is permitted to remain with her.
Rebbi Eliezer disagrees - in his opinion, we obligate him to divorce her.
(b) We will learn later that a man is forbidden to marry a woman who is
pregnant from her previous husband, or who is feeding his baby, for a period
of twenty-four months. The Chachamim rule in a case where a man *did* marry
one of the above women - that he must send her away until the twenty-four
months expire, when he may take her back.
(c) Rava tries to equate Rebbi Meir, who says that he must divorce her and
may never take her back, with Rebbi Eliezer (in a.) - because they both hold
that the sinner deserves to get punished for entering into a Safek Isur
Eishes Ach or for marrying a woman who is forbidden to him.
(d) Abaye disagrees with Rava's equation.
1. Rebbi Eliezer's ruling might be confined to our Mishnah, he says, but
will not apply to the case of Rebbi Meir - where he only transgressed an
2. ... Rebbi Meir's ruling might well be confined to the Din of marrying a
woman who is pregnant from her previous husband, or who is feeding his baby
(which are de'Rabbanan), but not to our case - which is anyway an Isur
d'Oraysa, and do not require reinforcement (and we sometimes find that the
Chachamim were more stringent by *their* commands than they were by the
(a) The Chachamim of Rebbi Meir (in the Beraisa) obligate the man to send
his wife away ('Yotzi') but, after the twenty-four months have expired, he
may take her back. Rava interprets 'Yotzi' to mean - that he must give her a
(b) Mar Zutra actually infers this from the Lashon 'Yotzi' - when the Tana
could have said 'Yafrish' ('that he should separate').
(a) We infer from Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says in a Mishnah in Shabbos
'Kol she'Shahah be'Adam Sheloshim Yom, Eino Nefel' - that if the baby died
within thirty days, he is a Safek Nefel.
(b) The ramifications of this ruling with regard to the Din of Yibum - are
that, if the baby died within thirty days, his mother requires Chalitzah but
(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel's Din will not apply - in a case when we know
for sure that the baby is a ninth-month baby, in which case he is never a
(a) Ravina Amar Rava says that, if, in the above case, the baby died within
thirty days, and the mother accepted Kidushin from a man from the Shuk: if
her husband is a Yisrael, she requires Chalitzah, but if he is a Kohen (who
will subsequently be forbidden to take her back) - she does not.
(b) Rav Mesharshaya Amar Rava says - that, even if her husband is a Kohen,
she still requires Chalitzah.
(c) Ravina explained that - the night before, Rava had indeed said what Rav
Mesharshaya quoted him as saying; in the morning however, he retracted from
his initial stance, in the way that *he* had quoted him.
(d) When Ravina told him that, Rav Mesharshaya retorted - 'Having permitted
this case, may you go on to permit Cheilev, too'.